News and Press releases

The survey was commissioned by the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion.

Assessment of the situation 

• According to the survey, 67% of interviewed believe that things are headed in the right direction in Ukraine, 18% are of the opposite opinion and a further 15% could not assess. Although in all regions and among all age and property groups the assessment of the direction as the correct one continues to dominate, there are some differences. Estimates are somewhat lower relative to the average among residents of the southern and eastern regions, residents of villages, middle-aged people and the poorest.

• Believe in the Ukrainian Armed Forces (86%) and family and loved ones (61%) were the main factors that helped those surveyed remain stability during the war with Russia. One-third noted that such factor was daily work (31%), up to a quarter – faith in the state, religion, or belief in God. 12% said that participation in volunteering and fundraising, as well as international aid, contributed to their resilience.

Country Evaluation and its future

• An absolute majority of those surveyed (82%) consider Ukraine to be a successful state. Only 16% have the opposite view.  56% of the polled think that the main sign of a successful state is a strong army. One-third of them consider it to be a strong economy, the rule of law and unity of the society. 19% consider it to be the social protection of citizens and the country's international standing. By 14–16% each – modern science and technology, political stability, equal society and strong democratic institutions. 11% consider the national idea to be a factor of success.

• Assessments of the top priorities for the country's development after the war showed that the safety factor and social protection were dominant. 77% determined that the priority of development after the war in Ukraine should be the development of the military industry, the strengthening of borders and reforms. 70% considered a priority on the growth of salaries and pensions, access to healthcare, and financial aid to the low-income. Innovations in the state (new technologies, energy saving, science and education) are priorities for 44% of respondents.

• Most of those surveyed (58%) said that they were prepared to endure difficulties because of the war for several years to win. 11% said that they were prepared to endure it for about a year, and 12% for a few months. 11% of the interviewed were not prepared to tolerate hardship, the majority (23%) among the poorer strata of the population.

• Medicine (50%), military industry (46%), construction (43%), agriculture (38%) and education and science (34%) are the spheres of the economy that, according to respondents, should be developed first of all after the war in Ukraine. 23% believe that heavy industry and metallurgy should be the priority for development, and 15% - the IT sphere.

• Young people (50%) and military and veterans (46%) are the categories of the population that, according to the majority of respondents, will contribute the most to the effective development of Ukrainian society in the future. 30% of respondents believe that they should be scientists, and innovators, 26% - are volunteers, 25% - are entrepreneurs of small and medium–sized businesses, 16% - are public figures, and 13% - are politicians and heads of large businesses, and enterprises. 8% each consider representatives of local authorities or clergymen, and 6% consider journalists and bloggers.

Social distances

• Ukrainian-language people, residents of the European Union, settlers from other regions, and fellow citizens who were under occupation after February 24, 2022, are the group of persons who respondents are most willing to cooperate and interact with. Ukrainians who have left the country, Russian-speaking Ukrainians and residents of occupied Crimea are the groups with which the majority of the population is ready to collaborate. Russians who live in Ukraine less than half are ready to cooperate with, not ready - 49%. 30% are ready to work with the inhabitants of the so-called DNR/LNR, 63% - are not, 22% are willing to deal with the residents of Belarus, and 73% are not. 90% are not able to associate with the residents of Russia, and only 7% are ready. 

• The majority of respondents (over 75%) did not personally feel criticized or disapproved because of their political preferences, language of communication, belonging to a certain region, religious affiliation, or because of nationality. Despite this, 21% said that they had faced criticism over the past year because of their political preferences, 13% because of their primary language and 11% because of their religious identity. Only 8% were criticised because of their religious affiliation and 6% because of their nationality.

Assessment of institutional performance

• In general, respondents rate the performance of the central government relatively well (68% consider it effective) and of the local government (56% rate it as effective). 

• The Armed Forces of Ukraine (82%) is the institution that Ukrainians think is the most effective nowadays. The President of Ukraine is considered the most effective by 68% and volunteers by 59%. Other institutions are rated as the most effective by significantly fewer respondents. The Security Service of Ukraine is evaluated as such by 38%, public organizations - 27%, national police - 19%, mayors/village heads - 16%, church, regional military administration, government, and nationwide media - 13-15% each, local media - 7%. The last positions in this assessment are authorities of the prosecutor's office (5%) and the courts (4%).

Interaction with local authorities

• In general, most people surveyed consider the efforts made by local citizens (71%), authorities (55%), and businesses (50%) for solving important issues of your community, town/village as sufficient. The evaluations are also relatively good in the temporal dimension: half of the respondents consider the cooperation between the residents of your town/village and the local authorities to be sufficient to solve important issues of your community at the present time and before the full-scale invasion of Russia (the opposite view is about 40%). In the future, 65% see such interaction as efficient. Only 13% do not believe in its effectiveness. 

• According to the respondents, fighting against corruption (51%) is the main priority, where the local authorities should direct their efforts. Solution of economic and communal problems and military assistance are seen as priorities of local authorities by 32-34%. Reconstruction of damaged infrastructure was seen as a priority by 25% of those polled, arrangement of shelters by 21%, assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) by 18%, support for small and medium-sized businesses by 17%, improvement of pre-school and secondary education by 14%, social protection by 12%, transparency of government performance by 11%. 

• At the same time, respondents praised the effectiveness of local authorities in the following areas: helping refugees and IDPs (43%), solving economic and communal problems (29%), helping the army (29%), and rebuilding damaged infrastructure (21%).

Participation in community life

• Over the last year, 69% have not participated in NGO activities and movements that address important issues for your community, town/village and 31% - took part in this. 43% volunteer occasionally, and 6% do it on a regular basis. 6% are planning to do so. 44% have not engaged in volunteering recently. 

• 82% of those surveyed express their willingness to become personally involved in important issues for your community, town or village in the future, while 16% are not. 

• 85% of interviewed say that people in their town/village community help each other (only 15% are contrary minded). 68% note that their community is prepared for emergencies. 27% are of the opposite opinion. The latter are relatively more numerous among the inhabitants of villages, middle-aged respondents and women.

The survey was conducted by the Rating Sociological Group for the Rating Lab Research Laboratory. The release and presentation were prepared by Rating Lab. For questions regarding the results of this study, please contact the director of the Rating Lab research laboratory, Doctor of Psychology, Professor Marianna Tkalich: Tel.: +38 (050) 322-09-25 (WhatsApp, Signal), e-mail: tkalych@ratinggroup.ua

INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITIES

The comparison of opportunities in various spheres included areas in which women have always faced restrictions, which can be divided into:

• subjective (self-discrimination and self-restriction of women, gender stereotypes, sexism, prejudice, the “glass ceiling” for women's career growth, the “maternity track”);

• objective (lack of access to political activity, voting rights; access to education and, accordingly, to careers and jobs that require qualifications and offer the opportunity to earn more; difficulties in finding work, opening bank accounts, obtaining loans, etc.).

Objective reasons can now be eliminated to a greater extent, but subjective reasons continue to have a significant impact: political activity in Ukraine remains male-dominated, with women having fewer opportunities and only partially able to claim equality. Career growth also gives a third of men more opportunities, while women can only partially count on equality, rather than advantages for their gender (only 7% believe that women have carte blanche in their careers). Remuneration is a more objective phenomenon: its amount is more often determined not by gender, but by the pay scale and official salary, especially in the public sector, so there is equal opportunity here – 61%.

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Gender and gender differences do not exist on their own as separate personality traits or social phenomena. They are always combined with other important characteristics, such as age and class (social status, employment, income level, etc.). Our study allows us to trace the differences between men and women of different ages and social status (through employment).

Men of all ages see less inequality than women, which is natural because inequality does not affect them. What women see as a lack of opportunities, men can explain by other reasons. Women are more critical: young women see significant limitations for women in political activity and career growth (because this is the age for career development, which is a sensitive issue for them). Women aged 51+ see significant inequalities in pay and political activity. The pensions of women in this group are usually lower than those of men, and therefore there is a significant gap: 20% fewer women than men of this age see equality of opportunity.  

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Middle-aged women and men recognize the least inequality, and the gap in assessments is also smaller: women rate equality in pay (68%) higher than men (61%). This is a period of maturity, social and professional achievements, when children are usually more independent and require less attention, so women have more time and opportunities, and therefore the balance is better in this age group.

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Women's political activity in all age groups is assessed as an area of inequality, unlike men, who believe that women have sufficient equal opportunities in this area.

Working women are more critical in their assessment of career opportunities, income, and political activity than women who do not work, because they have their own real experience rather than assumptions about these issues. Working men, on the other hand, assess women's opportunities more positively than men who do not work, again based on their own experience. Therefore, experience and its assessment are subjective. Pensioners' perceptions are linked not only to their change in status, but also to their age: women of retirement age traditionally see more inequality in these areas because they experience it the most and have more traditional views on gender role distribution.

Over the past two years, the situation with gender equality has improved, especially in terms of pay. Less so in terms of career growth and political activity. However, women still do not have greater opportunities than men in these areas and have even lost the preferences they had in 2021 in politics and career growth.

March 2021 is the period of the Covid-19 pandemic, June 2023 is the second year of full-scale war. Both are destabilizing factors. However, war is also a time of opportunity: significant changes in the economic and social landscape, internal and external migration, the emergence of new and restructuring of traditional areas of professional activity, changes in the requirements for competence and soft skills of people in politics and in the workplace. War, as a crisis event of the highest order, accelerates changes in the gender division of labor and vertical and horizontal segregation, which are already gradually disappearing over time.

Over the past two years, women have seen fewer positive changes in terms of opportunities than men, and they are generally more critical in their assessment of gender equality. For them, there have been positive changes since 2021, but for men, these changes are much more noticeable: 68% consider pay conditions to be equal, and 65% consider career opportunities to be equal. It is likely that the changes that have taken place in recent years are significant for men, as women are increasingly entering areas that were previously male-dominated, while women's expectations still exceed the reality of their situation in these areas.

ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN

The assessment of women's opportunities is generally optimistic. These indicators can be divided into two areas:

• career and income

• protection, support, and security

The situation is best in terms of income and career opportunities. Greater access to military specialties is not far behind—women have been making their way into the Armed Forces since 2014, and February 2022 brought even more opportunities and opened the door to military service for women even wider. Political activity is still less accessible, but during wartime it is difficult to assess, as the state of war objectively restricts the rights and freedoms of citizens, including political rights, not only for women but for all citizens and political figures.

Protection, support, and safety are less secure for women, with the exception of support for motherhood, but this is not about gender equality, but about the traditional value of motherhood—this indicator is equally supported by people with different views on gender equality. The safety of public places for women is generally at a good level, but protection from domestic violence and, especially, sexual harassment still needs attention from both the public and the responsible authorities: more than a third of respondents rate women's safety as low. Relevant statistics from humanitarian and government organizations also confirm that the level of domestic violence against women is still high for a European country.

Military actions in Ukraine have also heightened awareness of the importance of security and care for women in particular, as they are a group at risk of military crimes such as rape.

Traditionally, men have a more positive view of the opportunities for career advancement and income, as well as the security and support that women receive, with one exception: access to military specialties—women are more confident about their access to this previously closed sphere. Support for motherhood does not differ in terms of gender.

Since men have more opportunities in terms of career and income and do not need additional support and security, they perceive the world as one that offers opportunities for everyone.

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Young people under 35 see more opportunities for women in terms of income and career, and partly in terms of access to political activity, because their age group has the following advantages: these are times of less pressure from gender stereotypes and gender social control, better education and access to it, greater economic and social freedom, and geographical mobility.

This also applies to the assessment of the safety of public places, which may be related to the more confident behavior of young people in such places, as well as the fact that public places are indeed becoming safer.

Older women see the least opportunities for women in general; this age group has had insufficient opportunities to take advantage of the changes in gender balance that we are seeing in the 21st century. This also applies to protection and safety—these women lived in a time when violence and harassment against women were tolerated rather than condemned.

The situation with career opportunities and income for women looks best for men under 35, followed closely by their female peers, who also rate access to military specialties most highly, as it is precisely for young women who choose a military career today. Men in this age group already have more egalitarian views, are free of some stereotypes, are more willing to share the male world and support women, believing that they need more protection and support. This generation is more humanistic, tolerant, individualistic, and hedonistic. They are more open and flexible in their perception of the world.

No linear trends related to gender and age have been observed, which also confirms that in times of change, all social transformations can be contradictory and uneven.

Men from rural areas are less likely than urban men to see opportunities for women in most areas. For rural residents, access to opportunities is generally more limited than for urban residents, and women from rural areas, as a group with less access to quality education and professions, may experience additional limitations from the perspective of men. At the same time, women from rural areas themselves assess opportunities more positively than women from urban areas, who may have higher expectations and are dissatisfied with the current level of opportunities for women. In addition, lifestyle and professional employment in rural areas may have a slightly different distribution of roles, which affects assessments.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE INTRODUCTION OF SEPARATE CARRIAGES FOR WOMEN

Despite heated discussions about separate carriages for women, most citizens support this initiative. Among women, of course, there were more supporters, but not significantly more. So, the fear that women would support this innovation and men would oppose it did not come true.

For 17% of both men and women, this issue is not worth paying attention to—they do not care whether such cars will be introduced or not. Thus, only 18% of men and 11% of women are actually opposed to separate carriages for women. Therefore, Ukrzaliznytsia's initiative is appropriate and has received public approval.

This also indirectly determines the willingness to accept change and not resist it — a sign of flexible, adaptive societies. Because this is not just about train cars, but about change in general, new practices, and society's attitude toward the new and unfamiliar. Ukrainian society is ready to support the new.

The existence of separate carriages for women is not considered discriminatory – 77% believe that such carriages do not discriminate against anyone. This is not discrimination against either men or women, and separate carriages are not perceived as a violation or restriction of rights. It is not perceived as mistrust of men or unjustified preference for women. Only 11% of men perceived this as discrimination against themselves, but 6% of them noted that it also discriminates against women. Among women, there are understandably fewer such responses.  

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These figures seem reasonable, as women's safety and protection from domestic violence and sexual harassment are rated lower than anything related to income and career. There is an understanding in society that safety issues still need to be addressed, and carriages are one of the practical measures to improve the safety of public spaces for women.

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RESUME

Today, women around the world are becoming increasingly visible in all areas traditionally reserved for men, as well as in matters concerning their own needs. The narrative that a person is a man and everything else is secondary is gradually changing, with women now having a voice, preferences, achievements, and opportunities.  

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Both perceptions and the actual state of affairs regarding women's opportunities in career development, remuneration, and political activity have been transforming over the past decades. In Ukraine, gender balance and equality, as well as the “visibility” of women in traditionally male-dominated spheres, are now perceived more consciously, and the situation is gradually improving—women's opportunities are expanding.  However, legislative changes, additional attention to transparency in remuneration, the introduction of objective, unbiased practices for evaluating candidates for positions, and the adaptation of the world of work, politics, and military affairs to people who can be anyone, not just men, would contribute to improving the situation.

Women in Ukraine are still underrepresented in political activities: in parliament, local government, and government positions—and this is confirmed by the results of the study: politics is the area with the fewest opportunities for women in Ukraine. Military professions are considered more accessible to women today, but this is a trend that changes in wartime, when such professions and those who are ready to defend the country are given the green light.

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The assessment of opportunities for women in Ukraine varies depending on gender, age, social status, and employment. Men assess opportunities more positively, while women are more critical, because gender inequality affects women in particular, and their level of expectations is still higher than the opportunities that modern Ukrainian society can offer them.  Women themselves have different views on their opportunities and perceive different social norms differently, so the female group is also significantly different in its views, for example, depending on age: the views of young women under 35 and women over 51 are sometimes very different.

Support for motherhood in Ukraine is perceived as sufficient because motherhood as a traditional value is important to people with different views on gender equality, balance, and opportunities. Protection from sexual and domestic violence is still an area of growth for Ukraine, which became particularly acute during the war and showed how vulnerable women really are.  

Issues of safety for women in public places, protection from domestic and sexual violence, and care for motherhood are important aspects of gender equality and women's well-being. In recent years, many countries have adopted legislation and implemented policies aimed at preventing violence against women and ensuring their safety in public places, as studies have shown that public spaces are not safe.

This includes installing surveillance cameras, providing safety education, ensuring awareness of women's rights and opportunities, and creating safe spaces for them. Ukraine has also joined this process by launching separate women's carriages on Ukrzaliznytsia, which has been approved and supported by the public.  

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As a result, career and income issues are now being addressed more effectively and are perceived by the public as more gender-balanced, although women still tend to be more critical of their opportunities. The safety, protection, and care of women require greater attention from the state, non-governmental organizations, and foundations, especially during wartime and in overcoming the consequences of psychological trauma on society and vulnerable groups, which primarily include pregnant women, young mothers, and elderly women, who are most in need of new measures.

As part of the twenty-second wave of the project “Ukraine in War Conditions,” the Rating Sociological Group conducted another survey of public sentiment and the economic situation on June 1-2, 2023.

Assessment of the situation

• According to the survey results, 71% of respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction, 13% believe the opposite, and another 16% were unable to assess the situation. As in the summer of last year, there is currently a slight decrease in the number of those who assess the direction of the country's development as correct, and an increase in the number of those who are undecided in their assessments. In all regions and among all age groups, the assessment of the direction as correct continues to dominate. 

• The vast majority of respondents (95%) are confident that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack. As in previous months, about 60% said that it would take a long time to win the war: 25% believe it will take more than a year, and 37% believe it will take six months to a year. At the same time, almost 20% estimate that victory will take several months, and another 20% are currently unable to answer. There has been an increase in the number of those who estimate the time needed to win as long (more than a year).  The largest number of such respondents are among the youngest, aged 18-35 (38%). 

Economic situation

• 59% felt that their economic situation had worsened over the past six months, 35% said it had not changed, and only 6% felt it had improved. Assessments of the situation in Ukraine as a whole are worse: 75% felt it had worsened, 14% said there had been no change, and 8% said it had improved. Despite this, when talking about the country's economy in the future, respondents have more positive expectations: 35% expect improvement, 28% think that nothing will change, and 26% expect deterioration.  Regarding their personal situation, 31% hope that their personal economic situation will improve next year, 39% believe that it will not change, and 17% are pessimistic about this.

• Although the number of those who felt an improvement did not increase in terms of dynamics, negative assessments decreased slightly compared to the situation a year ago (from 75% in July 2022 to 59% now) due to an increase in the category of those who report no change. Negative assessments of the situation in Ukraine have also decreased (from 36% to 26%), along with an increase in the number of those who have not noticed any changes. Also, in terms of future expectations for themselves and the country, there has been an increase in the number of those who expect stability and a decrease in those who expect deterioration.

• The best assessments of their own economic situation are observed among residents of the west, younger respondents, those who are employed, and especially those who have found a new job. Almost the same trends are observed in assessments of the future. However, there are no significant differences in assessments of Ukraine's economy among demographic groups.

Assessment of opportunities

• In terms of economic opportunities, respondents rated the possibility of achieving success somewhat higher (41%), although 26% of respondents indicated that such opportunities were lacking. Also, 36% rated the possibility of finding a job highly, 40% rated it as average, and another 23% rated it as low. The possibility of having a stable income and engaging in entrepreneurship was rated somewhat worse: about 30% rated it positively, about 35% rated it as average, and 26% rated it negatively. The most pessimistic assessment was given to the opportunity to pursue a career in Ukraine today—33% believe that there is no or practically no such opportunity, although another 28% rated it as average, and 32% rated it positively.

• Over the past year, assessments of opportunities to engage in entrepreneurship and find a job have increased. Assessments of career opportunities have remained virtually unchanged, while those of income and success have deteriorated slightly due to an increase in mediocre assessments and a decrease in positive ones.

• Men, young people, and those who are fully employed have a more positive assessment of all opportunities. Pensioners do not see economic opportunities for themselves in Ukraine today. Also, those who work part-time have a significantly worse assessment of the possibility of having a stable salary (even worse than those who are not employed) — they have felt the decrease in income the most.

Internal migration

• The number of respondents who were forced to leave their place of permanent residence has remained almost unchanged – today it is 18%. The largest number of displaced persons are from the eastern macro-region – more than 60% of them have changed their place of residence.

• 75% of displaced persons express their intention to return home: 12% in the near future, 14% want to return but will wait, and 49% will return after the war ends. At the same time, 19% said they would not return home, and this percentage is growing: compared to last summer, the number of those who do not plan to return has doubled.

Work

• 41% of those who worked before the war are working in their usual jobs, 14% are working part-time, and 13% have found new jobs. Despite this, a third of those surveyed are still unemployed. The number of those who have found new jobs has increased over time. The employment situation is better for men and middle-aged people. Among IDPs, there has been a significant increase in the number of those who have been able to find new jobs—one in three of them has found new employment, and the proportion of unemployed among them has decreased from half to one-third.

Attitudes toward switching to the new church calendar

• 63% of respondents support switching to the new church calendar, 18% oppose the idea, and another 17% say they don't care either way.

• The transition has the most supporters among residents of the west (78%) and especially among Greek Catholics (92%). Among parishioners of the OCU/UOC (KP), more than 60% also support this initiative. Support for the transition is slightly lower among residents of the eastern and southern regions, but even there, about half support it. Although most parishioners of the UOC (MP) oppose this initiative (35%), more than 40% of them support the transition. Younger people and non-believers are generally not concerned about this issue.

• Support for the transition to the new church calendar (which also includes the transfer of Christmas) is higher than support for the transfer of Christmas was in December last year: in December, 44% supported moving Christmas to December 25 and 31% did not, while now 63% support the transition to the new calendar and 18% do not.

The study was commissioned by the Independent Defence Anti-Corruption Committee (NAKO) and supported by the 'Ukrainian Veterans Foundation' under the Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine. This document was created as part of a project funded by the UK's SDA. The Independent Defence Anti-Corruption Committee is responsible for the content of this publication. The publication cannot be considered to reflect the position of the Government of the United Kingdom. The report also uses data from nationwide surveys conducted by the 'Rating' Sociological Group, 'Ukraine During the War. The Image of Veterans in Ukrainian Society' (Wave I – August 6-7, 2022; Wave II – January 14-16, 2023).

• In general, there is a positive attitude in society towards all categories of people currently serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However, the most vulnerable group to discrimination remains LGBTQ+ representatives, while women and former convicts face a moderate risk, and national minorities encounter almost no prejudice.

WOMEN IN SERVICE

• The service of women in the AFU reflects gradual changes in society—support for gender equality is growing, and the stereotype of women's inability to hold leadership roles is fading. However, over 40% of the population still considers motherhood to be a woman's main duty, although young people aged 18–29 most resolutely reject such notions.
• Everyday problems during service remain relevant. Despite some improvements thanks to volunteers, women face difficulties with securing uniforms, ammunition, and medical aid, a lack of proper living conditions, as well as limited opportunities for career advancement and skills development, which is exacerbated by the reliance on the attitude of the command staff.
• Men generally notice discrimination in the AFU less often, and carriers of 'traditional' values are more likely to support stereotypes, assigning 'feminine' roles to women. At the same time, the key factors in changing the situation remain the number of women in the military, the growth of gender equality in society, and the position of commanders who set the corporate culture and can promote egalitarian approaches.

LGBTQ+ SERVICE IN THE AFU

• Attitudes toward LGBTQ+ individuals in the AFU are gradually improving, especially after 2022, yet over 40% of respondents acknowledge that discrimination exists. There are no formal restrictions regarding salaries or career advancement, but jokes, prejudice, and bullying are common. Openness (coming out) is only possible under supportive command, which ultimately determines the level of acceptance and protection.
• The perception of discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals in the AFU is gradually decreasing among men. However, homophobia, toxic masculinity, and the fear of "losing manliness" persist within the male environment. Rank-and-file soldiers demonstrate tolerance more often, while overt homophobes can be found among commanders, even though they acknowledge that professionalism is more important than orientation. The majority supports the right of the partners of LGBTQ+ service members to receive the body of the deceased.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE AFU

• Discrimination against national minorities in the AFU is barely recorded. The attitude toward service members of other nationalities is mostly positive or neutral, even towards Russians serving in the ranks of the AFU. Isolated doubts arise regarding the ability of minority representatives to command Ukrainians, but the overall position is: "Anyone who fights for Ukraine is one of us."

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CONVICTED VETERANS AND VETERAN WOMEN IN THE AFU

• Discrimination against convicted veterans and veteran women in the AFU appears weaker than expected. Despite a generally prejudiced attitude toward former prisoners, the majority positively perceives those who have been pardoned and are serving after February 24, 2022, allowing only for restrictions on individuals with serious crimes and emphasizing the need for a thorough review of their conduct.

SOCIAL ISSUES

• Social issues remain problematic due to bureaucracy, queues, and chaos in the system for processing aid and certificates, especially for wounded service members. The key solutions are seen to be the introduction of electronic document management, similar to "Diia," the reduction of paper procedures, the reform of medical commissions, and better training of personnel for working with the military.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE‍

• Psychological assistance is one of the main needs of service members and veterans. Service often destroys family relationships, particularly for female service members with civilian husbands, and creates high levels of stress, PTSD, and depression. However, the psychological support system within the AFU is largely ineffective due to a shortage of specialists and low qualifications, which reinforces the need to reform the service and expand assistance to both service members and their families.

EXPECTATIONS FOR RETURNING TO CIVILIAN LIFE. PROBLEMS

• Expectations for returning to civilian life are associated with risks of family conflicts, unemployment, health problems, alcoholism, and psychological disorders. The key challenges will be social and psychological adaptation, employment, and rehabilitation. The state, along with society, foundations, and international organizations, must ensure comprehensive support for veterans.

The latest public opinion survey in Ukraine conducted by the International Republican Institute shows sustained confidence in President Zelensky, a surge in support for NATO membership, and a strong desire for Russia to pay for post-war reconstruction.   

   
•  82% of Ukrainians would support joining NATO if a referendum were held today. That is an increase of 10% from a poll in June 2022 and an increase of 23% from April 2022. 
   
• When asked about the activities of President Zelensky, 91% approved of his performance. 97% of Ukrainians believe they will win the war against Russia and 74% believe Ukraine will maintain all territories from within its internationally recognized borders defined in 1991.
   
• The poll shows that 54% feel that reconstruction decisions should be made by the citizens of affected cities and towns while 37% support local elected authorities making those decisions.  
   
• Furthermore, Ukrainians believe that Russia should pay for any postwar reconstruction. 89% said that Russian seized assets or payments should finance damaged infrastructure. 

 • According to a study conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, 44% of Kyiv residents left Kyiv in February-March 2022 immediately after the start of the war. More than half of them moved to another region of Ukraine, a third to another settlement in the Kyiv region, and one in ten abroad. The main audience of those who left were young people, women, and the more affluent.

• The main reason for choosing Kyiv as a place of residence among displaced persons currently living in Kyiv was the presence of relatives and close friends (45%). Other reasons include the opportunity to find work (26%) and the city's safety in wartime (22%). 8-9% said they like Kyiv and that there are many opportunities here to start a new life, while 5% said there are places available for temporary accommodation. For 4%, it did not matter where they went, and for another 2%, it was the decision of the organization responsible for resettlement.

• 17% of IDPs said that their homes, where they lived before the war, were destroyed and uninhabitable. For 24%, it was partially damaged, 2% said it was destroyed but has already been restored, and 35% said it remained unchanged. 21% said they had no information about the condition of their homes. IDPs from Donbas and older respondents reported more damage.

• Two-thirds of IDPs rent apartments in Kyiv, while another quarter live with relatives, friends, or acquaintances. Six to seven percent live in refugee centers, hotels, or hostels, 2% live in their own homes, and 1% live with other local residents.

• During the war, more than 60% of Kyiv residents surveyed reported a deterioration in their family's economic situation. For 30%, it remained unchanged, and for 4%, it improved. The economic situation among IDPs is somewhat worse: about 80% reported a deterioration, 14% said it remained unchanged, and 5% said it improved.

• Three-quarters of both Kyiv residents and IDPs were employed before the war. Currently, 60% of Kyiv residents are working as usual, 6% are working remotely, 7% are working reduced hours, and 7% are in new jobs. Almost 20% of Kyiv residents have lost their jobs.

• Among IDPs, 21% work as usual, 12% work remotely, 4% work reduced hours, and 17% have found new jobs. Currently, 45% of IDPs living in Kyiv are unemployed.

• Among Kyiv residents who have lost their jobs, about 40% plan to find employment in Kyiv in the near future. Among IDPs, this figure exceeds 60%. 

• 65% of Kyiv residents surveyed indicated that there was no tension in relations between IDPs and Kyiv residents, while about 20% said that there was tension. Among IDPs, nearly 80% noted that there was no tension in relations with locals, while about 20% noted that there was.

• 55% of Kyiv residents surveyed would welcome some IDPs remaining in the city to live and work, 35% were neutral, and 8% were opposed.

• 85% of Kyiv residents surveyed said they definitely associate their plans for the future with living in Kyiv, another 11% tend to associate them, and about 3% have no plans to stay in Kyiv.

• Among IDPs, 28% definitely associate their plans with Kyiv, while another 27% tend to associate them. About a third of IDPs do not plan to live in the capital in the future.

• About 90% of Kyiv residents and IDPs surveyed consider Kyiv a comfortable place to live. The opposite opinion is held by 9% of Kyiv residents and 6% of IDPs.. 

• Over the past year, Kyiv residents' assessments of the activities of local authorities, social and municipal services have improved significantly. In particular, 68% are satisfied with the activities of Kyiv Mayor V. Klitschko, while 22% are dissatisfied. Among IDPs, these figures are 65% and 9% respectively (a quarter are undecided).

• 21% of Kyiv residents are satisfied with the activities of Kyiv City Council Chairman Serhiy Popko, while 8% are dissatisfied (more than 60% are undecided). Among IDPs, these figures are 25% and 4% respectively (more than 70% are undecided)

• The activities of the Kyiv City Council were assessed positively by 50% of Kyiv residents and negatively by 24% (25% are undecided). Among IDPs, these figures are 50% and almost 10% respectively (more than 40% are undecided).

• Almost 70% of local residents are satisfied with Kyiv's municipal services (more than a quarter are dissatisfied). Among IDPs, more than 80% are satisfied and almost 15% are dissatisfied.

• More than half of Kyiv residents surveyed are satisfied with social services, while 17% are dissatisfied (a third are undecided). Among IDPs, almost 70% are satisfied, 17% are dissatisfied (15% are undecided).

• More than 80% of Kyiv residents are satisfied with public transport services, while more than 10% are dissatisfied. Among IDPs, these figures are 86% and 8%, respectively.

• More than 60% of Kyiv residents are satisfied with the activities of the police, while about 20% are dissatisfied (more than 20% are undecided). Among IDPs, these figures are 62% and 7% respectively (30% are undecided).

• Almost 70% of Kyiv residents surveyed support the decision of the Kyiv city authorities to dismantle Soviet monuments, while about a quarter do not support it. Among IDPs, almost 65% support this decision, while about 20% oppose it.

• Almost 80% of Kyiv residents approve of the removal of cars parked in inappropriate places. Among those who own a car, more than 70% support the removal of illegally parked cars, while slightly more than 20% do not.

A survey commissioned by the Ukraine Children's Action Project

Problems of Ukrainian children in conditions of war (January 27 - February 1, 2023) from Ratinggroup

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating" among mothers of Ukrainian children aged 3 to 17 years, commissioned by the "Ukraine Children's Action Project", 42% of children study in schools/kindergartens online, 29% - within blended education form (both online and in the premises of institutions), 26% - constantly attend educational institutions. Only 3% study at home school. The online form of education is most common in the front-line zones*, online and blended forms - in the de-occupied zones and among the residents of the Center. In Kyiv, more than half are engaged both online and in blended education form, while almost 40% attend educational institutions regularly. In the Western regions, almost half of the children (47%) study offline, 40% study both online and offline, and only 10% study online all the time.

• The vast majority of Ukrainian children study in schools or attend preschool educational institutions. Only 8% do not attend. The main reasons why children do not attend educational institutions are the closing of schools/kindergartens due to the war (60%) and the reluctance of parents to send their children to school/kindergarten due to the danger during the war.

• Almost one-third of the children miss classes in schools/kindergartens every day (10%) or several times a week (18%). 36% have missed classes several times a month. 34% noted that they almost never encountered such a problem. Those who live in front-line zones, live away from home, or study only online have missed classes most often. The parents of those children who missed classes identified air alarms (61%), lack of heat and electricity (49%), or the child's illness (44%) as the main reasons for missing classes.

• The main device most often used by children for online learning is a smartphone. They also often use a laptop, much less often a tablet or a desktop computer. Along with that, almost 40% of those whose children use a smartphone as the main device for online learning say that it is not enough for full-fledged learning. Most often, those mothers whose children study online or within blended form believe that they still need a laptop (48%) or a tablet (23%) for studying.

• 83% of children studying online or with blended form of education use a wired connection to access the Internet, 51% use a mobile connection.

• More than half of the surveyed mothers of children studying in schools/kindergartens stated that the announcement of air alerts, blackouts, or lack of Internet were the reasons for their children for missing classes almost every day or several days a week.

• Almost every fifth respondent noted a significant deterioration in the child's academic performance and a decrease in the educational process quality. Most often, such problems were recorded among residents of front-line and de-occupied territories, mothers of junior and high school students, those who study online or within blended education form.

• 14% of the polled mothers noted that their children had to change the educational institution as a result of the war. The absolute majority of such children (82%) changed school/kindergarten only once, 15% – twice, 2% – 3 times. The absolute majority of parents (86%) whose children have changed institutions note that children feel good there. 11% believe that the child is not comfortable in the new educational institution. For preschool children, internally displaced persons, and those who left, but have already returned, it was necessary to change the educational institution relatively more often than others. 

• Among the factors that can cause traumatic psychological conditions of children, mothers most often recorded a fear of loud sounds (especially the smallest children under 9). Irritability and apathy, indifference to studies and past hobbies were also recorded relatively more often (these manifestations are more common for children of middle and high school age). In addition, outbursts of anger and aggression (among all children) were a relatively frequent problem. Signs of anxiety states such as fear of the future, sleep problems, nightmares, problems with memory and concentration were more often recorded among older children (16-17 years old), reflection of traumatic events in games and creativity - among the youngest (3-9 years old ).

• 60% of children have witnessed or participated in certain war-related events. Most often, according to mothers, children have experienced the following traumatic events: separation from family and friends (28%), moving to another region of the country (25%), shelling and bombing (24%), prolonged stay in a cold room (17%). Moved abroad - 11%, were under occupation - 8%, witnessed the death of relatives or loved ones - 6%, lost their home - 5%, experienced hunger and lack of water - 5%.

• 19% of the polled mothers of children currently live outside their homes. 20% – left their regions of residence, but have already returned. 61% have not changed their place of residence.

• 20% of respondents consider their current place of residence to be dangerous. Most of them live in the de-occupied, front-line regions and in Kyiv.

• 41% of the interviewed mothers of children noted that among their close relatives (husband, brother, sister, children, parents) there were those who serve in the war.

• 87% of mothers indicate that their children do not need psychological support or help, 13% note that their children do need help (most often these are children of internally displaced persons and those who moved but have already returned, mothers of children of middle and high school age). Only 5% of mothers have applied for psychological help for their children in the last three months, 93% of them were able to get it through a personal visit to a psychologist (78%), online consultation (18%), or by phone (7%).

• 92% of mothers said that their children currently do not need any healthcare support. 40% have applied for such help in the last three months (most often mothers of the smallest children under 5). 98% of those who applied were able to receive such assistance either through a personal visit (92%) or through a telephone consultation (14%).

• 94% of mothers of Ukrainian children definitely or rather believe that Ukraine will be able to beat off Russia's attack. Nevertheless, almost 40% noted that over the past year their sense of confidence in the future has worsened (most often such respondents live in places they consider dangerous, or they are IDPs, or have not lived at home until recently).

• Among the forms of aid since the beginning of the war, respondents most often have received food (40%), money transfers or financial aid (38%). They have also received non-food aid (clothing, hygiene items, blankets, etc.) relatively often (17%).

‍

 A comprehensive comparative study «HOW THE WAR CHANGED ME AND THE COUNTRY. SUMMARY OF THE YEAR» aims to show to what extent the views, assessments, and life of Ukrainians have changed in various spheres during the year of the full-scale russian invasion of Ukraine.

Comprehensive research: HOW THE WAR CHANGED ME AND THE COUNTRY. SUMMARY OF THE YEAR from Ratinggroup

POLITICAL CHANGES

• People's memories of February 24, 2022 reveal shock, confusion, uncertainty, unpreparedness. Despite this, these days, a year after the full-scale invasion, the confidence in victory is 95%, compared to 56% in January 2022. The majority (63%) believes that victory requires at least six months or even more time.

• A significant increase in social self-esteem is recorded. The majority of respondents rated Ukraine’s position above average - 4.6 points out of 7, which is 1.5 times higher than the 2021 indicator. Two-thirds of the respondents rated Ukraine's future prospects at the highest level.

• The main emotion respondents feel when thinking about Ukraine is pride. As a result of the full-scale invasion and the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people, this indicator has more than doubled - from 34% to 75%.

• There have also been changes in national self-identification: the absolute majority of respondents identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine (compared to 2021, the indicator has increased from 76% to 94%). Half identify themselves as Europeans (double growth).

• 22% of Ukrainians switched to more frequent use of the Ukrainian language during the year of the war.

• While assessing the financial situation at the end of 2022, two-thirds of respondents note a deterioration in their financial situation, one-third states lack of changes. At the same time, almost 40% (against 14% at the end of 2021) have experienced an increase of confidence in the future.

• The priorities for country’s recovery are the restoration of enterprises and jobs and the reconstruction of damage, because most Ukrainians want to work, not to receive social assistance.

• Ukraine is going through a difficult period of its development, rethinking its role in history. In general, the war has contributed to increasing the trust of citizens in state institutions. Trust in the Armed Forces of Ukraine has grown from 65% to 97%, in the President - from 36% to 90%.

• And while the majority (65%) would not mind Zelenskyi to be re-elected for the next term, the number of those dissatisfied with the performance of the Verkhovna Rada (54%) is higher as compared to the number of those satisfied (37%). And if elections were held in the nearest future, almost half would look for an alternative among new parties.

• There has been an increase in trust in mass media, but the main feature of wartime is a sharp change in the channels of communication and the receipt of information by citizens. And while trust in national and local media has grown, the frequency of consumption of their news content has decreased, on the contrary. Instead, there has been a significant growth of groups and channels in messengers (from 11% to 41%), as well as YouTube (from 21 to 29%). Social networks have retained their influence (35%).

• One of the direct consequences of the russian invasion was the strengthening of Euro-Atlantic moods among Ukrainians, which revealed record figures for the entire history of the country. These days, 87% support Ukraine joining the European Union, 86% - NATO.

• While in 2021 the majority of citizens had a negative image of the state, now more than half speak of a distinctly or moderately positive image. Illustrative in this regard is the indicator of the correct direction of the country’s development, which is the highest for the entire history of measurements (over the year, fluctuations have been at the level of 70-80%), which is based on high trust in the military and political leadership of the country, faith in our victory, a significant increase in self-esteem, and pride for the country, as well as the realization of the people's desire for Euro-Atlantic integration.

PSYCHOEMOTIONAL CHANGES AND ADAPTATION TO WAR

• Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the society has demonstrated a high level of vitality, the value of the Index has decreased minimally (from 3.9 to 3.7).

• About 8% believe they have serious disorders that greatly affect their lives. One-third claims having moderate disorders.

• "Planning horizon" is an important indicator of adaptation and it has not undergone significant changes: 45% currently do not plan their life at all. The number of those who have plans for several years ahead has decreased from 23% to 19%.

• Currently, negative emotions are more pronounced than positive, and therefore sadness (4.8) and anger (4.6) prevail over joy (4.1) and inspiration (4.3), between which fear (4.2) and disappointment (4.1) are located. And the most pronounced are excitement (5.0) and interest (4.8), which are neither unequivocally positive nor negative - it depends on the context.

• Over the year, the feeling of self-love has decreased, while love for others has increased; the tendency of affiliation (the desire to be with others) has worked, the personal gives way to the collective.

• Ukrainians are almost as prone to self-restraint as used to be six months ago - more than half (58%) believe that you should limit yourself significantly in terms of entertainment and shopping, and 37% are inclined to think that you should try to live a full life.

• At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, 44% of Ukrainians had to be temporarily separated from their families. A year later, only 21% of them remain separated. Most of those who had to be separated from their family passed the test, and for 20% their relationship has even improved.

• 83% believe that you should be careful with people, while in 2020, only 54% expressed such opinion. It is about trust as a basic value, as trust in the world, which is undermined or destroyed by war. This especially applies to "strangers", or those who have become such, but seemed close. 

• The attitude towards people who have left is ambiguous: women with children are tolerated the most; at the same time, the attitude towards men of military age is the most negative.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES

• Despite the full-scale invasion, Ukrainians remain a humane and tolerant society, support for the death penalty has decreased from 52% to 42%.

• At the same time, the level of tolerance in society has increased during the war: the positive-neutral attitude towards the LGBT community has increased from 53% to 64%, and towards people who do not want to have children (childfree) it has increased from 57% to 67%. 

• During the year of the war, faith in God has decreased somewhat: the percentage of those who do not doubt his existence has changed from 60% to 55%.

• Generally accepted norms and values have become more defined, so anomie moods have ceased to dominate: the number of those with a predominant anomie state (state of demoralization) has decreased from 72% to 48%. The biggest change has occurred regarding the improved understanding of what rules to follow and what to believe today.

• The war led to the loss of work for at least one-third of the working population, with a particularly difficult situation for displaced persons and residents of combat zones: half of them lost their jobs. Even among those who were able to continue working during the war, a half still has suffered a reduction in salaries. 

• The most difficult situation with work was recorded in the first months of the war, later people began to return to work. Also, after a sharp drop in number of those willing to start their own business at the beginning of the war, their number has been gradually recovering.

• The main strategy for action in the case of income reduction remains the search for an additional source of income (has decreased from 62% to 54%): many people have started looking for a second job during the war or have started working more. However, not everyone has the ability to control their income (60%), it is especially difficult for the elderly people.

• Most citizens have suffered direct or indirect consequences of the full-scale invasion, only 14% have experienced no losses. Residents of the eastern regions have suffered the most losses, more than half of them have left their homes.

• Despite positive changes in society, optimism and absolute faith in victory, the war continues to inflict irreparable damage on Ukrainians and take away the most valuable. Over the last six months, the number of those who had lost relatives has almost doubled (from 9% to 17%), as has the number of those whose loved ones had been injured (from 8% to 13%). At the same time, there is an increase in the number of those who talk about the deterioration of their health (from 25% to 33%), as well as a decrease in the number of those who talk about loss of income (from 38% to 31%).

For comments on the results of this study, please contact the director of the Rating Lab research laboratory, Doctor of Psychological Sciences,

Professor Marianna Tkalych. Phone:+38 (050) 322-09-25 (WhatsApp, Signal), e-mail: tkalych@ratinggroup.ua

 • According to the research conducted by the Sociological Group Rating, 16% of Ukrainians changed their place of residence since February 24; 12% had left, but have already returned home. 72% did not change their place of residence. Half of those who have left plan to return home only after the end of the war. 10% plan to return in the nearest future, 23% are still waiting, 11% do not plan to return home. Among the residents of the territories close to the hostilities (South and East), two-thirds live outside their homes these days.

Legal protection of victims from the war crimes of Russia from Ratinggroup 

 • The vast majority of respondents (87%) have not changed their place of residence due to the shelling of the infrastructure, 8% - have left and live away from home for this reason, 5% - have left and have already returned.

• Every tenth respondent has experienced damage or destruction of housing: 2% noted that their housing was damaged and unfit for living, 6% reported partial damage, 2% - destroyed, but already restored. For the majority (86%), housing has not undergone changes. Among the residents of the hostilities zone, 9% noted that their homes were destroyed, 20% - partially damaged. In the de-occupied territories, 5% of respondents reported destroyed housing, 14% - partially damaged, 5% - damaged but already repaired.

• Among those whose housing has been destroyed or partially damaged, 24% reported their homes’ damage to DIYA, 12% - to law enforcement agencies, and 8% - to state institutions. Almost 70% did not submit any applications.

• Among those who had a job before the war, 40% work as they used to, 17% - remotely or partially, 8% - found a new job. 33% are not working nowadays.

• Since the beginning of the war, the income level of 6% of respondents has increased; 36% noted it has hardly changed, 17% - has decreased somewhat, 30% - has decreased significantly. 10% of respondents lost almost all their income. The income situation is worse among residents of the South and East, middle-aged people, those poor and with low income, as well as those who have lost their jobs or are working part-time.

• 46% noted that during the war the state of their physical health have not changed, 32% said it has rather worsened, and 21% - worsened significantly. Residents of hostilities zone territories, those older and with lower income, women, those who have left their homes, have been injured or have lost loved ones as a result of the war more often reported the deterioration.

• Almost every tenth respondent noted that either they personally or close relatives have been injured as a result of the war. 66% of them have documented the facts of the injury.

• 17% have close relatives with whom they have lost contact and do not know where they are now. 5% have those who died as a result of the war; 3% - forcibly deported to Russia, or to the occupied territories of the East, Crimea.

• 96% of respondents have not contacted law enforcement agencies over the last six months on issues caused by the Russian invasion. The main reason for this is the absence of direct damages/losses or their insignificance (90%).

• 95% of respondents have not contacted public organizations over the last six months on issues caused by the Russian invasion.

• About one-third of the respondents are ready to personally participate in lawsuits to claim compensation for lost property/health in Ukrainian courts, international or special courts with the participation of national and foreign judges.

• In the opinion of 75% of the polled, the priority for justice referring war crimes should be fair punishment of war criminals; 21% name compensation for victims.

• Only 6% know about the legal assistance provided by Ukrainian justice to victims of war crimes, 35% have heard something about it. Almost 60% do not know anything. 60% want to learn more about legal assistance from justice authorities, 37% do not want to.

• 65% of respondents believe the law enforcement system of Ukraine to be effective in terms of the investigation of Russian war crimes, less than 20% share the opposing opinion. The main reasons for inefficiency were cited as following: corruption (59%), citizens' distrust of law enforcement officers (29%), their unprofessionalism (24%), and long proceedings of cases (21%).

• The efficiency of the judicial system of Ukraine referring the investigation of war crimes was assessed in the same way: 60% consider it effective, only about 20% - ineffective. Among the main reasons for the judicial system inefficiency were named such as corruption (65%), citizens' distrust of courts (36%), long proceedings (21%) and unprofessionalism of judges (15%). According to the majority (75%), war crimes’ trials in Ukraine should be started as soon as possible, 23% believe that it should be done after the end of the war.

• Special courts with the participation of national and foreign judges are believed to be the most effective mechanism of trial for Russia’s war crimes (65%). 22% believe that international institutions will be effective in this case, 7% think the same about the courts of Ukraine.

• The absolute majority (96%) support the idea of involving international legal organizations to document Russia's war crimes during the war.

• Considering the initiative to create a special international tribunal referring the aggression crime against Ukraine, 15% of respondents are aware of it, almost 60% have heard something about it. A quarter do not know anything about it. 96% believe that this tribunal should also consider other war crimes - against humanity, genocide. According to 95% of respondents, both Ukrainian and foreign experts should conduct the investigation in the case of the aggression crime against Ukraine.

• Almost 90% support the idea of creating a special judicial system (like an anti-corruption one) to administer justice for crimes committed during Russia's war against Ukraine.

• 34% believe that special judicial bodies should be created for conducting judicial proceedings in the territories of Donbas and Crimea liberated from occupation; 22% are in favor of the creation of such special courts, but on a temporary basis. Almost 40% stand for judicial proceedings in the liberated territories in ordinary courts of Ukraine.

• Only 4% of respondents are well aware of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 30% have heard something about it. More than 60% do not know anything. Instead, about 80% support the idea of Ukraine ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 4% do not support it, 17% have not decided.

• The absolute majority of respondents consider the Russian political authorities to be guilty of committing war crimes against Ukraine (98%), 96% think the same about Russian military personnel. 87% believe Russian citizens are guilty, only 10% think they are not guilty.

• Regarding the issue of applying amnesty to various categories of residents of the occupied territories, in respect of which the facts of collaboration with the enemy were established, a relative majority believes that amnesty is possible for teachers, doctors, social workers (68%), heads of local communal institutions (58%) and heads of local enterprises, banks, and organizations (51%). 38% allow amnesty for local mass media journalists, 57% do not allow it. More than 20% allow amnesty for members of local political parties and members of illegal armed groups, while more than 70% are against it. Less than 20% consider amnesty possible for local government officials and law enforcement officials, and about 80% think it is impossible.

• Almost 40% believe that self-trial in the case of war crimes against Ukraine is justified, 55% share the opposing opinion.

• According to the majority, Russia should compensate Ukraine's economic and infrastructural losses (94%), as well as moral damage to life and health of Ukrainian citizens (92%). 11% and 14% respectively speak about compensation from international organizations, European countries - 6% and 5%, USA - 2% each, Ukraine - 2% and 5% respectively.

• Less than half of the respondents believe that Russia will compensate economic and infrastructure losses. About the same number do not believe in it. Less than 40% believe in compensation for moral damage to life and health of Ukrainian citizens from Russia, about 60% do not believe.

The survey was conducted on the initiative of the "Ukrainian Veteran Fund" of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine. Funded by the Sociological Group "Rating"

• According to the results of the Twentieth national poll conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating" on the initiative of the "Ukrainian Veteran Fund" of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine on January 14-16, 2023, 47% of the respondents noted that among their relatives and friends there were those who had participated in hostilities on the territory of Ukraine between 2014 and 2021. 63% have among their close people those who fought or are fighting at the front, starting from February 24, 2022. Compared to the survey in August, the number of those whose loved ones are fighting at the front today has increased.

• Society continues to record the highest levels of trust in the military: 95% trust the military of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 93% - veterans of the current war, and 95% - veterans of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) in 2014-2021. Regardless of region and age, the absolute majority trust these categories of the population.

• Speaking about the main features of the image of veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war, half of the respondents describe them as middle-aged people, and those who currently serve in the Armed Forces. Respondents do not see a gender difference in the concept of "veteran" - the absolute majority (87%) are convinced that representatives of both genders can be a veteran. On the other hand, such a feature as disability is not decisive for the concept of "veteran": 41% hesitated when they had to decide on the answer to this question, 30% believe that they imagine a "veteran" as a rather healthy person, 29% - precisely as a person with a disability.

• Conflicts in the family, lack of job, and abuse of alcohol or drugs are key problems that veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war are likely to face after returning home. This is the opinion of more than half of the polled. Regarding the risks of suicide and breaking the law, the vast majority (at least two-thirds) consider it unlikely for veterans. Compared to the survey in August, the number of those who foresee the risks of conflicts in families and abuse of alcohol or drugs has increased. Relatives of ATO veterans who fought and are fighting now feel the presence of conflict in the family, or abuse of alcohol or drugs, more acutely. Relatives of those who are no longer fighting feel more acutely about unemployment. Women spoke more often about the risks of conflicts in the family and the lack of job for veterans, while the risks of alcoholism, drug addiction, or breaking the law were more often pronounced by men.

• The level of salaries of military personnel directly participating in hostilities is considered optimal by 40%, less than necessary - by 34%, more than necessary - by 8%, and 18% were unable to answer on the matter. Regarding the salary of soldiers serving in the rear, half rated it as optimal, 13% - less the necessary, 11% - more the necessary, 25% - could not estimate. Compared to the survey in August 2022, there are no sharp changes in the assessment of the salary of the mentioned categories of military.

• The number of those who believe that the state fulfills its obligations to veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war has decreased: in August 2022, there were 69% of them, while in January 2023 – 53%. These days, the number of those who share the opposing opinion is 26%. Residents of the western regions, representatives of the middle-aged and older generations, relatives of those who fought in the ATO and are not fighting today reveal a negative opinion about the fulfillment of the state's obligations to veterans.

• The absolute majority (91%) believes that society respects veterans, only 6% share the opposing opinion.

• The absolute majority (97%) of those who run their own business, or would like to have one, are ready to hire a veteran of the Russian-Ukrainian war. 93% of all respondents indicated that they are ready to work in the same team with such a veteran.

• 93% support the idea of granting benefits to businesses founded by veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war, only 5% stand against it.

• Veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war (54%), persons with disabilities (35%) and large families (35%) should have the most benefits and guarantees from the state, according to the respondents. The provision of benefits for single mothers/fathers is supported by 17%, for pensioners – by 12%, for those with low income and internally displaced persons – by 9-10% each, for those who suffered from Chernobyl disaster - only 3%.

• 75% do not agree with the opinion that veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war abuse benefits. 13% share the opposing opinion. Compared to August 2022, public opinion on this issue has hardly changed. Residents of the East, relatives of those who are fighting at the front today, poor and low-income citizens spoke most often about the abuse of benefits.

• 14% of respondents said that they communicated with the military, who were on the front line, every day or almost every day. 21% talk to them at least once a week, 14% - several times a month. Almost half of the respondents contact with the military who are fighting today rarely or almost never. Most of the latter are among residents of the East, the older population, and women.

• 9% noted that they communicated with veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war almost every day, 14% – at least once a week, 11% – several times a month, two-thirds - rarely or never. The main reason for not communicating with veterans is the absence of such persons in one’s environment. 13% indicated the unwillingness to evoke unpleasant memories as the reason for the lack of communication with veterans. About 4-5% said that they do not communicate because of the fear of saying the wrong thing or lack of common topics to discuss.

• Two-thirds of respondents indicated that they were completely or somewhat uninformed about the problems of veterans. 37% stated that they were informed. More of the latter was recorded among residents of the Center and South, middle-aged people, relatives of those who fought during 2014-2021, men, and those who often communicate with veterans.

• Among the main problems that veterans face most often, the relative majority identified psychological disorders (40%). 23% to 29% consider the main problems to be difficulties with registration of benefits, job search, receiving healthcare, misunderstanding of society. Conflicts with family and friends or alcohol or drug addiction were mentioned by 14% of the respondents as problems of veterans.

• TV (37%), stories of relatives and friends (37%), news from social networks (34%) are the main sources of information about veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war and their problems. 22% learn about such things from Telegram channels or Viber, 19% - from Internet mass media, 13% - from personal experience.

• 47% of respondents reveal a rather positive attitude towards the fact that various political forces can invite veterans to run in the elections. 15% don't care of it. On the other hand, one-third (32%) share a negative attitude towards politicians' involvement of veterans in elections. Most of the latter are among residents of the West and Center, young and middle-aged people, those with high income, as well as relatives of those who fought in the ATO and those who fought and are currently fighting.

 • According to the results of the Twentieth national poll conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating" on January 14-16, 2023, 87% of the respondents would support Ukraine's accession to the European Union if the referendum were held (3% - against, 8% - would not vote). 

• The support for joining NATO has increased once again over recent months and reveals the highest in the history of research: 86% would support this initiative in a referendum, 3% would vote against it, and 8% would not vote. The support for joining the EU and NATO is almost unanimous among representatives of all macro-regions, age and income groups.

• 85% of the polled support the idea of creating military and political union of Ukraine, Poland and Great Britain. 3% stand against such an initiative, 7% don’t care of it.

• 80% reveal a positive attitude towards the idea of creating military and political union of Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania. 6% are against such a union, and 9% are indifferent. The idea of military and political unions with the mentioned European countries gains high support among all regional, age, and income groups. 

• The Sociological Group "Rating" within the framework of the Nineteenth national survey in the conditions of war, on November 20-21, 2022 carried out research on the attitude of Ukrainians towards the idea of transferring the date of Christmas celebration.

• Over the last year, the number of those who celebrate Christmas only on December 25 (4% to 11%) and those who celebrate it on both dates (18% to 25%) has somewhat increased. More than half (55%) will celebrate Christmas on January 7 (71% in 2021). 8% do not celebrate Christmas at all (mostly among young people, residents of the South and the capital). Residents of the West, Kyiv, younger respondents and Greek Catholics mentioned more often either the double celebration of Christmas or the celebration only on December 25.

• The number of those who support the idea of transferring the Christmas celebration to December 25 has also increased over the year: from 26% to 44%. 31% (in 2021 - 58%) stand against such an idea. 23% said they do not care about this question and 2% could not answer on the matter.

• The majority of supporters of the idea of Christmas transferring was recorded among residents of the West and Kyiv: more than half support this idea. Among the residents of the Center, a relative majority (44%) is also not against this initiative. Moreover, there is considerable support for the idea of Christmas celebration postponing among Greek Catholics. Among the parishioners of OCU, almost a half support this idea (46%), while one-third of them stand against it. On the other hand, among the residents of the South and East, a relative majority does not support the idea of transferring the date of Christmas celebration. In terms of age, the most contradictions are observed within the older and middle-aged groups, where the relative majority (more than 40%) support the idea of postponing the date, while a significant number (at least one-third) are against it. Among young people, one-third are in favor of the transfer, while one-third are against it, and the same number said that they didn't care.

• The Sociological Group "Rating" within the framework of the Nineteenth national survey in the conditions of war, on November 20-21, 2022 carried out comprehensive research on the assessments of changes in various spheres of life, and citizens’ expectations and hopes for the next year.

• As of the end of 2022, over 82% of respondents believe that things in Ukraine are going in the right direction, only 7% think this direction is wrong. Assessment of the right direction of things’ development dominates in all regional cuts and age groups.

• The absolute majority of respondents (97%) are sure that Ukraine will be able to beat off Russian attack.

• Two-thirds of the polled expect the next 2023 year to be better than the previous one. 12% believe that next year will be the same, 16% - worse. Compared to last year's study, the indicators are more optimistic. Also, almost 90% wait for 2023 with optimism, only 6% with pessimism.

• When assessing changes in various spheres over the last year, more positive rates were recorded referring the political situation (about half said it had improved) and a feeling of confidence in the future (almost 40% of respondents said it had improved).

• Regarding the assessment of their own state of health, two-thirds of the polled indicated no changes, one-third mentioned deterioration. The respondents rated the economic situation in the country the worst: 80% noted deterioration, 10% - no change, only 6% - improvement. More than 60% said that the economic situation of their family had worsened, one-third mentioned no change, and only 4% - improvement.

• Considering the dynamics over the last year, the feeling of confidence in the future and assessment of the political situation in the country have improved. Although the assessment of both one's own economic situation and the country’s has undergone negative changes over the year, the indicators are not worse than the 2018 level. Negative trends in the assessments of the economy and finances among the younger and middle-aged generations’ representatives are especially noticeable.

• Evaluating changes in specific spheres, the best ratings are observed in the assessment of the country's defense capacity (90%) and Ukraine's international image (86%).

• Referring freedom of speech and democracy, half of the respondents have not noticed any changes, 34% believe that the situation has improved, 12% think it has worsened. Regarding the roads’ condition, 42% have hardly noted any changes, 24% - improvement, and 28% - deterioration. The situation with the fight against corruption has not changed for 46%, improved for 22%, worsened for 17%. The quality of healthcare and housing and communal services has not changed for almost half of the polled, improved - for 12% and 8% respectively, worsened - for 23% and 41% respectively.

• The worst rated are the situation with the prices for basic goods and medicines (worsened for 94%), opportunities to find a job (worsened for 72%), and quality of education (worsened for 55%).

• Referring the dynamics, negative trends are observed regarding the evaluation of the roads’ condition, the opportunity of finding a job, and the quality of education. There were no changes during the assessment year regarding the prices for basic goods and medicines. Indexes regarding the quality of housing and communal services, healthcare, fight against corruption, freedom of speech and democracy, and especially the international image, have improved.

• Sociological group «Rating» by order of the public organization «Transatlantic Dialogue Center» carried out a study «Reconstruction of Ukraine and international aid» on November 20-21, 2022. According to the results of the survey, Ukrainians' views on when to begin the repair of damage in the de-occupied territories are somewhat diverse: 44% think it should be done as soon as possible, and 52% believe it is worth waiting for the war end. Differences are observed within the regional distribution: residents of the Eastern regions are more likely to be in favor of reconstruction as soon as possible, while respondents from the Western and Central regions are more supportive of the idea of postponing it until the war ends. 

• Restoration of jobs and income sources is more important for Ukrainians as direct financial support. Thus, among the programs most needed for war-affected communities, the most often chosen were the restoration of businesses and jobs (60%) and the damage repair (55%). Financial support was identified as an important program by 44%. 37% named medical and humanitarian assistance as important. Children's development programs and psychosocial care are significant for a quarter of the polled. Instead, programs for either democratic institutions development or cultural and social cohesion were chosen less often – by 3 to 6%.

• There are certain differences in the relevance of reconstruction programs within regional and age cut. Thus, for the residents of the East, the issues of returning to work and damage repair are more critical. Humanitarian assistance and support for children's development are more important for young people as compared to older people. Also, one-third of the younger population declared the need for a psychosocial care program. Moreover, displaced people more often than others record the need for reconstruction: those who have moved more often than others talk about the need for jobs restoration, damage repair, and the need for medical and humanitarian assistance.

• Communications and energy infrastructure (64%) are the main priority for recovery in conflict-affected communities according to all respondents. Reconstruction of social infrastructure (schools, hospitals) was most often chosen as the second priority (29%), somewhat less often - restoration of private housing and communications (24% each), transport infrastructure (17%).

• Opinions on the reconstruction strategy for the damaged infrastructure are diverse: 48% believe that the recovery should take place as soon as possible, while 49% stand for the recovery to last longer but include the introduction of green, energy-saving technologies and modernization. Among the polled from the Eastern regions, there are somewhat more of those who prefer quick recovery, but still among them there are also about 40% who do not mind waiting for infrastructure modernization. Among the residents of the Center and West, there are somewhat more of those in favor of slower reconstruction, but with modernization. There are also generational differences: while older people want to rebuild infrastructure as soon as possible, most young people want to modernize and advocate for the introduction of green energy.

• In general, the majority of respondents positively perceive the participation of countries that do not commit aggression against Ukraine referring the reconstruction. Thus, potential aid from Great Britain, the USA, Germany, and France is perceived very positively: 81-90% of respondents support the participation of these states in the reconstruction. Regarding Turkey, 67% share this opinion (22% are neutral, 10% are negative). As for China, 45% support such an initiative (a quarter are neutral and the same number are negative).

• Evaluating different scenarios of foreign countries' involvement in Ukraine's reconstruction, the majority (55%) advocate that foreign countries provide finances and supervise Ukrainian companies. The scenario in which foreign companies are directly involved in the reconstruction was supported by 29%. 13% supported the idea that foreign countries provide finances while Ukrainian companies carry out the reconstruction works on their own. Participation of foreign countries only at the consultation level was supported by only 2%. Among those who are positive towards the foreign countries’ involvement in Ukraine’s reconstruction, the support for the ideas of direct participation of foreigners or control on their part is more often observed.

• Since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion, the conviction that Ukraine's victory in the war is the liberation of all its territories, including Crimea and occupied Donbas, has increased (from 74% in March to 85% in November 2022). Only 9% chose the option of returning only the territories that Ukraine controlled until 24.02.22. At the same time, no more than 5% support the continuation of hostilities on the Russian territories. Support for the de-occupation of all territories of Ukraine without exception is absolute (more than 80%) among representatives of all regions of the country.

• The number of those who support the reinstatement of nuclear-weapon-state status for Ukraine has increased (from 47% in 2019 to 53% in 2022).

• Ukraine's accession to NATO (61%) and Russia's nuclear disarmament (50%) are measures to deter future attacks against Ukraine which are most often supported by respondents. Ukraine's accession to the EU and guarantees from Western countries to supply Ukraine with weapons are supported by 34% of respondents as measures of deterrence. Nuclear weapons of Ukraine and financial aid to our state were chosen by 17% each. Only 8% supported signing peace agreements with Russia as a method of deterring aggression. Residents of the East and South, as well as those who support the military recapture of only the territories controlled as of February 24, 2022, are somewhat more likely to believe in the effectiveness of signing peace agreements with Russia. At the same time, in all regional and age groups, an overwhelming majority chose Ukraine's accession to NATO and Russia's nuclear disarmament as the best guarantees of security.

• The majority of the population of Ukraine has not heard anything about the initiative of French President Macron «European Political Community». Only 3% know something about it, 29% have heard something about it. In general, 54% among all believe in the benefits of such a platform, and 63% of them among those who have heard something about it. A quarter of Ukrainians believe that such an initiative would not be effective in countering Russian aggression.

• The vast majority of respondents (60%) consider Germany to be a friendly country towards Ukraine, about one-third considers it rather neutral. Only 1% consider Germany hostile in relation to our state. The attitude towards the involvement of Germany in the reconstruction is somewhat better as compared to the perception of it as an ally, because referring the issue of reconstruction the positive attitude towards it is at the level of 85%.

• The main factors that influence the perception of Germany as a friendly country were the supply of arms to Ukraine and aid to Ukrainian refugees (over 50%). 38% noted that the factor that positively influenced their opinion of Germany was its financial aid to Ukraine. 14% rate Germany as friendly because they believe the German population supports Ukraine. Among other factors that influenced the positive assessment, only 7% of respondents identified the introduction of sanctions against Russia by Germany, 5% - the pro-Ukrainian stance of German politicians. 5% said they simply like this country.

• Instead, the main factor determining Ukrainians' perception of Germany as an unfriendly or neutral country is that German politicians have a pro-Russian stance (44% among those who consider Germany to be neutral or hostile). The fact that Germany continues to cooperate with Russia (28%) and that it supplies insufficient amount of weapons (27%) also play a significant role in this assessment. About the insufficiency of financial aid, or German population support to Russia, the polled spoke much less often (9-10% each). 2-5% of respondents noted either lack of sympathy for Germany.

The research carried out in cooperation with the Doctor of Sociological Sciences, Deputy Director of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine Serhii Dembitskyi

• According to the results of the nineteenth national survey "Ukraine in the conditions of war" carried out by the Sociological group "Rating", in general, at this stage, Ukrainian society is characterized by an almost equal number of those who believe there are no generally recognized norms in our society (anomie state), and those who, on the contrary, believe that such norms exist (non-anomie state). The number of the first category is 46%, while the number of the latter is 48%. 6% of respondents belong to the intermediate group, and it is difficult to draw a conclusion regarding their attitude towards the existence of generally accepted norms in society.

• Throughout the entire history of modern Ukraine, society was dominated by the anomie condition, which has been weakening very slowly and inconsistently (from 82% in 1992 to 72% in 2021). But after the start of Russia's large-scale war against Ukraine at the beginning of 2022, anomie sentiments have significantly decreased and ceased to be decisive, although they remain quite widespread.

• The key indicators that still point out the existence of anomie attitudes among the respondents are uncertainty about the future and a sense of the destruction of what their parents believed in. These observations fit perfectly into the logic of what is currently happening in Ukraine. At the same time, the vast majority of respondents clearly understand what is happening around them, and are also confident in their assessments of what is currently true and what is not.

• Considering the regional cut, there are almost no differences regarding the anomia state among the respondents. Though the following differences are present among the residents of different settlement types, age groups, and genders:

1) the larger the size of the settlement, the less widespread is the anomie feeling;

2) anomie becomes more common with age;

3) anomie feeling is weaker among men compared to women.

Reference: Anomie Scale (McClosky & Schaar) makes it possible to assess anomie demoralization. Anomie demoralization is a psychological reaction of people to a social situation, when one system of norms and values, which unites people into a community, is broken, and the other is not yet formed.

• According to the results of the survey conducted by the Sociological group "Rating", 93% said that they agree with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932-1933 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people. The number of those who do not support this thesis is 3%; 4% hesitate to answer.

• Over the past ten years, an increse of one and a half times is being observed in the number of respondents who agree with the thesis that the 1932-33 Holodomor was a genocide of the Ukrainian people (compared to last year - increase of 8 percentage points). The Holodomor of 1932-33 is recognized as genocide by the absolute majority of residents in the western, central, and southeastern oblasts. Also, no significant deviations in age distributions in this matter were recorded.

• As part of the Eighteenth national survey during the war, Sociological group “Rating” on October  8-9, 2022 conducted a comprehensive study of the general assessment of the situation, the perception of the nuclear threat danger from russia, as well as the attitude towards foreign countries and their assessment according to the "ally" index.

• Results of the survey confirmed the growth dynamics referring those who believe the things in the country are going in the right direction. Within this survey, a record indicator was observed throughout the whole history of the studies - 86% of respondents believe that things in Ukraine are going in the right direction. Only 6% have revealed the opposite opinion, 8% could not answer on the matter. In all regions and within all age groups, the assessment of the countries development direction as correct dominates.

• Two-thirds of Ukrainians do not believe that russia will use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, and even more respondents do not believe in the possibility of a nuclear strike on NATO countries (84%). Compared to the survey in April of this year, the confidence that russia will not launch a nuclear attack on Ukraine and the Western countries - members of the North Atlantic Alliance – has strengthened.

• According to Ukrainians, currently Poland, Lithuania, Great Britain, the USA, and Canada are the most friendly towards Ukraine. Finland, Sweden, Denmark, France, Switzerland, Germany, and Japan are also considered to be friendly. About half of the polled believe Turkey and Kazakhstan to be friendly, though 40% think these two countries are rather neutral towards Ukraine.

• China currently remains mostly neutral country for Ukrainians. Hungary, on the contrary, "turned" into a "hostile" state - 41% find it hostile, 26% - neutral, 21% - friendly. Belarus (85%) and russia (97%) are absolutely hostile countries for Ukrainians. Over the recent months, the attitude of Ukrainians towards Canada, Poland, Lithuania, Great Britain, and the USA has improved; towards France it has hardly changed. Instead, the neutral attitude towards Turkey has grown. There is also a trend of attitudes’ worsening towards China (especially compared to 2021 data).

As a part of the eighteenth wave of the “Ukraine during the war” project, Sociological Group “Rating” conducted another study of psychological markers: the levels of resilience and psychological exhaustion as well as the consumer behavior strategies

 SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE CITIZENS OF UKRAINE

• The share of the respondents who have been forced to leave their places of permanent residence since February 24, 2022, has increased somewhat. The growth is due to the increase in the number of internally displaced persons from the Eastern and Southern regions.

• 85% of the polled express their intention to return home: 21% - soon, 19% - willing to return, but are going to wait, and 45% - will return, but only when the war is over. Only 6% said they will not return home. Compared to July of this year, the share of those who plan to return soon has been increasing, while the share of those who either will return after the war, or will not return at all, has been decreasing.

• The gradual return of the citizens to their workplaces continues. Currently, 38% of those who had worked before the war have returned to their regular job places, while 18% are working remotely, and 7% have found a new job. Despite this, one-third of such respondents are still not employed. Most of the latter are among the youngest and the oldest respondents, as well as among women and residents of the East of the country. This survey for the first time recorded positive trends in returning to work among residents of the South and East. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that regional identification is made according to the place of residence until February 24, 2022.

LEVEL OF RESILIENCE

• During the eighth month of the war, Ukrainians continue to demonstrate a good level of resilience (3.9 points out of 5). The components of this indicator: psychological resilience (3.9) and maintaining physical health (3.7) – has not changed significantly as compared to June.

• Curiosity about what is happening around (4.5), plans for the future (4.2), normal nutrition (4.2), absence of regrets about the past (4.1), and confidence in one's decisions (4.0) primarily contribute to the relatively high index of psychological resilience. 

• These days, Ukrainians suffer most from fatigue (only 34% do not feel it) and lack of good sleep (only 47% have good sleep). Such reactions of the body are natural for stress and at the same time quite exhausting. Despite this, other emotional and moral indicators of citizens are better. 

• Since April, there has been a decrease in indicators of normal nutrition, while at the same time, indicators of good sleep have been increasing. And this allows to keep a relative balance of physical health support.

• Women have a lower level of resilience than men. A relatively lower level of resilience has been recorded within the youngest and oldest age groups. The availability of work has a positive effect on resilience: those who work full-time or part-time feel better than those who do not work, because work (employment, team) and salary cover the basic need for security and belonging to the community. Also, a higher level of resilience is observed among those who have relatives who currently bear arms.

• In the regional terms, this survey has revealed no significant differences in terms of the integral indicator. At the same time, there is a significant gap between the index of physical health (relatively lower level) and psychological stability (relatively higher level) among the residents of the South.

• For all groups of the polled, psychological resilience (3.9) is higher than the indicators of physical condition (3.7). Similarly, like in the previous study, the hypothesis is proven: the war has physically exhausted Ukrainians to a bigger extent, while psychological endurance still remains better. 

• The dynamics of the resilience index has somewhat improved. Eight months of war but Ukrainians still have enough physical and moral strength to live in tough circumstances, to work, to help, and to fight. 

LEVEL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXHAUSTION

• The dynamics of research of the emotional states for the period from March till October, 2022 reveals that the changes in day-to-day assessment of one’s emotional stress are still insignificant. The peak of stress was observed at the beginning of April 2022 (3.5), while in June there has been a gradual decrease of the stress (3.3), and in October it has remained at that exact level (3.3).

• 24% of Ukrainians feel calm and very calm. 40% feel tense and very tense, and this is a relatively low indicator as for wartime. Tension increases with age, probably due to narrowing opportunities to take care of oneself, as well as material and other resources. Also, tension is more common for women (probably due to their higher sensitivity and need to take care not only of themselves, but also of their children) and for those who have changed their place of residence, - the need to adapt to a new place, situation of uncertainty, change in the usual living conditions significantly increase stress.

• The index of psychological exhaustion is still quite moderate (2.0). Considering dynamics, it has not changed from April to October 2022, except for the indicator of trust in people (it has decreased). The share of those who believe that people cannot be trusted and of those who think that something bad may happen has increased. The latter trend is probably related to the news about the destruction and the dead, and the realization that there are few left who were not at least indirectly affected by it.

• The index of psychological exhaustion is mainly “warranted” by mistrust of people (2.7) and sad mood (2.6). However, Ukrainians still do not feel “dead” inside (1.6) and can rely on themselves (1.4). Also, the majority do not feel weak, and the surrounding world is not perceived as hostile and dangerous. Since April, there has been a decrease in indicators of "sad" mood; at the same time, there has been an increase in mistrust of others and despair in the ability to rely on oneself.

• Those youngest and oldest respondents, women, residents of the East and West, those who are not working or are retired, those who have changed their place of residence, as well as those who have relatives currently bearing arms feel the most exhausted.

• Monitoring of emotional states, level of resilience and psychological exhaustion from March to October 2022 has revealed that, in general, Ukrainians were able to maintain and stabilize their psychological and emotional state, acquire sufficient competence in overcoming stressful events of war life. Those younger and older people, women, and those who have lost their jobs remain the risk groups.

CONSUMER BEHAVIOR STRATEGIES

• Most often, respondents make decisions about buying products and goods based on the compatibility of price and quality (42%). 29% are guided by the fact that they regularly buy the same goods (regular consumption strategy) or because of the opportunity to buy them cheaper (cost minimization strategy). 20% buy because the purchase brings pleasure (hedonists), 13% buy the best quality goods (perfectionists). Only 4% buy products impulsively (impulsive consumption strategy), 2% - because the product is new (novelties consumption). Compatibility of price and quality and regularity of purchase are more likely for the younger and middle-aged generation, who are guided by a rational approach to spending. Buying because of a lower price is more likely for older people, since they often have lower incomes and are forced to save. Young people are also relatively more likely to buy either because it brings pleasure or guided by the quality indicator - it corresponds to the values of the younger generation, who are more hedonistic and perfectionist. Regularity and the "cheapness" motive prevail among women; compatibility of price and quality, especially better quality - among men. Thus, women have more rational strategies, while men have more emotional strategies (although women are usually seen as oriented on emotions, but women usually have lower incomes as compared to men).

• The results of the cluster analysis of the consumer behavior strategies made it possible to divide consumers into the following groups: hedonists (38%), rationalists (24%), traditionalists (21%), and thrifty (19%). "Hedonists" - choose goods of the best quality, buy something based on the compatibility of price and quality and something that brings pleasure; prevail among young people, men, and those who have job (respectively, higher incomes). "Rationalists"- buy cheaper and when there is a good "price-quality" ratio; more of them are among representatives of the middle-aged generation, men, those who have job, as well as retirees. "Traditionalists" - buy the same goods in the "price - quality" ratio; more of them are among young people and those who work. "Thrifty" - buy cheaper and the same things; more of them are among the elderly, women (more of them among the oldest category), unemployed, and retired. In general, these are worthy, adequate strategies of developed societies with good economic indicators.

For comments on the results of this study, please contact Professor Marianna Tkalych, Director of the Rating Lab research laboratory, Doctor of Psychological Sciences. Tel.: +38 (050) 322-09-25 (WhatsApp, Signal), e-mail: tkalych@ratinggroup.ua 

 • Sociological group "Rating" within the framework of the "People's Top" project continued the research of outstanding Ukrainians of all times. With the help of an open ended question, the respondents, without receiving any lists or prompts, named those famous personalities whom they consider worthy of this rating.

• Taras Shevchenko once again became the leader of the "People's TOP" rating (63.9%). Volodymyr Zelenskyi (29.8%), Lesya Ukrainka (19.6%), Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (17.3%), and Stepan Bandera (12.8%) also entered top 5 most outstanding Ukrainians. Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (11.6%), Ivan Franko (10.1%), Ivan Mazepa (8.8%), Vyacheslav Chornovil (8.7%) and Valery Zaluzhnyi (7, 7%) entered top 10.

• Hryhoriy Skovoroda (6.7%), Vasyl Stus (3.4%), Volodymyr Veliky (2.6%), Yaroslav Mudryi (2.5%), Leonid Kravchuk (2.5%), Ivan Sirko (2.4%), Vitaliy Klitschko (2.2%), Oleksandr Usyk (2.2%), Andriy Shevchenko (1.8%), and Petro Sagaidachnyi (1.8%) entered the second ten of the rating.

• Third ten is represented by: Roman Shukhevich (1.7%), Leonid Kuchma (1.5%), Taras Bulba (1.5%), Ivan Kotlyarevskyi (1.4%), Lina Kostenko (1.3%), Ihor Sikorskyi (1.2%), Petro Poroshenko (1.2%), Mykhailo Kotsiubinskyi (1.1%), Mykola Amosov (0.9%), and Pavlo Skoropadskyi (0.9%).

• Respondents indicated a total of 148 names. At the same time, about 8% of respondents could not name (remember) a single outstanding Ukrainian.

The survey was conducted as part of the project of the Public Organization "Center for Promotion of the Volunteer Movement "Volonter.Org": "Assessment of the damage caused by the war crimes of the Russian Federation in Ukraine". The survey and the report were developed within the framework of the project "Urgent support of the EU for civil society", which is implemented by ISAR Ednannia with the financial support of the European Union. Its content is entirely responsibility of the Public Organization "Center for Promotion of the Volunteer Movement “Volonter.Org" and does not necessarily reflect the position of the European Union. Expert support and consultations during the research have been provided by the representatives of the Coalition "Ukraine. Five in the morning".

• According to the survey results, about a quarter of the respondents said they were forced to change their place of residence in Ukraine during the full-scale invasion of russia in Ukraine. Most of them are among those who lived in the war zone * (64%) and in Kyiv (42%). One-third of those who left their homes have already returned. Also, 9% of those displaced plan to return in the nearest future, 15% intend to wait. At the same time, another one-third intend to return, but only if the war ends. Only 6% do not plan to return at all. Considering the de-occupied localities, half of those who had left during the war have already returned.

• 32% of the polled stated they experienced material losses as a result of the war; 67% did not. More than a half of the inhabitants of the territories where hostilities were or are still ongoing have suffered losses. Among the losses, money was most often mentioned – by 36%, housing - 23%, household appliances - 14%. 7% said they had lost animals, 6% - cars, 5% - production, 4% - commercial real estate. 

• Every tenth respondent stated that their housing was either destroyed (2%) or damaged (8%). 5% are not aware of the current condition of their housing. For 85%, the housing situation has not changed. About one-third of those whose home is either in the de-occupied territory or in the war zone said that their home was damaged. Also, every fifth of those whose housing is still in the occupation zone, does not know anything about its condition.

• In a third of the damaged buildings, reconstruction works have already begun: 4% have started major renewal, 27% - partial renewal. Despite this, 66% have not yet started any works. Among those who lost their homes, 18% have already filed a claim for damage to DIYA, 16% - to law enforcement bodies, 15% - to other state institutions, 67% - have not appealed anywhere yet. 39% of victims believe that their houses should be rebuilt as soon as possible, 59% - on the contrary, think that it is worth waiting for the end of the war first.

• The majority of those who lost their homes (58%) plan to use their own funds for reconstruction. 27% expect to restore the housing using state funds, 12% - funds of international organizations, 9% - funds of volunteers, and 7% - funds of relatives or charitable funds. Owners of destroyed housing expect more help from the state, while owners of partially damaged housing expect to cope using their own resources. In general, those who have already started repairs proceed mostly at their own expense. In general, residents who have already returned home are more active in restoring their housing - most of them have already started reconstruction and filed a claim for damage.

• Currently, among those who had had a job before the war, 61% are working: full-time - 36%, remote or part-time - 19%, found a new job - 6%. Instead, 37% lost their jobs and are not working now. The highest number of those who lost their jobs was recorded among the residents of the East, women, those with the lowest income, and internally displaced persons. Over the month, the indicators of employment have not changed significantly in general; however, compared to the previous surveys, positive trends in terms of the return to work in the Central and Western regions are observed.

• The main source of income for the majority of respondents is salary (56%) and pension (31%). 8% had income from private business, and the same number received social assistance. Since the beginning of the war, only 2% of respondents declare growth of income; 33% say their income has not changed. On the other hand, two-thirds of the polled have seen a worsening of the income situation: 18% have had a slight decrease of income, 32% - a significant decrease, and 14% have lost almost all of their income. Residents of the South and East and middle-aged people have experienced the greatest financial losses. Half of the polled said that in case of a complete loss of income, their savings would last for month, 19% - up to 2 months, 12% - up to 3 months, the same number - up to six months or more.

• Among those whose source of income before the war was business, only 12% noted that it continued to operate fully. Almost a half indicated that their business was operating, but with lower profits. On the other hand, 12% plan to close their business, 28% - have already stopped operating. 30% of business income recipients have had employees. Among them, almost 40% of employers had to fire employees, more than 20% - to reduce salaries.

• 35% of the polled had to temporarily separate from their family/partner due to the war: 12% had to, but they have already reunited, 23% are still living separately. Most of them are among the residents of the war zone, young people, those with higher income, and those whose relatives are fighting. 52% said they were not separated from their families because of the war.

• More than a half of the respondents noted the deterioration of their physical health, more than 60% spoke the same about their mental health. Deterioration of health is observed among the residents of de-occupied, front-line, and war zones, older people, those with lower income, those who had to be separated from their families, and those who have lost relatives because of the war.

• 47% indicated that they had close relatives who bear arms. Almost 20% reported that they had close relatives with whom they had lost contact and still do not know where they are. 5% have among their relatives those who died due to the war, 3% - those who were forcibly deported either to russia or to the occupied territories of the East or Crimea. 7% of the polled noted that they personally or their close relatives had been injured or disabled due to military actions.

• 95% did not apply to law enforcement agencies over the last six months on issues caused by the invasion of russia.

• Over 90% believe russia should compensate Ukraine's economic and infrastructural losses during the war. At the same time, only one-third of the respondents believe in this compensation. 14-15% expect for compensation from European countries and international organizations, 10% - from the USA, and 9% - from Ukraine. More than 70% believe in the possibility of compensations from these countries.

• Special trials with the participation of national and foreign judges (63%) and international institutions (23%) are considered to be the most effective mechanism to deal with war crimes of russia. Only 5% believe Ukrainian courts can be such a mechanism. One-third of the polled are ready to personally participate in lawsuits in order to claim compensation for lost property/health in Ukrainian and international courts.

• Among the sources of information about the war in Ukraine, the most trusted are the TV marathon (40%), the stories of eyewitnesses and acquaintances (35%), and social media channels (33%).

• Almost 40% believe that five years are enough to restore Ukraine's infrastructure and economy. 25% believe that it takes up to ten years, 23% - more than ten years. 4% think that reconstruction will last up to one year.

• The majority of Ukrainians are ready to participate in the reconstruction of the country: 42% - personally, 49% - ready, but do not have the opportunity. Residents of Kyiv, those aged 18-50, men, those with higher income are more likely to participate in reconstruction.

* For the purposes of this survey, several approaches to regional distribution are used. In the answers that refer to damage assessment, an atypical distribution is used, taking into account the intensity of hostilities during a full-scale russian invasion in Ukraine in 2022. Hhostilities zones (partially or fully occupied regions in which active hostilities are taking place): Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Kherson regions. Front-line zones (regions near the hostilities zone, some of which are subject to constant fire): Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Odesa. De-occupied zones (regions that were partially occupied until April 2022): Kyiv, Sumy, Chernihiv. West and Center (regions that were not occupied (absolutely or almost): Vinnytsia, Volyn, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Poltava, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky, Chernivtsi, Cherkasy. Kyiv is picked out in a separate group due to its proximity to hostilities until April 2022 and a high level of internal migration.

In other cases, a more traditional distribution into 5 macro-regions is used: West, Center, South, East, and the city of Kyiv.