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• According to a study conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, 44% of Kyiv residents left Kyiv in February-March 2022 immediately after the start of the war. More than half of them moved to another region of Ukraine, a third to another settlement in the Kyiv region, and one in ten abroad. The main audience of those who left were young people, women, and the more affluent.
• The main reason for choosing Kyiv as a place of residence among displaced persons currently living in Kyiv was the presence of relatives and close friends (45%). Other reasons include the opportunity to find work (26%) and the city's safety in wartime (22%). 8-9% said they like Kyiv and that there are many opportunities here to start a new life, while 5% said there are places available for temporary accommodation. For 4%, it did not matter where they went, and for another 2%, it was the decision of the organization responsible for resettlement.
• 17% of IDPs said that their homes, where they lived before the war, were destroyed and uninhabitable. For 24%, it was partially damaged, 2% said it was destroyed but has already been restored, and 35% said it remained unchanged. 21% said they had no information about the condition of their homes. IDPs from Donbas and older respondents reported more damage.
• Two-thirds of IDPs rent apartments in Kyiv, while another quarter live with relatives, friends, or acquaintances. Six to seven percent live in refugee centers, hotels, or hostels, 2% live in their own homes, and 1% live with other local residents.
• During the war, more than 60% of Kyiv residents surveyed reported a deterioration in their family's economic situation. For 30%, it remained unchanged, and for 4%, it improved. The economic situation among IDPs is somewhat worse: about 80% reported a deterioration, 14% said it remained unchanged, and 5% said it improved.
• Three-quarters of both Kyiv residents and IDPs were employed before the war. Currently, 60% of Kyiv residents are working as usual, 6% are working remotely, 7% are working reduced hours, and 7% are in new jobs. Almost 20% of Kyiv residents have lost their jobs.
• Among IDPs, 21% work as usual, 12% work remotely, 4% work reduced hours, and 17% have found new jobs. Currently, 45% of IDPs living in Kyiv are unemployed.
• Among Kyiv residents who have lost their jobs, about 40% plan to find employment in Kyiv in the near future. Among IDPs, this figure exceeds 60%.
• 65% of Kyiv residents surveyed indicated that there was no tension in relations between IDPs and Kyiv residents, while about 20% said that there was tension. Among IDPs, nearly 80% noted that there was no tension in relations with locals, while about 20% noted that there was.
• 55% of Kyiv residents surveyed would welcome some IDPs remaining in the city to live and work, 35% were neutral, and 8% were opposed.
• 85% of Kyiv residents surveyed said they definitely associate their plans for the future with living in Kyiv, another 11% tend to associate them, and about 3% have no plans to stay in Kyiv.
• Among IDPs, 28% definitely associate their plans with Kyiv, while another 27% tend to associate them. About a third of IDPs do not plan to live in the capital in the future.
• About 90% of Kyiv residents and IDPs surveyed consider Kyiv a comfortable place to live. The opposite opinion is held by 9% of Kyiv residents and 6% of IDPs..
• Over the past year, Kyiv residents' assessments of the activities of local authorities, social and municipal services have improved significantly. In particular, 68% are satisfied with the activities of Kyiv Mayor V. Klitschko, while 22% are dissatisfied. Among IDPs, these figures are 65% and 9% respectively (a quarter are undecided).
• 21% of Kyiv residents are satisfied with the activities of Kyiv City Council Chairman Serhiy Popko, while 8% are dissatisfied (more than 60% are undecided). Among IDPs, these figures are 25% and 4% respectively (more than 70% are undecided)
• The activities of the Kyiv City Council were assessed positively by 50% of Kyiv residents and negatively by 24% (25% are undecided). Among IDPs, these figures are 50% and almost 10% respectively (more than 40% are undecided).
• Almost 70% of local residents are satisfied with Kyiv's municipal services (more than a quarter are dissatisfied). Among IDPs, more than 80% are satisfied and almost 15% are dissatisfied.
• More than half of Kyiv residents surveyed are satisfied with social services, while 17% are dissatisfied (a third are undecided). Among IDPs, almost 70% are satisfied, 17% are dissatisfied (15% are undecided).
• More than 80% of Kyiv residents are satisfied with public transport services, while more than 10% are dissatisfied. Among IDPs, these figures are 86% and 8%, respectively.
• More than 60% of Kyiv residents are satisfied with the activities of the police, while about 20% are dissatisfied (more than 20% are undecided). Among IDPs, these figures are 62% and 7% respectively (30% are undecided).
• Almost 70% of Kyiv residents surveyed support the decision of the Kyiv city authorities to dismantle Soviet monuments, while about a quarter do not support it. Among IDPs, almost 65% support this decision, while about 20% oppose it.
• Almost 80% of Kyiv residents approve of the removal of cars parked in inappropriate places. Among those who own a car, more than 70% support the removal of illegally parked cars, while slightly more than 20% do not.
A survey commissioned by the Ukraine Children's Action Project
Problems of Ukrainian children in conditions of war (January 27 - February 1, 2023) from Ratinggroup
• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating" among mothers of Ukrainian children aged 3 to 17 years, commissioned by the "Ukraine Children's Action Project", 42% of children study in schools/kindergartens online, 29% - within blended education form (both online and in the premises of institutions), 26% - constantly attend educational institutions. Only 3% study at home school. The online form of education is most common in the front-line zones*, online and blended forms - in the de-occupied zones and among the residents of the Center. In Kyiv, more than half are engaged both online and in blended education form, while almost 40% attend educational institutions regularly. In the Western regions, almost half of the children (47%) study offline, 40% study both online and offline, and only 10% study online all the time.
• The vast majority of Ukrainian children study in schools or attend preschool educational institutions. Only 8% do not attend. The main reasons why children do not attend educational institutions are the closing of schools/kindergartens due to the war (60%) and the reluctance of parents to send their children to school/kindergarten due to the danger during the war.
• Almost one-third of the children miss classes in schools/kindergartens every day (10%) or several times a week (18%). 36% have missed classes several times a month. 34% noted that they almost never encountered such a problem. Those who live in front-line zones, live away from home, or study only online have missed classes most often. The parents of those children who missed classes identified air alarms (61%), lack of heat and electricity (49%), or the child's illness (44%) as the main reasons for missing classes.
• The main device most often used by children for online learning is a smartphone. They also often use a laptop, much less often a tablet or a desktop computer. Along with that, almost 40% of those whose children use a smartphone as the main device for online learning say that it is not enough for full-fledged learning. Most often, those mothers whose children study online or within blended form believe that they still need a laptop (48%) or a tablet (23%) for studying.
• 83% of children studying online or with blended form of education use a wired connection to access the Internet, 51% use a mobile connection.
• More than half of the surveyed mothers of children studying in schools/kindergartens stated that the announcement of air alerts, blackouts, or lack of Internet were the reasons for their children for missing classes almost every day or several days a week.
• Almost every fifth respondent noted a significant deterioration in the child's academic performance and a decrease in the educational process quality. Most often, such problems were recorded among residents of front-line and de-occupied territories, mothers of junior and high school students, those who study online or within blended education form.
• 14% of the polled mothers noted that their children had to change the educational institution as a result of the war. The absolute majority of such children (82%) changed school/kindergarten only once, 15% – twice, 2% – 3 times. The absolute majority of parents (86%) whose children have changed institutions note that children feel good there. 11% believe that the child is not comfortable in the new educational institution. For preschool children, internally displaced persons, and those who left, but have already returned, it was necessary to change the educational institution relatively more often than others.
• Among the factors that can cause traumatic psychological conditions of children, mothers most often recorded a fear of loud sounds (especially the smallest children under 9). Irritability and apathy, indifference to studies and past hobbies were also recorded relatively more often (these manifestations are more common for children of middle and high school age). In addition, outbursts of anger and aggression (among all children) were a relatively frequent problem. Signs of anxiety states such as fear of the future, sleep problems, nightmares, problems with memory and concentration were more often recorded among older children (16-17 years old), reflection of traumatic events in games and creativity - among the youngest (3-9 years old ).
• 60% of children have witnessed or participated in certain war-related events. Most often, according to mothers, children have experienced the following traumatic events: separation from family and friends (28%), moving to another region of the country (25%), shelling and bombing (24%), prolonged stay in a cold room (17%). Moved abroad - 11%, were under occupation - 8%, witnessed the death of relatives or loved ones - 6%, lost their home - 5%, experienced hunger and lack of water - 5%.
• 19% of the polled mothers of children currently live outside their homes. 20% – left their regions of residence, but have already returned. 61% have not changed their place of residence.
• 20% of respondents consider their current place of residence to be dangerous. Most of them live in the de-occupied, front-line regions and in Kyiv.
• 41% of the interviewed mothers of children noted that among their close relatives (husband, brother, sister, children, parents) there were those who serve in the war.
• 87% of mothers indicate that their children do not need psychological support or help, 13% note that their children do need help (most often these are children of internally displaced persons and those who moved but have already returned, mothers of children of middle and high school age). Only 5% of mothers have applied for psychological help for their children in the last three months, 93% of them were able to get it through a personal visit to a psychologist (78%), online consultation (18%), or by phone (7%).
• 92% of mothers said that their children currently do not need any healthcare support. 40% have applied for such help in the last three months (most often mothers of the smallest children under 5). 98% of those who applied were able to receive such assistance either through a personal visit (92%) or through a telephone consultation (14%).
• 94% of mothers of Ukrainian children definitely or rather believe that Ukraine will be able to beat off Russia's attack. Nevertheless, almost 40% noted that over the past year their sense of confidence in the future has worsened (most often such respondents live in places they consider dangerous, or they are IDPs, or have not lived at home until recently).
• Among the forms of aid since the beginning of the war, respondents most often have received food (40%), money transfers or financial aid (38%). They have also received non-food aid (clothing, hygiene items, blankets, etc.) relatively often (17%).
A comprehensive comparative study «HOW THE WAR CHANGED ME AND THE COUNTRY. SUMMARY OF THE YEAR» aims to show to what extent the views, assessments, and life of Ukrainians have changed in various spheres during the year of the full-scale russian invasion of Ukraine.
Comprehensive research: HOW THE WAR CHANGED ME AND THE COUNTRY. SUMMARY OF THE YEAR from Ratinggroup
POLITICAL CHANGES
• People's memories of February 24, 2022 reveal shock, confusion, uncertainty, unpreparedness. Despite this, these days, a year after the full-scale invasion, the confidence in victory is 95%, compared to 56% in January 2022. The majority (63%) believes that victory requires at least six months or even more time.
• A significant increase in social self-esteem is recorded. The majority of respondents rated Ukraine’s position above average - 4.6 points out of 7, which is 1.5 times higher than the 2021 indicator. Two-thirds of the respondents rated Ukraine's future prospects at the highest level.
• The main emotion respondents feel when thinking about Ukraine is pride. As a result of the full-scale invasion and the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people, this indicator has more than doubled - from 34% to 75%.
• There have also been changes in national self-identification: the absolute majority of respondents identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine (compared to 2021, the indicator has increased from 76% to 94%). Half identify themselves as Europeans (double growth).
• 22% of Ukrainians switched to more frequent use of the Ukrainian language during the year of the war.
• While assessing the financial situation at the end of 2022, two-thirds of respondents note a deterioration in their financial situation, one-third states lack of changes. At the same time, almost 40% (against 14% at the end of 2021) have experienced an increase of confidence in the future.
• The priorities for country’s recovery are the restoration of enterprises and jobs and the reconstruction of damage, because most Ukrainians want to work, not to receive social assistance.
• Ukraine is going through a difficult period of its development, rethinking its role in history. In general, the war has contributed to increasing the trust of citizens in state institutions. Trust in the Armed Forces of Ukraine has grown from 65% to 97%, in the President - from 36% to 90%.
• And while the majority (65%) would not mind Zelenskyi to be re-elected for the next term, the number of those dissatisfied with the performance of the Verkhovna Rada (54%) is higher as compared to the number of those satisfied (37%). And if elections were held in the nearest future, almost half would look for an alternative among new parties.
• There has been an increase in trust in mass media, but the main feature of wartime is a sharp change in the channels of communication and the receipt of information by citizens. And while trust in national and local media has grown, the frequency of consumption of their news content has decreased, on the contrary. Instead, there has been a significant growth of groups and channels in messengers (from 11% to 41%), as well as YouTube (from 21 to 29%). Social networks have retained their influence (35%).
• One of the direct consequences of the russian invasion was the strengthening of Euro-Atlantic moods among Ukrainians, which revealed record figures for the entire history of the country. These days, 87% support Ukraine joining the European Union, 86% - NATO.
• While in 2021 the majority of citizens had a negative image of the state, now more than half speak of a distinctly or moderately positive image. Illustrative in this regard is the indicator of the correct direction of the country’s development, which is the highest for the entire history of measurements (over the year, fluctuations have been at the level of 70-80%), which is based on high trust in the military and political leadership of the country, faith in our victory, a significant increase in self-esteem, and pride for the country, as well as the realization of the people's desire for Euro-Atlantic integration.
PSYCHOEMOTIONAL CHANGES AND ADAPTATION TO WAR
• Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the society has demonstrated a high level of vitality, the value of the Index has decreased minimally (from 3.9 to 3.7).
• About 8% believe they have serious disorders that greatly affect their lives. One-third claims having moderate disorders.
• "Planning horizon" is an important indicator of adaptation and it has not undergone significant changes: 45% currently do not plan their life at all. The number of those who have plans for several years ahead has decreased from 23% to 19%.
• Currently, negative emotions are more pronounced than positive, and therefore sadness (4.8) and anger (4.6) prevail over joy (4.1) and inspiration (4.3), between which fear (4.2) and disappointment (4.1) are located. And the most pronounced are excitement (5.0) and interest (4.8), which are neither unequivocally positive nor negative - it depends on the context.
• Over the year, the feeling of self-love has decreased, while love for others has increased; the tendency of affiliation (the desire to be with others) has worked, the personal gives way to the collective.
• Ukrainians are almost as prone to self-restraint as used to be six months ago - more than half (58%) believe that you should limit yourself significantly in terms of entertainment and shopping, and 37% are inclined to think that you should try to live a full life.
• At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, 44% of Ukrainians had to be temporarily separated from their families. A year later, only 21% of them remain separated. Most of those who had to be separated from their family passed the test, and for 20% their relationship has even improved.
• 83% believe that you should be careful with people, while in 2020, only 54% expressed such opinion. It is about trust as a basic value, as trust in the world, which is undermined or destroyed by war. This especially applies to "strangers", or those who have become such, but seemed close.
• The attitude towards people who have left is ambiguous: women with children are tolerated the most; at the same time, the attitude towards men of military age is the most negative.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES
• Despite the full-scale invasion, Ukrainians remain a humane and tolerant society, support for the death penalty has decreased from 52% to 42%.
• At the same time, the level of tolerance in society has increased during the war: the positive-neutral attitude towards the LGBT community has increased from 53% to 64%, and towards people who do not want to have children (childfree) it has increased from 57% to 67%.
• During the year of the war, faith in God has decreased somewhat: the percentage of those who do not doubt his existence has changed from 60% to 55%.
• Generally accepted norms and values have become more defined, so anomie moods have ceased to dominate: the number of those with a predominant anomie state (state of demoralization) has decreased from 72% to 48%. The biggest change has occurred regarding the improved understanding of what rules to follow and what to believe today.
• The war led to the loss of work for at least one-third of the working population, with a particularly difficult situation for displaced persons and residents of combat zones: half of them lost their jobs. Even among those who were able to continue working during the war, a half still has suffered a reduction in salaries.
• The most difficult situation with work was recorded in the first months of the war, later people began to return to work. Also, after a sharp drop in number of those willing to start their own business at the beginning of the war, their number has been gradually recovering.
• The main strategy for action in the case of income reduction remains the search for an additional source of income (has decreased from 62% to 54%): many people have started looking for a second job during the war or have started working more. However, not everyone has the ability to control their income (60%), it is especially difficult for the elderly people.
• Most citizens have suffered direct or indirect consequences of the full-scale invasion, only 14% have experienced no losses. Residents of the eastern regions have suffered the most losses, more than half of them have left their homes.
• Despite positive changes in society, optimism and absolute faith in victory, the war continues to inflict irreparable damage on Ukrainians and take away the most valuable. Over the last six months, the number of those who had lost relatives has almost doubled (from 9% to 17%), as has the number of those whose loved ones had been injured (from 8% to 13%). At the same time, there is an increase in the number of those who talk about the deterioration of their health (from 25% to 33%), as well as a decrease in the number of those who talk about loss of income (from 38% to 31%).
For comments on the results of this study, please contact the director of the Rating Lab research laboratory, Doctor of Psychological Sciences,
Professor Marianna Tkalych. Phone:+38 (050) 322-09-25 (WhatsApp, Signal), e-mail: tkalych@ratinggroup.ua
• According to the research conducted by the Sociological Group Rating, 16% of Ukrainians changed their place of residence since February 24; 12% had left, but have already returned home. 72% did not change their place of residence. Half of those who have left plan to return home only after the end of the war. 10% plan to return in the nearest future, 23% are still waiting, 11% do not plan to return home. Among the residents of the territories close to the hostilities (South and East), two-thirds live outside their homes these days.
Legal protection of victims from the war crimes of Russia from Ratinggroup
• The vast majority of respondents (87%) have not changed their place of residence due to the shelling of the infrastructure, 8% - have left and live away from home for this reason, 5% - have left and have already returned.
• Every tenth respondent has experienced damage or destruction of housing: 2% noted that their housing was damaged and unfit for living, 6% reported partial damage, 2% - destroyed, but already restored. For the majority (86%), housing has not undergone changes. Among the residents of the hostilities zone, 9% noted that their homes were destroyed, 20% - partially damaged. In the de-occupied territories, 5% of respondents reported destroyed housing, 14% - partially damaged, 5% - damaged but already repaired.
• Among those whose housing has been destroyed or partially damaged, 24% reported their homes’ damage to DIYA, 12% - to law enforcement agencies, and 8% - to state institutions. Almost 70% did not submit any applications.
• Among those who had a job before the war, 40% work as they used to, 17% - remotely or partially, 8% - found a new job. 33% are not working nowadays.
• Since the beginning of the war, the income level of 6% of respondents has increased; 36% noted it has hardly changed, 17% - has decreased somewhat, 30% - has decreased significantly. 10% of respondents lost almost all their income. The income situation is worse among residents of the South and East, middle-aged people, those poor and with low income, as well as those who have lost their jobs or are working part-time.
• 46% noted that during the war the state of their physical health have not changed, 32% said it has rather worsened, and 21% - worsened significantly. Residents of hostilities zone territories, those older and with lower income, women, those who have left their homes, have been injured or have lost loved ones as a result of the war more often reported the deterioration.
• Almost every tenth respondent noted that either they personally or close relatives have been injured as a result of the war. 66% of them have documented the facts of the injury.
• 17% have close relatives with whom they have lost contact and do not know where they are now. 5% have those who died as a result of the war; 3% - forcibly deported to Russia, or to the occupied territories of the East, Crimea.
• 96% of respondents have not contacted law enforcement agencies over the last six months on issues caused by the Russian invasion. The main reason for this is the absence of direct damages/losses or their insignificance (90%).
• 95% of respondents have not contacted public organizations over the last six months on issues caused by the Russian invasion.
• About one-third of the respondents are ready to personally participate in lawsuits to claim compensation for lost property/health in Ukrainian courts, international or special courts with the participation of national and foreign judges.
• In the opinion of 75% of the polled, the priority for justice referring war crimes should be fair punishment of war criminals; 21% name compensation for victims.
• Only 6% know about the legal assistance provided by Ukrainian justice to victims of war crimes, 35% have heard something about it. Almost 60% do not know anything. 60% want to learn more about legal assistance from justice authorities, 37% do not want to.
• 65% of respondents believe the law enforcement system of Ukraine to be effective in terms of the investigation of Russian war crimes, less than 20% share the opposing opinion. The main reasons for inefficiency were cited as following: corruption (59%), citizens' distrust of law enforcement officers (29%), their unprofessionalism (24%), and long proceedings of cases (21%).
• The efficiency of the judicial system of Ukraine referring the investigation of war crimes was assessed in the same way: 60% consider it effective, only about 20% - ineffective. Among the main reasons for the judicial system inefficiency were named such as corruption (65%), citizens' distrust of courts (36%), long proceedings (21%) and unprofessionalism of judges (15%). According to the majority (75%), war crimes’ trials in Ukraine should be started as soon as possible, 23% believe that it should be done after the end of the war.
• Special courts with the participation of national and foreign judges are believed to be the most effective mechanism of trial for Russia’s war crimes (65%). 22% believe that international institutions will be effective in this case, 7% think the same about the courts of Ukraine.
• The absolute majority (96%) support the idea of involving international legal organizations to document Russia's war crimes during the war.
• Considering the initiative to create a special international tribunal referring the aggression crime against Ukraine, 15% of respondents are aware of it, almost 60% have heard something about it. A quarter do not know anything about it. 96% believe that this tribunal should also consider other war crimes - against humanity, genocide. According to 95% of respondents, both Ukrainian and foreign experts should conduct the investigation in the case of the aggression crime against Ukraine.
• Almost 90% support the idea of creating a special judicial system (like an anti-corruption one) to administer justice for crimes committed during Russia's war against Ukraine.
• 34% believe that special judicial bodies should be created for conducting judicial proceedings in the territories of Donbas and Crimea liberated from occupation; 22% are in favor of the creation of such special courts, but on a temporary basis. Almost 40% stand for judicial proceedings in the liberated territories in ordinary courts of Ukraine.
• Only 4% of respondents are well aware of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 30% have heard something about it. More than 60% do not know anything. Instead, about 80% support the idea of Ukraine ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 4% do not support it, 17% have not decided.
• The absolute majority of respondents consider the Russian political authorities to be guilty of committing war crimes against Ukraine (98%), 96% think the same about Russian military personnel. 87% believe Russian citizens are guilty, only 10% think they are not guilty.
• Regarding the issue of applying amnesty to various categories of residents of the occupied territories, in respect of which the facts of collaboration with the enemy were established, a relative majority believes that amnesty is possible for teachers, doctors, social workers (68%), heads of local communal institutions (58%) and heads of local enterprises, banks, and organizations (51%). 38% allow amnesty for local mass media journalists, 57% do not allow it. More than 20% allow amnesty for members of local political parties and members of illegal armed groups, while more than 70% are against it. Less than 20% consider amnesty possible for local government officials and law enforcement officials, and about 80% think it is impossible.
• Almost 40% believe that self-trial in the case of war crimes against Ukraine is justified, 55% share the opposing opinion.
• According to the majority, Russia should compensate Ukraine's economic and infrastructural losses (94%), as well as moral damage to life and health of Ukrainian citizens (92%). 11% and 14% respectively speak about compensation from international organizations, European countries - 6% and 5%, USA - 2% each, Ukraine - 2% and 5% respectively.
• Less than half of the respondents believe that Russia will compensate economic and infrastructure losses. About the same number do not believe in it. Less than 40% believe in compensation for moral damage to life and health of Ukrainian citizens from Russia, about 60% do not believe.
The survey was conducted on the initiative of the "Ukrainian Veteran Fund" of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine. Funded by the Sociological Group "Rating"
• According to the results of the Twentieth national poll conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating" on the initiative of the "Ukrainian Veteran Fund" of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine on January 14-16, 2023, 47% of the respondents noted that among their relatives and friends there were those who had participated in hostilities on the territory of Ukraine between 2014 and 2021. 63% have among their close people those who fought or are fighting at the front, starting from February 24, 2022. Compared to the survey in August, the number of those whose loved ones are fighting at the front today has increased.
• Society continues to record the highest levels of trust in the military: 95% trust the military of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 93% - veterans of the current war, and 95% - veterans of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) in 2014-2021. Regardless of region and age, the absolute majority trust these categories of the population.
• Speaking about the main features of the image of veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war, half of the respondents describe them as middle-aged people, and those who currently serve in the Armed Forces. Respondents do not see a gender difference in the concept of "veteran" - the absolute majority (87%) are convinced that representatives of both genders can be a veteran. On the other hand, such a feature as disability is not decisive for the concept of "veteran": 41% hesitated when they had to decide on the answer to this question, 30% believe that they imagine a "veteran" as a rather healthy person, 29% - precisely as a person with a disability.
• Conflicts in the family, lack of job, and abuse of alcohol or drugs are key problems that veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war are likely to face after returning home. This is the opinion of more than half of the polled. Regarding the risks of suicide and breaking the law, the vast majority (at least two-thirds) consider it unlikely for veterans. Compared to the survey in August, the number of those who foresee the risks of conflicts in families and abuse of alcohol or drugs has increased. Relatives of ATO veterans who fought and are fighting now feel the presence of conflict in the family, or abuse of alcohol or drugs, more acutely. Relatives of those who are no longer fighting feel more acutely about unemployment. Women spoke more often about the risks of conflicts in the family and the lack of job for veterans, while the risks of alcoholism, drug addiction, or breaking the law were more often pronounced by men.
• The level of salaries of military personnel directly participating in hostilities is considered optimal by 40%, less than necessary - by 34%, more than necessary - by 8%, and 18% were unable to answer on the matter. Regarding the salary of soldiers serving in the rear, half rated it as optimal, 13% - less the necessary, 11% - more the necessary, 25% - could not estimate. Compared to the survey in August 2022, there are no sharp changes in the assessment of the salary of the mentioned categories of military.
• The number of those who believe that the state fulfills its obligations to veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war has decreased: in August 2022, there were 69% of them, while in January 2023 – 53%. These days, the number of those who share the opposing opinion is 26%. Residents of the western regions, representatives of the middle-aged and older generations, relatives of those who fought in the ATO and are not fighting today reveal a negative opinion about the fulfillment of the state's obligations to veterans.
• The absolute majority (91%) believes that society respects veterans, only 6% share the opposing opinion.
• The absolute majority (97%) of those who run their own business, or would like to have one, are ready to hire a veteran of the Russian-Ukrainian war. 93% of all respondents indicated that they are ready to work in the same team with such a veteran.
• 93% support the idea of granting benefits to businesses founded by veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war, only 5% stand against it.
• Veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war (54%), persons with disabilities (35%) and large families (35%) should have the most benefits and guarantees from the state, according to the respondents. The provision of benefits for single mothers/fathers is supported by 17%, for pensioners – by 12%, for those with low income and internally displaced persons – by 9-10% each, for those who suffered from Chernobyl disaster - only 3%.
• 75% do not agree with the opinion that veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war abuse benefits. 13% share the opposing opinion. Compared to August 2022, public opinion on this issue has hardly changed. Residents of the East, relatives of those who are fighting at the front today, poor and low-income citizens spoke most often about the abuse of benefits.
• 14% of respondents said that they communicated with the military, who were on the front line, every day or almost every day. 21% talk to them at least once a week, 14% - several times a month. Almost half of the respondents contact with the military who are fighting today rarely or almost never. Most of the latter are among residents of the East, the older population, and women.
• 9% noted that they communicated with veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war almost every day, 14% – at least once a week, 11% – several times a month, two-thirds - rarely or never. The main reason for not communicating with veterans is the absence of such persons in one’s environment. 13% indicated the unwillingness to evoke unpleasant memories as the reason for the lack of communication with veterans. About 4-5% said that they do not communicate because of the fear of saying the wrong thing or lack of common topics to discuss.
• Two-thirds of respondents indicated that they were completely or somewhat uninformed about the problems of veterans. 37% stated that they were informed. More of the latter was recorded among residents of the Center and South, middle-aged people, relatives of those who fought during 2014-2021, men, and those who often communicate with veterans.
• Among the main problems that veterans face most often, the relative majority identified psychological disorders (40%). 23% to 29% consider the main problems to be difficulties with registration of benefits, job search, receiving healthcare, misunderstanding of society. Conflicts with family and friends or alcohol or drug addiction were mentioned by 14% of the respondents as problems of veterans.
• TV (37%), stories of relatives and friends (37%), news from social networks (34%) are the main sources of information about veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war and their problems. 22% learn about such things from Telegram channels or Viber, 19% - from Internet mass media, 13% - from personal experience.
• 47% of respondents reveal a rather positive attitude towards the fact that various political forces can invite veterans to run in the elections. 15% don't care of it. On the other hand, one-third (32%) share a negative attitude towards politicians' involvement of veterans in elections. Most of the latter are among residents of the West and Center, young and middle-aged people, those with high income, as well as relatives of those who fought in the ATO and those who fought and are currently fighting.
• According to the results of the Twentieth national poll conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating" on January 14-16, 2023, 87% of the respondents would support Ukraine's accession to the European Union if the referendum were held (3% - against, 8% - would not vote).
• The support for joining NATO has increased once again over recent months and reveals the highest in the history of research: 86% would support this initiative in a referendum, 3% would vote against it, and 8% would not vote. The support for joining the EU and NATO is almost unanimous among representatives of all macro-regions, age and income groups.
• 85% of the polled support the idea of creating military and political union of Ukraine, Poland and Great Britain. 3% stand against such an initiative, 7% don’t care of it.
• 80% reveal a positive attitude towards the idea of creating military and political union of Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania. 6% are against such a union, and 9% are indifferent. The idea of military and political unions with the mentioned European countries gains high support among all regional, age, and income groups.
• The results of a survey conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating" on December 10-18 in Chernihiv revealed that over 60% of the city's residents believe that things are going in the right direction both in Ukraine and in the city: 67% say that things are going in the right direction in Ukraine, 63% - in the city.
• The vast majority of Chernihiv residents are confident that Ukraine will be able to beat off the Russian attack (93%), 4% could not answer on the matter, and only 3% are not sure about Ukraine's victory.
• 63% of the city's residents are convinced that friendly relations between Ukrainians and Russians will never be restored. A quarter assume that the restoration of relations can only happen in 20-30 years, 6% think it will happen in 10-15 years, and only 3% foresee the restoration of friendship in the nearest years (there are more of them among the older and poorer population).
• 83% of Chernihiv residents are satisfied with the performance of Mayor Atroshenko, 11% are not satisfied, 6% could not rate him. 65% are satisfied with the activities of the Chernihiv City Council, 13% are not satisfied, 23% could not rate it. The performance of Chernihiv Oblast State Administration was assessed almost the same: 60% were satisfied with its activities, 20% were not satisfied, and 20% could not answer on the matter.
• The majority of residents are also satisfied with the activities of the local territorial defense: 73% are satisfied, 10% are not satisfied, and 16% could not assess. Among city services, communal institutions were rated the best: 82% were satisfied with their performance and only 13% were dissatisfied. Somewhat lower number are satisfied with the activities of public transport and healthcare facilities in the city: about 70% are satisfied, 13-17% are dissatisfied, and the same number could not answer. 62% are satisfied with the police performance, 16% are not satisfied, and 22% could not assess it. 55% of respondents rated the performance of educational institutions in war conditions positively, 15% were dissatisfied with their activities, and one-third could not provide an answer to this question.
• The absolute majority (92%) are satisfied with the quality of city cleaning, and only 4% are not satisfied. Regarding other directions of the authorities’ activities, opinions differ: 40% are satisfied with houses’ reconstruction, 26% are dissatisfied with it, 33% could not rate it; about 40% are also satisfied with the material support of residents, about 30% are not satisfied, and the same number could not answer. Only one-third are satisfied with the organization of bomb shelters, and half of the city's residents are not.
• Among local government representatives, city residents expressed the most positive attitude towards the city mayor Vladyslav Atroshenko: 81% reveal a positive attitude towards him, 10% - negative. Mostly, since the beginning of the war, the attitude of the residents towards Mayor Atroshenko has either improved or has not changed: 36% say that the attitude has improved, 51% - nothing has changed, and only 9% - attitude has worsened during the war.
• 47% of Chernihiv residents are positive towards the head of the Oblast State Administration Vyacheslav Chaus, 29% are negative, 21% have not given an answer, and 3% have not heard of him. 45% reveal a positive attitude towards the secretary of the City Council Oleksandr Lomako, 11% - negative attitude, 20% - undecided, and 24% do not know him. The least known is the head of the Chernihiv Oblast Council, Olena Dmytrenko: 65% do not know her, 20% could not give an answer. 12% are positive towards her, and 3% - negative.
• 31% of city residents are in a tense emotional state, 33% are in average state of tension, and 34% are in a calm state. Younger people, those with higher income, and men manage to remain calmer.
• More than half of Chernihiv residents have close relatives who serve in the war. 12% said that they lost a close relative (husband/wife, parents, children) as a result of the war. Among those whose relatives fought at the front, 16% talk about the loss of a close person.
• 53% of Chernihiv residents left their homes during the war. Most of them left either to another settlement of Chernihiv region (45%), or to another region within Ukraine (44%). Only 9% of them traveled abroad. Those with higher income more often have left for other regions, while those with lower income more often have stayed within the region. In general, among younger respondents and women, there are more of those who left Chernihiv during the war.
• 78% of Chernihiv residents plan to stay in the city even if the situation with electricity, water, or heat gets worse, only 12% plan to leave, and 10% do not know what they are to do. In case of an escalation of hostilities near the city/region, the majority of Chernihiv residents are also planning to stay at home: 70% will stay, 15% plan to leave, and 15% have not decided. In general, women, younger people, and those who already left the city during the war are more likely to leave. At the same time, even among those who had previously left Chernihiv during the war, more than 70% agree to stay without communications, and more than 50% - in case of safety situation worsening.
• In general, 75% of Chernihiv residents rate it as a safe city to live in: 21% - definitely safe and 54% - rather safe. However, 14% consider Chernihiv not a very safe city: 12% - rather dangerous, 2% - completely dangerous, and 11% - could not give an answer. The level of safety in Chernihiv is more optimistically assessed by those with higher income, men, and younger respondents.
• 68% of those who had had a job before the start of the full-scale invasion of Russia continue to work in the usual mode. 5% work remotely, 5% have found a new job. By contrast, 21% are currently unemployed. Relatively higher number of the latter is recorded among the elderly and those with lowest income.
• 45% noted that their income has decreased as compared to the pre-war level (19% – somewhat, 26% – significantly). 4% have lost their sources of income at all. 46%, on the other hand, noted that nothing has changed in their financial situation. Representatives of the middle-aged group, those with lowest income, and those who have lost their jobs mentioned financial difficulties most often.
• Despite the fact that about a half of the respondents experience income decrease, 82% of Chernihiv residents said that they were ready to endure financial difficulties as long as necessary for the sake of victory over Russia. Along with that, there are no significant differences in property or age categories.
• 25% indicated that their houses had been damaged since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Russia: 22% - partial damage, 3% - significant damage, uninhabitable housing. 70% of respondents whose houses were damaged during the war said the repair of the premises had already begun: 59% spoke about the start of partial repair, 11% - major repair. 28%, on the other hand, noted that the repair has not yet started. Most of the latter are among those whose housing is almost or completely destroyed.
• 77% of those whose homes were damaged noted that they carried out repairs at their own expense. Only 9% said that the repairs were done with state funds, 6% - with funds from international organizations, 5% - with funds from volunteers or charitable foundations, and 3% - with funds from relatives and friends.
• 71% of all respondents are convinced that houses should be rebuilt as soon as possible, 17% said that it is necessary to wait for the end of the war. At the same time, 51% are convinced that the central government should finance the restoration of damaged buildings, 37% believe that it should be done by international organizations, and 34% - by local government.
• 49% of Chernihiv residents indicated that they were ready to personally (financially or participating in construction) take part in the reconstruction of the city. 37% would like to join, but cannot; 9% consider it not their business. The willingness to participate in the reconstruction was most often expressed by men, those younger and with higher income.
• Two-thirds reveal a negative attitude towards the idea of creating a military-civilian administration in Chernihiv and suspending the power of the mayor and the city council for the period of martial law in Ukraine. 18% support such an initiative.
• 71% of respondents are well aware of the decision of the Yavoriv District Court, according to which the mayor of Chernihiv, Vladyslav Atroshenko, was deprived of the right to hold the position of mayor for one year. 22% have heard something about it. 73% of Chernihiv residents do not support such a decision of the court, only 14% support it. 62% are convinced that such a decision is pressure on local authorities, 18% believe that it is a fight against corruption.
• The Sociological Group "Rating" within the framework of the Nineteenth national survey in the conditions of war, on November 20-21, 2022 carried out research on the attitude of Ukrainians towards the idea of transferring the date of Christmas celebration.
• Over the last year, the number of those who celebrate Christmas only on December 25 (4% to 11%) and those who celebrate it on both dates (18% to 25%) has somewhat increased. More than half (55%) will celebrate Christmas on January 7 (71% in 2021). 8% do not celebrate Christmas at all (mostly among young people, residents of the South and the capital). Residents of the West, Kyiv, younger respondents and Greek Catholics mentioned more often either the double celebration of Christmas or the celebration only on December 25.
• The number of those who support the idea of transferring the Christmas celebration to December 25 has also increased over the year: from 26% to 44%. 31% (in 2021 - 58%) stand against such an idea. 23% said they do not care about this question and 2% could not answer on the matter.
• The majority of supporters of the idea of Christmas transferring was recorded among residents of the West and Kyiv: more than half support this idea. Among the residents of the Center, a relative majority (44%) is also not against this initiative. Moreover, there is considerable support for the idea of Christmas celebration postponing among Greek Catholics. Among the parishioners of OCU, almost a half support this idea (46%), while one-third of them stand against it. On the other hand, among the residents of the South and East, a relative majority does not support the idea of transferring the date of Christmas celebration. In terms of age, the most contradictions are observed within the older and middle-aged groups, where the relative majority (more than 40%) support the idea of postponing the date, while a significant number (at least one-third) are against it. Among young people, one-third are in favor of the transfer, while one-third are against it, and the same number said that they didn't care.
• The Sociological Group "Rating" within the framework of the Nineteenth national survey in the conditions of war, on November 20-21, 2022 carried out comprehensive research on the assessments of changes in various spheres of life, and citizens’ expectations and hopes for the next year.
• As of the end of 2022, over 82% of respondents believe that things in Ukraine are going in the right direction, only 7% think this direction is wrong. Assessment of the right direction of things’ development dominates in all regional cuts and age groups.
• The absolute majority of respondents (97%) are sure that Ukraine will be able to beat off Russian attack.
• Two-thirds of the polled expect the next 2023 year to be better than the previous one. 12% believe that next year will be the same, 16% - worse. Compared to last year's study, the indicators are more optimistic. Also, almost 90% wait for 2023 with optimism, only 6% with pessimism.
• When assessing changes in various spheres over the last year, more positive rates were recorded referring the political situation (about half said it had improved) and a feeling of confidence in the future (almost 40% of respondents said it had improved).
• Regarding the assessment of their own state of health, two-thirds of the polled indicated no changes, one-third mentioned deterioration. The respondents rated the economic situation in the country the worst: 80% noted deterioration, 10% - no change, only 6% - improvement. More than 60% said that the economic situation of their family had worsened, one-third mentioned no change, and only 4% - improvement.
• Considering the dynamics over the last year, the feeling of confidence in the future and assessment of the political situation in the country have improved. Although the assessment of both one's own economic situation and the country’s has undergone negative changes over the year, the indicators are not worse than the 2018 level. Negative trends in the assessments of the economy and finances among the younger and middle-aged generations’ representatives are especially noticeable.
• Evaluating changes in specific spheres, the best ratings are observed in the assessment of the country's defense capacity (90%) and Ukraine's international image (86%).
• Referring freedom of speech and democracy, half of the respondents have not noticed any changes, 34% believe that the situation has improved, 12% think it has worsened. Regarding the roads’ condition, 42% have hardly noted any changes, 24% - improvement, and 28% - deterioration. The situation with the fight against corruption has not changed for 46%, improved for 22%, worsened for 17%. The quality of healthcare and housing and communal services has not changed for almost half of the polled, improved - for 12% and 8% respectively, worsened - for 23% and 41% respectively.
• The worst rated are the situation with the prices for basic goods and medicines (worsened for 94%), opportunities to find a job (worsened for 72%), and quality of education (worsened for 55%).
• Referring the dynamics, negative trends are observed regarding the evaluation of the roads’ condition, the opportunity of finding a job, and the quality of education. There were no changes during the assessment year regarding the prices for basic goods and medicines. Indexes regarding the quality of housing and communal services, healthcare, fight against corruption, freedom of speech and democracy, and especially the international image, have improved.
• Sociological group «Rating» by order of the public organization «Transatlantic Dialogue Center» carried out a study «Reconstruction of Ukraine and international aid» on November 20-21, 2022. According to the results of the survey, Ukrainians' views on when to begin the repair of damage in the de-occupied territories are somewhat diverse: 44% think it should be done as soon as possible, and 52% believe it is worth waiting for the war end. Differences are observed within the regional distribution: residents of the Eastern regions are more likely to be in favor of reconstruction as soon as possible, while respondents from the Western and Central regions are more supportive of the idea of postponing it until the war ends.
• Restoration of jobs and income sources is more important for Ukrainians as direct financial support. Thus, among the programs most needed for war-affected communities, the most often chosen were the restoration of businesses and jobs (60%) and the damage repair (55%). Financial support was identified as an important program by 44%. 37% named medical and humanitarian assistance as important. Children's development programs and psychosocial care are significant for a quarter of the polled. Instead, programs for either democratic institutions development or cultural and social cohesion were chosen less often – by 3 to 6%.
• There are certain differences in the relevance of reconstruction programs within regional and age cut. Thus, for the residents of the East, the issues of returning to work and damage repair are more critical. Humanitarian assistance and support for children's development are more important for young people as compared to older people. Also, one-third of the younger population declared the need for a psychosocial care program. Moreover, displaced people more often than others record the need for reconstruction: those who have moved more often than others talk about the need for jobs restoration, damage repair, and the need for medical and humanitarian assistance.
• Communications and energy infrastructure (64%) are the main priority for recovery in conflict-affected communities according to all respondents. Reconstruction of social infrastructure (schools, hospitals) was most often chosen as the second priority (29%), somewhat less often - restoration of private housing and communications (24% each), transport infrastructure (17%).
• Opinions on the reconstruction strategy for the damaged infrastructure are diverse: 48% believe that the recovery should take place as soon as possible, while 49% stand for the recovery to last longer but include the introduction of green, energy-saving technologies and modernization. Among the polled from the Eastern regions, there are somewhat more of those who prefer quick recovery, but still among them there are also about 40% who do not mind waiting for infrastructure modernization. Among the residents of the Center and West, there are somewhat more of those in favor of slower reconstruction, but with modernization. There are also generational differences: while older people want to rebuild infrastructure as soon as possible, most young people want to modernize and advocate for the introduction of green energy.
• In general, the majority of respondents positively perceive the participation of countries that do not commit aggression against Ukraine referring the reconstruction. Thus, potential aid from Great Britain, the USA, Germany, and France is perceived very positively: 81-90% of respondents support the participation of these states in the reconstruction. Regarding Turkey, 67% share this opinion (22% are neutral, 10% are negative). As for China, 45% support such an initiative (a quarter are neutral and the same number are negative).
• Evaluating different scenarios of foreign countries' involvement in Ukraine's reconstruction, the majority (55%) advocate that foreign countries provide finances and supervise Ukrainian companies. The scenario in which foreign companies are directly involved in the reconstruction was supported by 29%. 13% supported the idea that foreign countries provide finances while Ukrainian companies carry out the reconstruction works on their own. Participation of foreign countries only at the consultation level was supported by only 2%. Among those who are positive towards the foreign countries’ involvement in Ukraine’s reconstruction, the support for the ideas of direct participation of foreigners or control on their part is more often observed.
• Since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion, the conviction that Ukraine's victory in the war is the liberation of all its territories, including Crimea and occupied Donbas, has increased (from 74% in March to 85% in November 2022). Only 9% chose the option of returning only the territories that Ukraine controlled until 24.02.22. At the same time, no more than 5% support the continuation of hostilities on the Russian territories. Support for the de-occupation of all territories of Ukraine without exception is absolute (more than 80%) among representatives of all regions of the country.
• The number of those who support the reinstatement of nuclear-weapon-state status for Ukraine has increased (from 47% in 2019 to 53% in 2022).
• Ukraine's accession to NATO (61%) and Russia's nuclear disarmament (50%) are measures to deter future attacks against Ukraine which are most often supported by respondents. Ukraine's accession to the EU and guarantees from Western countries to supply Ukraine with weapons are supported by 34% of respondents as measures of deterrence. Nuclear weapons of Ukraine and financial aid to our state were chosen by 17% each. Only 8% supported signing peace agreements with Russia as a method of deterring aggression. Residents of the East and South, as well as those who support the military recapture of only the territories controlled as of February 24, 2022, are somewhat more likely to believe in the effectiveness of signing peace agreements with Russia. At the same time, in all regional and age groups, an overwhelming majority chose Ukraine's accession to NATO and Russia's nuclear disarmament as the best guarantees of security.
• The majority of the population of Ukraine has not heard anything about the initiative of French President Macron «European Political Community». Only 3% know something about it, 29% have heard something about it. In general, 54% among all believe in the benefits of such a platform, and 63% of them among those who have heard something about it. A quarter of Ukrainians believe that such an initiative would not be effective in countering Russian aggression.
• The vast majority of respondents (60%) consider Germany to be a friendly country towards Ukraine, about one-third considers it rather neutral. Only 1% consider Germany hostile in relation to our state. The attitude towards the involvement of Germany in the reconstruction is somewhat better as compared to the perception of it as an ally, because referring the issue of reconstruction the positive attitude towards it is at the level of 85%.
• The main factors that influence the perception of Germany as a friendly country were the supply of arms to Ukraine and aid to Ukrainian refugees (over 50%). 38% noted that the factor that positively influenced their opinion of Germany was its financial aid to Ukraine. 14% rate Germany as friendly because they believe the German population supports Ukraine. Among other factors that influenced the positive assessment, only 7% of respondents identified the introduction of sanctions against Russia by Germany, 5% - the pro-Ukrainian stance of German politicians. 5% said they simply like this country.
• Instead, the main factor determining Ukrainians' perception of Germany as an unfriendly or neutral country is that German politicians have a pro-Russian stance (44% among those who consider Germany to be neutral or hostile). The fact that Germany continues to cooperate with Russia (28%) and that it supplies insufficient amount of weapons (27%) also play a significant role in this assessment. About the insufficiency of financial aid, or German population support to Russia, the polled spoke much less often (9-10% each). 2-5% of respondents noted either lack of sympathy for Germany.
The research carried out in cooperation with the Doctor of Sociological Sciences, Deputy Director of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine Serhii Dembitskyi
• According to the results of the nineteenth national survey "Ukraine in the conditions of war" carried out by the Sociological group "Rating", in general, at this stage, Ukrainian society is characterized by an almost equal number of those who believe there are no generally recognized norms in our society (anomie state), and those who, on the contrary, believe that such norms exist (non-anomie state). The number of the first category is 46%, while the number of the latter is 48%. 6% of respondents belong to the intermediate group, and it is difficult to draw a conclusion regarding their attitude towards the existence of generally accepted norms in society.
• Throughout the entire history of modern Ukraine, society was dominated by the anomie condition, which has been weakening very slowly and inconsistently (from 82% in 1992 to 72% in 2021). But after the start of Russia's large-scale war against Ukraine at the beginning of 2022, anomie sentiments have significantly decreased and ceased to be decisive, although they remain quite widespread.
• The key indicators that still point out the existence of anomie attitudes among the respondents are uncertainty about the future and a sense of the destruction of what their parents believed in. These observations fit perfectly into the logic of what is currently happening in Ukraine. At the same time, the vast majority of respondents clearly understand what is happening around them, and are also confident in their assessments of what is currently true and what is not.
• Considering the regional cut, there are almost no differences regarding the anomia state among the respondents. Though the following differences are present among the residents of different settlement types, age groups, and genders:
1) the larger the size of the settlement, the less widespread is the anomie feeling;
2) anomie becomes more common with age;
3) anomie feeling is weaker among men compared to women.
Reference: Anomie Scale (McClosky & Schaar) makes it possible to assess anomie demoralization. Anomie demoralization is a psychological reaction of people to a social situation, when one system of norms and values, which unites people into a community, is broken, and the other is not yet formed.
• According to the results of the survey conducted by the Sociological group "Rating", 93% said that they agree with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932-1933 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people. The number of those who do not support this thesis is 3%; 4% hesitate to answer.
• Over the past ten years, an increse of one and a half times is being observed in the number of respondents who agree with the thesis that the 1932-33 Holodomor was a genocide of the Ukrainian people (compared to last year - increase of 8 percentage points). The Holodomor of 1932-33 is recognized as genocide by the absolute majority of residents in the western, central, and southeastern oblasts. Also, no significant deviations in age distributions in this matter were recorded.
• As part of the Eighteenth national survey during the war, Sociological group “Rating” on October 8-9, 2022 conducted a comprehensive study of the general assessment of the situation, the perception of the nuclear threat danger from russia, as well as the attitude towards foreign countries and their assessment according to the "ally" index.
• Results of the survey confirmed the growth dynamics referring those who believe the things in the country are going in the right direction. Within this survey, a record indicator was observed throughout the whole history of the studies - 86% of respondents believe that things in Ukraine are going in the right direction. Only 6% have revealed the opposite opinion, 8% could not answer on the matter. In all regions and within all age groups, the assessment of the countries development direction as correct dominates.
• Two-thirds of Ukrainians do not believe that russia will use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, and even more respondents do not believe in the possibility of a nuclear strike on NATO countries (84%). Compared to the survey in April of this year, the confidence that russia will not launch a nuclear attack on Ukraine and the Western countries - members of the North Atlantic Alliance – has strengthened.
• According to Ukrainians, currently Poland, Lithuania, Great Britain, the USA, and Canada are the most friendly towards Ukraine. Finland, Sweden, Denmark, France, Switzerland, Germany, and Japan are also considered to be friendly. About half of the polled believe Turkey and Kazakhstan to be friendly, though 40% think these two countries are rather neutral towards Ukraine.
• China currently remains mostly neutral country for Ukrainians. Hungary, on the contrary, "turned" into a "hostile" state - 41% find it hostile, 26% - neutral, 21% - friendly. Belarus (85%) and russia (97%) are absolutely hostile countries for Ukrainians. Over the recent months, the attitude of Ukrainians towards Canada, Poland, Lithuania, Great Britain, and the USA has improved; towards France it has hardly changed. Instead, the neutral attitude towards Turkey has grown. There is also a trend of attitudes’ worsening towards China (especially compared to 2021 data).
As a part of the eighteenth wave of the “Ukraine during the war” project, Sociological Group “Rating” conducted another study of psychological markers: the levels of resilience and psychological exhaustion as well as the consumer behavior strategies
SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE CITIZENS OF UKRAINE
• The share of the respondents who have been forced to leave their places of permanent residence since February 24, 2022, has increased somewhat. The growth is due to the increase in the number of internally displaced persons from the Eastern and Southern regions.
• 85% of the polled express their intention to return home: 21% - soon, 19% - willing to return, but are going to wait, and 45% - will return, but only when the war is over. Only 6% said they will not return home. Compared to July of this year, the share of those who plan to return soon has been increasing, while the share of those who either will return after the war, or will not return at all, has been decreasing.
• The gradual return of the citizens to their workplaces continues. Currently, 38% of those who had worked before the war have returned to their regular job places, while 18% are working remotely, and 7% have found a new job. Despite this, one-third of such respondents are still not employed. Most of the latter are among the youngest and the oldest respondents, as well as among women and residents of the East of the country. This survey for the first time recorded positive trends in returning to work among residents of the South and East. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that regional identification is made according to the place of residence until February 24, 2022.
LEVEL OF RESILIENCE
• During the eighth month of the war, Ukrainians continue to demonstrate a good level of resilience (3.9 points out of 5). The components of this indicator: psychological resilience (3.9) and maintaining physical health (3.7) – has not changed significantly as compared to June.
• Curiosity about what is happening around (4.5), plans for the future (4.2), normal nutrition (4.2), absence of regrets about the past (4.1), and confidence in one's decisions (4.0) primarily contribute to the relatively high index of psychological resilience.
• These days, Ukrainians suffer most from fatigue (only 34% do not feel it) and lack of good sleep (only 47% have good sleep). Such reactions of the body are natural for stress and at the same time quite exhausting. Despite this, other emotional and moral indicators of citizens are better.
• Since April, there has been a decrease in indicators of normal nutrition, while at the same time, indicators of good sleep have been increasing. And this allows to keep a relative balance of physical health support.
• Women have a lower level of resilience than men. A relatively lower level of resilience has been recorded within the youngest and oldest age groups. The availability of work has a positive effect on resilience: those who work full-time or part-time feel better than those who do not work, because work (employment, team) and salary cover the basic need for security and belonging to the community. Also, a higher level of resilience is observed among those who have relatives who currently bear arms.
• In the regional terms, this survey has revealed no significant differences in terms of the integral indicator. At the same time, there is a significant gap between the index of physical health (relatively lower level) and psychological stability (relatively higher level) among the residents of the South.
• For all groups of the polled, psychological resilience (3.9) is higher than the indicators of physical condition (3.7). Similarly, like in the previous study, the hypothesis is proven: the war has physically exhausted Ukrainians to a bigger extent, while psychological endurance still remains better.
• The dynamics of the resilience index has somewhat improved. Eight months of war but Ukrainians still have enough physical and moral strength to live in tough circumstances, to work, to help, and to fight.
LEVEL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXHAUSTION
• The dynamics of research of the emotional states for the period from March till October, 2022 reveals that the changes in day-to-day assessment of one’s emotional stress are still insignificant. The peak of stress was observed at the beginning of April 2022 (3.5), while in June there has been a gradual decrease of the stress (3.3), and in October it has remained at that exact level (3.3).
• 24% of Ukrainians feel calm and very calm. 40% feel tense and very tense, and this is a relatively low indicator as for wartime. Tension increases with age, probably due to narrowing opportunities to take care of oneself, as well as material and other resources. Also, tension is more common for women (probably due to their higher sensitivity and need to take care not only of themselves, but also of their children) and for those who have changed their place of residence, - the need to adapt to a new place, situation of uncertainty, change in the usual living conditions significantly increase stress.
• The index of psychological exhaustion is still quite moderate (2.0). Considering dynamics, it has not changed from April to October 2022, except for the indicator of trust in people (it has decreased). The share of those who believe that people cannot be trusted and of those who think that something bad may happen has increased. The latter trend is probably related to the news about the destruction and the dead, and the realization that there are few left who were not at least indirectly affected by it.
• The index of psychological exhaustion is mainly “warranted” by mistrust of people (2.7) and sad mood (2.6). However, Ukrainians still do not feel “dead” inside (1.6) and can rely on themselves (1.4). Also, the majority do not feel weak, and the surrounding world is not perceived as hostile and dangerous. Since April, there has been a decrease in indicators of "sad" mood; at the same time, there has been an increase in mistrust of others and despair in the ability to rely on oneself.
• Those youngest and oldest respondents, women, residents of the East and West, those who are not working or are retired, those who have changed their place of residence, as well as those who have relatives currently bearing arms feel the most exhausted.
• Monitoring of emotional states, level of resilience and psychological exhaustion from March to October 2022 has revealed that, in general, Ukrainians were able to maintain and stabilize their psychological and emotional state, acquire sufficient competence in overcoming stressful events of war life. Those younger and older people, women, and those who have lost their jobs remain the risk groups.
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR STRATEGIES
• Most often, respondents make decisions about buying products and goods based on the compatibility of price and quality (42%). 29% are guided by the fact that they regularly buy the same goods (regular consumption strategy) or because of the opportunity to buy them cheaper (cost minimization strategy). 20% buy because the purchase brings pleasure (hedonists), 13% buy the best quality goods (perfectionists). Only 4% buy products impulsively (impulsive consumption strategy), 2% - because the product is new (novelties consumption). Compatibility of price and quality and regularity of purchase are more likely for the younger and middle-aged generation, who are guided by a rational approach to spending. Buying because of a lower price is more likely for older people, since they often have lower incomes and are forced to save. Young people are also relatively more likely to buy either because it brings pleasure or guided by the quality indicator - it corresponds to the values of the younger generation, who are more hedonistic and perfectionist. Regularity and the "cheapness" motive prevail among women; compatibility of price and quality, especially better quality - among men. Thus, women have more rational strategies, while men have more emotional strategies (although women are usually seen as oriented on emotions, but women usually have lower incomes as compared to men).
• The results of the cluster analysis of the consumer behavior strategies made it possible to divide consumers into the following groups: hedonists (38%), rationalists (24%), traditionalists (21%), and thrifty (19%). "Hedonists" - choose goods of the best quality, buy something based on the compatibility of price and quality and something that brings pleasure; prevail among young people, men, and those who have job (respectively, higher incomes). "Rationalists"- buy cheaper and when there is a good "price-quality" ratio; more of them are among representatives of the middle-aged generation, men, those who have job, as well as retirees. "Traditionalists" - buy the same goods in the "price - quality" ratio; more of them are among young people and those who work. "Thrifty" - buy cheaper and the same things; more of them are among the elderly, women (more of them among the oldest category), unemployed, and retired. In general, these are worthy, adequate strategies of developed societies with good economic indicators.
For comments on the results of this study, please contact Professor Marianna Tkalych, Director of the Rating Lab research laboratory, Doctor of Psychological Sciences. Tel.: +38 (050) 322-09-25 (WhatsApp, Signal), e-mail: tkalych@ratinggroup.ua
• Sociological group "Rating" within the framework of the "People's Top" project continued the research of outstanding Ukrainians of all times. With the help of an open ended question, the respondents, without receiving any lists or prompts, named those famous personalities whom they consider worthy of this rating.
• Taras Shevchenko once again became the leader of the "People's TOP" rating (63.9%). Volodymyr Zelenskyi (29.8%), Lesya Ukrainka (19.6%), Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (17.3%), and Stepan Bandera (12.8%) also entered top 5 most outstanding Ukrainians. Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (11.6%), Ivan Franko (10.1%), Ivan Mazepa (8.8%), Vyacheslav Chornovil (8.7%) and Valery Zaluzhnyi (7, 7%) entered top 10.
• Hryhoriy Skovoroda (6.7%), Vasyl Stus (3.4%), Volodymyr Veliky (2.6%), Yaroslav Mudryi (2.5%), Leonid Kravchuk (2.5%), Ivan Sirko (2.4%), Vitaliy Klitschko (2.2%), Oleksandr Usyk (2.2%), Andriy Shevchenko (1.8%), and Petro Sagaidachnyi (1.8%) entered the second ten of the rating.
• Third ten is represented by: Roman Shukhevich (1.7%), Leonid Kuchma (1.5%), Taras Bulba (1.5%), Ivan Kotlyarevskyi (1.4%), Lina Kostenko (1.3%), Ihor Sikorskyi (1.2%), Petro Poroshenko (1.2%), Mykhailo Kotsiubinskyi (1.1%), Mykola Amosov (0.9%), and Pavlo Skoropadskyi (0.9%).
• Respondents indicated a total of 148 names. At the same time, about 8% of respondents could not name (remember) a single outstanding Ukrainian.
The survey was conducted as part of the project of the Public Organization "Center for Promotion of the Volunteer Movement "Volonter.Org": "Assessment of the damage caused by the war crimes of the Russian Federation in Ukraine". The survey and the report were developed within the framework of the project "Urgent support of the EU for civil society", which is implemented by ISAR Ednannia with the financial support of the European Union. Its content is entirely responsibility of the Public Organization "Center for Promotion of the Volunteer Movement “Volonter.Org" and does not necessarily reflect the position of the European Union. Expert support and consultations during the research have been provided by the representatives of the Coalition "Ukraine. Five in the morning".
• According to the survey results, about a quarter of the respondents said they were forced to change their place of residence in Ukraine during the full-scale invasion of russia in Ukraine. Most of them are among those who lived in the war zone * (64%) and in Kyiv (42%). One-third of those who left their homes have already returned. Also, 9% of those displaced plan to return in the nearest future, 15% intend to wait. At the same time, another one-third intend to return, but only if the war ends. Only 6% do not plan to return at all. Considering the de-occupied localities, half of those who had left during the war have already returned.
• 32% of the polled stated they experienced material losses as a result of the war; 67% did not. More than a half of the inhabitants of the territories where hostilities were or are still ongoing have suffered losses. Among the losses, money was most often mentioned – by 36%, housing - 23%, household appliances - 14%. 7% said they had lost animals, 6% - cars, 5% - production, 4% - commercial real estate.
• Every tenth respondent stated that their housing was either destroyed (2%) or damaged (8%). 5% are not aware of the current condition of their housing. For 85%, the housing situation has not changed. About one-third of those whose home is either in the de-occupied territory or in the war zone said that their home was damaged. Also, every fifth of those whose housing is still in the occupation zone, does not know anything about its condition.
• In a third of the damaged buildings, reconstruction works have already begun: 4% have started major renewal, 27% - partial renewal. Despite this, 66% have not yet started any works. Among those who lost their homes, 18% have already filed a claim for damage to DIYA, 16% - to law enforcement bodies, 15% - to other state institutions, 67% - have not appealed anywhere yet. 39% of victims believe that their houses should be rebuilt as soon as possible, 59% - on the contrary, think that it is worth waiting for the end of the war first.
• The majority of those who lost their homes (58%) plan to use their own funds for reconstruction. 27% expect to restore the housing using state funds, 12% - funds of international organizations, 9% - funds of volunteers, and 7% - funds of relatives or charitable funds. Owners of destroyed housing expect more help from the state, while owners of partially damaged housing expect to cope using their own resources. In general, those who have already started repairs proceed mostly at their own expense. In general, residents who have already returned home are more active in restoring their housing - most of them have already started reconstruction and filed a claim for damage.
• Currently, among those who had had a job before the war, 61% are working: full-time - 36%, remote or part-time - 19%, found a new job - 6%. Instead, 37% lost their jobs and are not working now. The highest number of those who lost their jobs was recorded among the residents of the East, women, those with the lowest income, and internally displaced persons. Over the month, the indicators of employment have not changed significantly in general; however, compared to the previous surveys, positive trends in terms of the return to work in the Central and Western regions are observed.
• The main source of income for the majority of respondents is salary (56%) and pension (31%). 8% had income from private business, and the same number received social assistance. Since the beginning of the war, only 2% of respondents declare growth of income; 33% say their income has not changed. On the other hand, two-thirds of the polled have seen a worsening of the income situation: 18% have had a slight decrease of income, 32% - a significant decrease, and 14% have lost almost all of their income. Residents of the South and East and middle-aged people have experienced the greatest financial losses. Half of the polled said that in case of a complete loss of income, their savings would last for month, 19% - up to 2 months, 12% - up to 3 months, the same number - up to six months or more.
• Among those whose source of income before the war was business, only 12% noted that it continued to operate fully. Almost a half indicated that their business was operating, but with lower profits. On the other hand, 12% plan to close their business, 28% - have already stopped operating. 30% of business income recipients have had employees. Among them, almost 40% of employers had to fire employees, more than 20% - to reduce salaries.
• 35% of the polled had to temporarily separate from their family/partner due to the war: 12% had to, but they have already reunited, 23% are still living separately. Most of them are among the residents of the war zone, young people, those with higher income, and those whose relatives are fighting. 52% said they were not separated from their families because of the war.
• More than a half of the respondents noted the deterioration of their physical health, more than 60% spoke the same about their mental health. Deterioration of health is observed among the residents of de-occupied, front-line, and war zones, older people, those with lower income, those who had to be separated from their families, and those who have lost relatives because of the war.
• 47% indicated that they had close relatives who bear arms. Almost 20% reported that they had close relatives with whom they had lost contact and still do not know where they are. 5% have among their relatives those who died due to the war, 3% - those who were forcibly deported either to russia or to the occupied territories of the East or Crimea. 7% of the polled noted that they personally or their close relatives had been injured or disabled due to military actions.
• 95% did not apply to law enforcement agencies over the last six months on issues caused by the invasion of russia.
• Over 90% believe russia should compensate Ukraine's economic and infrastructural losses during the war. At the same time, only one-third of the respondents believe in this compensation. 14-15% expect for compensation from European countries and international organizations, 10% - from the USA, and 9% - from Ukraine. More than 70% believe in the possibility of compensations from these countries.
• Special trials with the participation of national and foreign judges (63%) and international institutions (23%) are considered to be the most effective mechanism to deal with war crimes of russia. Only 5% believe Ukrainian courts can be such a mechanism. One-third of the polled are ready to personally participate in lawsuits in order to claim compensation for lost property/health in Ukrainian and international courts.
• Among the sources of information about the war in Ukraine, the most trusted are the TV marathon (40%), the stories of eyewitnesses and acquaintances (35%), and social media channels (33%).
• Almost 40% believe that five years are enough to restore Ukraine's infrastructure and economy. 25% believe that it takes up to ten years, 23% - more than ten years. 4% think that reconstruction will last up to one year.
• The majority of Ukrainians are ready to participate in the reconstruction of the country: 42% - personally, 49% - ready, but do not have the opportunity. Residents of Kyiv, those aged 18-50, men, those with higher income are more likely to participate in reconstruction.
* For the purposes of this survey, several approaches to regional distribution are used. In the answers that refer to damage assessment, an atypical distribution is used, taking into account the intensity of hostilities during a full-scale russian invasion in Ukraine in 2022. Hhostilities zones (partially or fully occupied regions in which active hostilities are taking place): Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Kherson regions. Front-line zones (regions near the hostilities zone, some of which are subject to constant fire): Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Odesa. De-occupied zones (regions that were partially occupied until April 2022): Kyiv, Sumy, Chernihiv. West and Center (regions that were not occupied (absolutely or almost): Vinnytsia, Volyn, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Poltava, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky, Chernivtsi, Cherkasy. Kyiv is picked out in a separate group due to its proximity to hostilities until April 2022 and a high level of internal migration.
In other cases, a more traditional distribution into 5 macro-regions is used: West, Center, South, East, and the city of Kyiv.
• According to the results of the national survey conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating" in October 1-2, 2022, 86% of the respondents would support Ukraine's accession to the European Union in the event of a referendum (3% - against, 7% - would not vote). The support of joining the EU is unanimous among the representatives of all macro-regions and age groups.
• The support of Ukraine’s NATO membership is the highest in the history of observations: 83% would support such an initiative in a referendum, 4% have the opposite opinion, and 9% would not vote. In June 2022, 76% supported joining the Alliance. In contrast to joining the EU, joining NATO is more cautiously perceived by the respondents from the eastern regions of Ukraine (69% of them support the membership, 9% - are against, 17% - would not vote). Despite this, in comparison with the previous survey, the dynamics of support for joining the Alliance among residents of this regions is very positive (in June 2022, 55% - support joining, 20% - against, 22% - would not vote).
• In its Seventeenth national survey during the war, Sociological group “Rating” conducted a comprehensive study of various markers of patriotism of Ukrainians. On the eve of Ukraine’s Independence Day, the respondents were asked the questions about their confidence in victory, emotions they feel today about the country and themselves, assessment of the position of Ukraine in the world, their civic and linguistic identity, the frequency of consumption of Russian content, and their attitude towards various ethnic groups. The dynamics of changes of the values of Ukrainian society was studied separately according to the abbreviated method of Schwartz (Schwartz Shalom H.).
• Three quarters of Ukrainians (74%) assess the direction of the country's development as the right one. Only 13% believe that it is moving in the wrong direction, while the same share of the respondents could not answer. After a slight drop in May, these indicators stabilized.
• The absolute majority of the respondents (93%) are confident that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia’s attack. About 60% said that a longer time is needed to win the war: 20% believe that more than a year is needed, while 40%, six months to a year. At the same time, almost a quarter estimate the time needed for victory to be up to several months.
• Pride is the main emotion the respondents feel when thinking about Ukraine (75%). Other emotions include sadness (29%) and joy (26%). About 10% feel interest or fear. The emotions the respondents feel when thinking about themselves were equally distributed: pride (34%), sadness (31%), interest (29%), and joy (23%). Over the past year, pride and joy for the country have doubled. At the individual level, the indicators of pride have also increased, while likewise, there is a rise in sadness and fear. At the same time, fear and sadness about the respondents themselves are more articulated than the ones about the country. The situation with pride is similar. But the opposite is true for interest: the respondents report higher interest towards themselves than towards the country. The residents of the South of Ukraine and women feel sadness for the country relatively more often. Fear is reported more often by women and by the poorer population groups. At the individual level, the residents of the East of Ukraine, women and the poor feel fear more often, while younger people feel joy more often.
• If there was a choice today to support the declaration of the Independence of Ukraine or not, the absolute majority would support it (86%, definitely, and 11%, rather). Compared to last year, this indicator increased from 80% to 97%, and compared to 2012, from 62% to 97%.
• On a 7-point scale, where 7 is the highest step and 1 is the lowest one, the respondents rated Ukraine's position above the medium level: at 4.6 points, which is 1.5 times higher than the last year's indicator (3.0).
• The respondents assessed Ukraine’s future in 10 years at 6.4 points out of 7, which is also significantly higher than the last year's measurement (4.5). At the same time, two-thirds of the respondents rated Ukraine's future prospects at the highest level.
• The majority of Ukrainians see their country as free, independent and rich in the future.
• Specifically, in an open question, the respondents were offered to use three words to describe how they see Ukraine in the future. “Free” was most often the first word. Also, “strong”, “blooming”, “prosperous”, “peaceful”, and “happy” were often mentioned as the first words. The respondents most often used “independent” as the second attribute to characterize the future of Ukraine. The third attribute is most often “rich”, while such characteristics as “European”, “developed”, and “united” were also used.
• Our analysis by age groups showed that the younger respondents more often than those in other age groups see the future Ukraine as free, independent and strong, the middle-aged respondents, as peaceful, prosperous and successful, and the elderly, as rich, prosperous and happy. There are also differences by gender. Men more often see the future Ukraine as free, independent, strong, progressive, democratic, and European without corruption. Meanwhile, women see their country as rich, prosperous, peaceful, happy and invincible.
• The absolute majority of the respondents identify as citizens of Ukraine (94%). Almost as many identify as the residents of their region. Half of the respondents identify as Europeans (about 30% do not). Almost 10% think of themselves as a “Soviet person”, but more than 80% do not.
• As for civic identity, there are no significant regional and age differences. Young people more often consider themselves Europeans, while older people more often consider themselves “Soviet people”.
• The share of those who speak Ukrainian at home continues to grow. Specifically, today, 51% say they speak Ukrainian at home (48% said so in April 2022), while a third of the respondents speak both languages, and 13% speak Russian. More than half of the residents of the South and East of Ukraine are bilingual, about a quarter are Russian-speaking. The use of Russian in everyday life has decreased by about half.
• 76% indicated Ukrainian as their native language, while 19%, Russian. At the same time, 30% of Russian speakers consider Ukrainian to be their native language.
• 86% believe that Ukrainian language should be the only state language. 10% support the status of Russian as the official language in certain regions, while only 3% support Russian as the second state language in Ukraine.
• Before the war, more than half of the respondents always spoke Ukrainian, a quarter, sometimes, and every fifth one, rarely or never. Over the past six months, the share of those who began speaking Ukrainian on a regular basis increased to 64%. 24% speak Ukrainian sometimes, and 12%, rarely or never. The residents of the South and East of Ukraine and the internally displaced persons (IDPs) began to use Ukrainian more often. Since the beginning of the war, 19% of Ukrainians have switched to permanent or more frequent use of the Ukrainian language. In general, since the beginning of the war, 41% of Russian speakers and bilinguals began to speak Ukrainian more often: 24%, constantly, and 17%, more often.
• There is a sharp decrease in the consumption of Russian content among Ukrainians.
• More than 40% of the respondents stopped watching Russian TV series altogether, while another quarter did not watch them before and do not watch them now. In general, almost 70% had not watched Russian TV series during the last six months, and this figure has tripled. Only 15% continue to watch Russian series as before.
• More than 40% of respondents stopped listening to Russian music altogether, while another 18% did not listen to it before and do not listen now. In general, almost 60% had not listened to Russian music during the last six months, and this figure increased almost fivefold. Only a quarter continue to listen to Russian music as before.
• Before the full-scale Russian invasion, older respondents, women, and the residents of the East and South of Ukraine watched Russian TV series more often than others. Young and middle-aged people, as well as men listened to Russian music more often than others. Today, representatives of the middle-aged generation and women watch Russian series somewhat more often than others. On the other hand, young and middle-aged respondents as well as men stand out significantly in the frequency of consumption of Russian music: a third of these respondents continue to listen to the music by Russian performers.
• Our survey showed a further deterioration of the attitudes of Ukrainians towards the residents of Russia and Belarus. 81% have a negative attitude towards Russians (69% reported negative attitude in April 2022, and 41%, in April 2021). 14% feel neutral, and only 3% feel positive towards Russians. 52% have a negative attitude towards Belarusians (in April 2022, this share was 33%, and in April 2021, 4%). A neutral attitude is reported by 34%, and a positive one, by 10%.
• The respondents have predominantly neutral attitude towards the Russians who live in Ukraine (42%). 22% have a positive attitude towards them, while 29% have a negative attitude. The attitude towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians is mostly positive (51%) or neutral (31%). Only 14% report a negative attitude. In general, as a result of the war, the attitude towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians improved from 37% (in April 2021) to 51% (in August 2022), although over the last four months, the positive attitudes has slightly decreased in favor of neutral ones, with no increase in negativity.
• The attitudes towards the residents of the occupied Crimea and especially towards the residents of the so-called “L/DPR” continue to deteriorate. 22% have a positive attitude towards the residents of the occupied Crimea, while 23% have a negative attitude, and 45% have a neutral attitude (in April, 41% of the attitudes were positive, 14% were negative, and 40% were neutral). Only 14% have a positive view of the residents of the so-called of the DPR/LPR, 47% have a negative view, and 32% are neutral (in April 2022, 27% had a positive view, 31% had a negative view, and 37% were neutral).
• There is a certain “softening” of the estimates of the time needed for reconciliation between Ukrainians and Russians. While in April 2022 (the survey was conducted after the liberation of Kyiv region from the Russian invaders), two-thirds said that reconciliation was impossible, in August, this share comprises about half of the respondents. A third believe that it will be possible to renew the relationship in 20-30 years, 14% believe that it will happen in 10-15 years, and only 5% believe that it is possible in a few years. Older respondents, the residents of the East and South of Ukraine, and Russian speakers are more disposed to “reconciliation” in relatively shorter terms.
• There were no significant changes in the values structure in Ukraine. In general, there is a trend towards the values of self-determination and openness to change. Universalism and kindness continue to dominate as they traditionally did. Conformity remains at a high level as well as, in contrast, independence. The values of security and traditionality are also significant. Ukrainians value wealth the least, as they did last year. Over the year, the values of traditionality, hedonism, stimulation, and especially the value of independence have slightly increased.
• Traditionally, the values of independence, wealth, and hedonism are observed more among the young people. In contrast to them, the respondents in the middle-age group and especially those in the older group are more inclined to conservative values (traditionalism and conformity). On the other hand, such values as independence, universalism, kindness, security, and achievement are common to the representatives of all age groups. And while the significance of the values of stimulation, achievement and wealth (power) is significantly higher for men, security, traditionality, conformity, universalism and kindness are more significant for women.
The survey was initiated by the Ukrainian Veterans Foundation at the Ministry for Veterans Affairs of Ukraine. The survey was conducted and funded by the Sociological Group “Rating”.
• The Sixteenth national survey in Ukraine during the war, conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” and initiate by the Ukrainian Veterans Foundation at the Ministry for Veterans Affairs of Ukraine on August 6-7, 2022, more than 40% of the respondents said that among their relatives and friends, there are those who took part in military operations on the territory of Ukraine since 2014. Specifically, 54% have those who fought or are fighting at the frontline starting from February 24, 2022 among their closest ones. 44% said that there are those who participated in the war in the East of Ukraine in 2014-2021 among their family and friends.
• The respondents associate the term “war veteran” with different categories of the participants of military operations: for a third of the respondents, it means the veterans who have fought in the current war, while for another third, it is primarily the veterans of the World War II. Another 14% associate this term with the veterans of the Anti-terrorist operation (ATO) of 2014-2021, only 2%, with the veterans of the war in Afghanistan, and 12%, with other categories of combatants. 8% could not answer this question. It is interesting that for young people, a “veteran” is more often a participant of the World War II, and for the oldest respondents, it is someone who is fighting today. Residents of the East and South of Ukraine associate this term more often with the participants of the World War II, while the respondents from the West and Center of Ukraine mean by this term those who are fighting for Ukraine today more often.
• Regarding the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war, respondents primarily feel gratitude (64%) and pride (50%). A quarter feel sadness when meeting veterans, while the same share of the respondents feel joy. Respondents named other feelings less often: guilt when meeting a veteran is felt by 3%, shame and fear, by 2% for each of these emotions, and indifference, anger, and dislike, only by 1% for each. Women talk about sadness regarding the veterans more often than men. Also, those who have close ones among the veterans of the Anti-terrorist Operation (ATO) of 2014-2021 feel sadness somewhat more often. The respondents who personally know those who fought in 2014-2021 and continue to fight feel gratitude and pride more often than others.
• More than 90% trust the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the veterans of the ongoing war and the veterans of the Anti-terrorist Operation (ATO) of 2014-2021. 67% trust the veterans of the World War II, while 15% do not trust them, and 17% could not answer. 62% trust Afghanistan veterans, 19% do not trust them, and 19% could not answer. Regardless of the region and age, the majority trust the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the veterans of the current war, and the veterans of the ATO. World War II veterans are most likely to be trusted by the youngest respondents, while Afghanistan veterans are slightly more trusted by older people.
• Patriotism is most often cited as a positive trait of the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war – it was mentioned by 75% of the respondents. Also, about a quarter noted that veterans are characterized by independence in decision-making and discipline, while another 13% called them hardworking, and 9%, law-abiding.
• As for the negative traits, the respondents found it more difficult to identify them regarding the veterans. Namely, 17% could not answer this question at all, while 11% said that none of the negative qualities listed among the answers describes this group of people. Despite this, a third of the respondents believe that veterans are characterized by emotional instability, a quarter, by closedness and isolation. Other negative qualities (cruelty, inability to adapt, and tendency to violence) were chosen less often: by the shares of respondents ranging from 11% to 17%.
• According to the respondents, first of all, veterans expect support (46%) and gratitude (36%) from the citizens. Friendly attitude, respect, and understanding were named by 20-21%, fulfillment of obligations, by 15%. The smallest share of the respondents believe that the veterans expect sympathy: only 5%.
• Half of the respondents believe that the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war are likely to face the problem of unemployment, while a little less than half think they are unlikely to. Such problems as conflicts in the families of the veterans and abuse of alcohol or drugs are considered more unlikely than likely. Regarding the risk of suicide and the one of breaking the law, the vast majority (at least two-thirds of the respondents) consider them unlikely for the veterans. Residents of the East of Ukraine and men consider the mentioned problems likely more often. Also, the presence of all these problems is reported more acutely by the friends and relatives of the ATO veterans who are no longer fighting and are adapting to life, while the friends and relatives of those who are still fighting are more optimistic about the potential risks, perhaps underestimating them so far.
• The level of salaries of the military personnel directly participating in military operations is considered optimal by 40%, lower than necessary, by 32%, and higher than necessary, by 11%. 17% were unable to assess it. Regarding the salary of the soldiers serving in the rear, half rated it as optimal, 15% rated it as lower than necessary, 15%, as above the necessary level, and 22% were unable to assess it.
• The absolute majority (93%) believe that the Ukrainian society respects the veterans today. Only 3% have the opposite opinion.
• Almost 70% of respondents believe that the government fulfills its obligations to the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war, while 20% believe is does not.
• More than 90% support the idea of granting benefits to the businesses founded by the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war, while only 6% are against it.
• The respondents believe that the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war (50%), persons with disabilities (34%), and large families (31%) should have the most benefits and guarantees from the government. Equal shares of 17% of the respondents support giving benefits for pensioners and for single mothers or fathers. Benefits for people with low income and for the internally displaced persons are supported by 12-13% of respondents per each group, and only 1% support benefits for those who suffered from the Chornobyl catastrophe.
- The latest public opinion survey of the International Republican Institute (IRI) in Ukraine conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” shows that confidence in winning the war against Russia and approval for President Zelensky remain very strong. Most Ukrainians do not believe in conceding any territory and support for NATO membership has spiked.
- When asked if they believe Ukraine will win the war, 98% said yes. With regard to President Zelensky, 91% of Ukrainians approve of his job performance.
- Support for NATO membership has increased in recent months. Seventy-two percent of Ukrainians would back joining NATO if a referendum were held today. That is a jump of 13 percentage points from a poll released in May.
- The poll also shows a large majority of Ukrainians do not believe they will cede any territory to their Russian invaders. Sixty-four percent say Ukraine will maintain all territories from its internationally recognized borders in 1991 after the current war. Another 14% say that Ukraine will regain territory under their control previous to Russia’s February 24 attack.