News and Press releases

• According to the results of the national survey conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating" in October 1-2, 2022, 86% of the respondents would support Ukraine's accession to the European Union in the event of a referendum (3% - against, 7%  - would not vote). The support of joining the EU is unanimous among the representatives of all macro-regions and age groups.

• The support of Ukraine’s NATO membership is the highest in the history of observations: 83% would support such an initiative in a referendum, 4% have the opposite opinion, and 9% would not vote. In June 2022, 76% supported joining the Alliance. In contrast to joining the EU, joining NATO is more cautiously perceived by the respondents from the eastern regions of Ukraine (69% of them support the membership, 9% - are against, 17% - would not vote). Despite this, in comparison with the previous survey, the dynamics of support for joining the Alliance among residents of this regions is very positive (in June 2022, 55% - support joining, 20% - against, 22% - would not vote).

• In its Seventeenth national survey during the war, Sociological group “Rating” conducted a comprehensive study of various markers of patriotism of Ukrainians. On the eve of Ukraine’s Independence Day, the respondents were asked the questions about their confidence in victory, emotions they feel today about the country and themselves, assessment of the position of Ukraine in the world, their civic and linguistic identity, the frequency of consumption of Russian content, and their attitude towards various ethnic groups. The dynamics of changes of the values of Ukrainian society was studied separately according to the abbreviated method of Schwartz (Schwartz Shalom H.).

• Three quarters of Ukrainians (74%) assess the direction of the country's development as the right one. Only 13% believe that it is moving in the wrong direction, while the same share of the respondents could not answer. After a slight drop in May, these indicators stabilized. 

• The absolute majority of the respondents (93%) are confident that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia’s attack. About 60% said that a longer time is needed to win the war: 20% believe that more than a year is needed, while 40%, six months to a year. At the same time, almost a quarter estimate the time needed for victory to be up to several months.

• Pride is the main emotion the respondents feel when thinking about Ukraine (75%). Other emotions include sadness (29%) and joy (26%). About 10% feel interest or fear. The emotions the respondents feel when thinking about themselves were equally distributed: pride (34%), sadness (31%), interest (29%), and joy (23%). Over the past year, pride and joy for the country have doubled. At the individual level, the indicators of pride have also increased, while likewise, there is a rise in sadness and fear. At the same time, fear and sadness about the respondents themselves are more articulated than the ones about the country. The situation with pride is similar. But the opposite is true for interest: the respondents report higher interest towards themselves than towards the country. The residents of the South of Ukraine and women feel sadness for the country relatively more often. Fear is reported more often by women and by the poorer population groups. At the individual level, the residents of the East of Ukraine, women and the poor feel fear more often, while younger people feel joy more often.

• If there was a choice today to support the declaration of the Independence of Ukraine or not, the absolute majority would support it (86%, definitely, and 11%, rather). Compared to last year, this indicator increased from 80% to 97%, and compared to 2012, from 62% to 97%.

• On a 7-point scale, where 7 is the highest step and 1 is the lowest one, the respondents rated Ukraine's position above the medium level: at 4.6 points, which is 1.5 times higher than the last year's indicator (3.0).

• The respondents assessed Ukraine’s future in 10 years at 6.4 points out of 7, which is also significantly higher than the last year's measurement (4.5). At the same time, two-thirds of the respondents rated Ukraine's future prospects at the highest level.

• The majority of Ukrainians see their country as free, independent and rich in the future.

• Specifically, in an open question, the respondents were offered to use three words to describe how they see Ukraine in the future. “Free” was most often the first word. Also, “strong”, “blooming”, “prosperous”, “peaceful”, and “happy” were often mentioned as the first words. The respondents most often used “independent” as the second attribute to characterize the future of Ukraine. The third attribute is most often “rich”, while such characteristics as “European”, “developed”, and “united” were also used.

• Our analysis by age groups showed that the younger respondents more often than those in other age groups see the future Ukraine as free, independent and strong, the middle-aged respondents, as peaceful, prosperous and successful, and the elderly, as rich, prosperous and happy. There are also differences by gender. Men more often see the future Ukraine as free, independent, strong, progressive, democratic, and European without corruption. Meanwhile, women see their country as rich, prosperous, peaceful, happy and invincible.

• The absolute majority of the respondents identify as citizens of Ukraine (94%). Almost as many identify as the residents of their region. Half of the respondents identify as Europeans (about 30% do not). Almost 10% think of themselves as a “Soviet person”, but more than 80% do not.

• As for civic identity, there are no significant regional and age differences. Young people more often consider themselves Europeans, while older people more often consider themselves “Soviet people”.

• The share of those who speak Ukrainian at home continues to grow. Specifically, today, 51% say they speak Ukrainian at home (48% said so in April 2022), while a third of the respondents speak both languages, and 13% speak Russian. More than half of the residents of the South and East of Ukraine are bilingual, about a quarter are Russian-speaking. The use of Russian in everyday life has decreased by about half.

• 76% indicated Ukrainian as their native language, while 19%, Russian. At the same time, 30% of Russian speakers consider Ukrainian to be their native language.

• 86% believe that Ukrainian language should be the only state language. 10% support the status of Russian as the official language in certain regions, while only 3% support Russian as the second state language in Ukraine.

• Before the war, more than half of the respondents always spoke Ukrainian, a quarter, sometimes, and every fifth one, rarely or never. Over the past six months, the share of those who began speaking Ukrainian on a regular basis increased to 64%. 24% speak Ukrainian sometimes, and 12%, rarely or never. The residents of the South and East of Ukraine and the internally displaced persons (IDPs) began to use Ukrainian more often. Since the beginning of the war, 19% of Ukrainians have switched to permanent or more frequent use of the Ukrainian language. In general, since the beginning of the war, 41% of Russian speakers and bilinguals began to speak Ukrainian more often: 24%, constantly, and 17%, more often.

• There is a sharp decrease in the consumption of Russian content among Ukrainians.

• More than 40% of the respondents stopped watching Russian TV series altogether, while another quarter did not watch them before and do not watch them now. In general, almost 70% had not watched Russian TV series during the last six months, and this figure has tripled. Only 15% continue to watch Russian series as before.

• More than 40% of respondents stopped listening to Russian music altogether, while another 18% did not listen to it before and do not listen now. In general, almost 60% had not listened to Russian music during the last six months, and this figure increased almost fivefold. Only a quarter continue to listen to Russian music as before.

• Before the full-scale Russian invasion, older respondents, women, and the residents of the East and South of Ukraine watched Russian TV series more often than others. Young and middle-aged people, as well as men listened to Russian music more often than others. Today, representatives of the middle-aged generation and women watch Russian series somewhat more often than others. On the other hand, young and middle-aged respondents as well as men stand out significantly in the frequency of consumption of Russian music: a third of these respondents continue to listen to the music by Russian performers.

• Our survey showed a further deterioration of the attitudes of Ukrainians towards the residents of Russia and Belarus. 81% have a negative attitude towards Russians (69% reported negative attitude in April 2022, and 41%, in April 2021). 14% feel neutral, and only 3% feel positive towards Russians. 52% have a negative attitude towards Belarusians (in April 2022, this share was 33%, and in April 2021, 4%). A neutral attitude is reported by 34%, and a positive one, by 10%.

• The respondents have predominantly neutral attitude towards the Russians who live in Ukraine (42%). 22% have a positive attitude towards them, while 29% have a negative attitude. The attitude towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians is mostly positive (51%) or neutral (31%). Only 14% report a negative attitude. In general, as a result of the war, the attitude towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians improved from 37% (in April 2021) to 51% (in August 2022), although over the last four months, the positive attitudes has slightly decreased in favor of neutral ones, with no increase in negativity.

• The attitudes towards the residents of the occupied Crimea and especially towards the residents of the so-called “L/DPR” continue to deteriorate. 22% have a positive attitude towards the residents of the occupied Crimea, while 23% have a negative attitude, and 45% have a neutral attitude (in April, 41% of the attitudes were positive, 14% were negative, and 40% were neutral). Only 14% have a positive view of the residents of the so-called of the DPR/LPR, 47% have a negative view, and 32% are neutral (in April 2022, 27% had a positive view, 31% had a negative view, and 37% were neutral).

• There is a certain “softening” of the estimates of the time needed for reconciliation between Ukrainians and Russians. While in April 2022 (the survey was conducted after the liberation of Kyiv region from the Russian invaders), two-thirds said that reconciliation was impossible, in August, this share comprises about half of the respondents. A third believe that it will be possible to renew the relationship in 20-30 years, 14% believe that it will happen in 10-15 years, and only 5% believe that it is possible in a few years. Older respondents, the residents of the East and South of Ukraine, and Russian speakers are more disposed to “reconciliation” in relatively shorter terms.

• There were no significant changes in the values structure in Ukraine. In general, there is a trend towards the values of self-determination and openness to change. Universalism and kindness continue to dominate as they traditionally did. Conformity remains at a high level as well as, in contrast, independence. The values of security and traditionality are also significant. Ukrainians value wealth the least, as they did last year. Over the year, the values of traditionality, hedonism, stimulation, and especially the value of independence have slightly increased.

• Traditionally, the values of independence, wealth, and hedonism are observed more among the young people. In contrast to them, the respondents in the middle-age group and especially those in the older group are more inclined to conservative values (traditionalism and conformity). On the other hand, such values as independence, universalism, kindness, security, and achievement are common to the representatives of all age groups. And while the significance of the values of stimulation, achievement and wealth (power) is significantly higher for men, security, traditionality, conformity, universalism and kindness are more significant for women. 

 The survey was initiated by the Ukrainian Veterans Foundation at the Ministry for Veterans Affairs of Ukraine. The survey was conducted and funded by the Sociological Group “Rating”.

• The Sixteenth national survey in Ukraine during the war, conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” and initiate by the Ukrainian Veterans Foundation at the Ministry for Veterans Affairs of Ukraine on August 6-7, 2022, more than 40% of the respondents said that among their relatives and friends, there are those who took part in military operations on the territory of Ukraine since 2014. Specifically, 54% have those who fought or are fighting at the frontline starting from February 24, 2022 among their closest ones. 44% said that there are those who participated in the war in the East of Ukraine in 2014-2021 among their family and friends. 

• The respondents associate the term “war veteran” with different categories of the participants of military operations: for a third of the respondents, it means the veterans who have fought in the current war, while for another third, it is primarily the veterans of the World War II. Another 14% associate this term with the veterans of the Anti-terrorist operation (ATO) of 2014-2021, only 2%, with the veterans of the war in Afghanistan, and 12%, with other categories of combatants. 8% could not answer this question. It is interesting that for young people, a “veteran” is more often a participant of the World War II, and for the oldest respondents, it is someone who is fighting today. Residents of the East and South of Ukraine associate this term more often with the participants of the World War II, while the respondents from the West and Center of Ukraine mean by this term those who are fighting for Ukraine today more often.

• Regarding the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war, respondents primarily feel gratitude (64%) and pride (50%). A quarter feel sadness when meeting veterans, while the same share of the respondents feel joy. Respondents named other feelings less often: guilt when meeting a veteran is felt by 3%, shame and fear, by 2% for each of these emotions, and indifference, anger, and dislike, only by 1% for each. Women talk about sadness regarding the veterans more often than men. Also, those who have close ones among the veterans of the Anti-terrorist Operation (ATO) of 2014-2021 feel sadness somewhat more often. The respondents who personally know those who fought in 2014-2021 and continue to fight feel gratitude and pride more often than others.

• More than 90% trust the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the veterans of the ongoing war and the veterans of the Anti-terrorist Operation (ATO) of 2014-2021. 67% trust the veterans of the World War II, while 15% do not trust them, and 17% could not answer. 62% trust Afghanistan veterans, 19% do not trust them, and 19% could not answer. Regardless of the region and age, the majority trust the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the veterans of the current war, and the veterans of the ATO. World War II veterans are most likely to be trusted by the youngest respondents, while Afghanistan veterans are slightly more trusted by older people.

• Patriotism is most often cited as a positive trait of the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war – it was mentioned by 75% of the respondents. Also, about a quarter noted that veterans are characterized by independence in decision-making and discipline, while another 13% called them hardworking, and 9%, law-abiding.

• As for the negative traits, the respondents found it more difficult to identify them regarding the veterans. Namely, 17% could not answer this question at all, while 11% said that none of the negative qualities listed among the answers describes this group of people. Despite this, a third of the respondents believe that veterans are characterized by emotional instability, a quarter, by closedness and isolation. Other negative qualities (cruelty, inability to adapt, and tendency to violence) were chosen less often: by the shares of respondents ranging from 11% to 17%.

• According to the respondents, first of all, veterans expect support (46%) and gratitude (36%) from the citizens. Friendly attitude, respect, and understanding were named by 20-21%, fulfillment of obligations, by 15%. The smallest share of the respondents believe that the veterans expect sympathy: only 5%.

• Half of the respondents believe that the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war are likely to face the problem of unemployment, while a little less than half think they are unlikely to. Such problems as conflicts in the families of the veterans and abuse of alcohol or drugs are considered more unlikely than likely. Regarding the risk of suicide and the one of breaking the law, the vast majority (at least two-thirds of the respondents) consider them unlikely for the veterans. Residents of the East of Ukraine and men consider the mentioned problems likely more often. Also, the presence of all these problems is reported more acutely by the friends and relatives of the ATO veterans who are no longer fighting and are adapting to life, while the friends and relatives of those who are still fighting are more optimistic about the potential risks, perhaps underestimating them so far.

• The level of salaries of the military personnel directly participating in military operations is considered optimal by 40%, lower than necessary, by 32%, and higher than necessary, by 11%. 17% were unable to assess it. Regarding the salary of the soldiers serving in the rear, half rated it as optimal, 15% rated it as lower than necessary, 15%, as above the necessary level, and 22% were unable to assess it.  

• The absolute majority (93%) believe that the Ukrainian society respects the veterans today. Only 3% have the opposite opinion.

• Almost 70% of respondents believe that the government fulfills its obligations to the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war, while 20% believe is does not. 

• More than 90% support the idea of granting benefits to the businesses founded by the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war, while only 6% are against it.

• The respondents believe that the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war (50%), persons with disabilities (34%), and large families (31%) should have the most benefits and guarantees from the government. Equal shares of 17% of the respondents support giving benefits for pensioners and for single mothers or fathers. Benefits for people with low income and for the internally displaced persons are supported by 12-13% of respondents per each group, and only 1% support benefits for those who suffered from the Chornobyl catastrophe. 

   
• The latest public opinion survey  of the International Republican Institute (IRI)  in Ukraine conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” shows that confidence in winning the war against Russia and approval for President Zelensky remain very strong. Most Ukrainians do not believe in conceding any territory and support for NATO membership has spiked.  
   
• When asked if they believe Ukraine will win the war, 98% said yes. With regard to President Zelensky, 91% of Ukrainians approve of his job performance. 
   
•  Support for NATO membership has increased in recent months. Seventy-two percent of Ukrainians would back joining NATO if a referendum were held today. That is a jump of 13 percentage points from a poll released in May.   
   
• The poll also shows a large majority of Ukrainians do not believe they will cede any territory to their Russian invaders. Sixty-four percent say Ukraine will maintain all territories from its internationally recognized borders in 1991 after the current war. Another 14% say that Ukraine will regain territory under their control previous to Russia’s February 24 attack.  

The survey was carried out in cooperation with Serhiy Dembitskyi, Doctor of Sociological Sciences, Deputy Director of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine 

• Sociological group “Rating” conducted a survey of opinions regarding cynicism in Ukraine within our 15th national survey “Ukraine during the war”. The generalized results of this survey show that 55% of the respondents completely or mostly demonstrate opinions about the presence of cynicism in the society, 29% completely or mostly demonstrate undefined opinions about this issue, while 16%, on the contrary, completely or mostly demonstrate opinions about the absence of cynicism. 

• The majority of the respondents gave an affirmative answer to almost all of the indicators that test opinions regarding cynicism. In this sense, the strongest belief (by three-quarters of the respondents) is the belief in the ability of people to lie in order to get promoted. At the same time, the belief that people are only honest because they are afraid of being exposed in a lie is the exception: in this case, the share of people who disagree with this statement is almost equal to the share of those who agree with it.

• Despite this mostly negative picture, positive changes have been observed in the estimates of the prevalence of cynicism in Ukrainian society for the first time over the years of research. First of all, this is demonstrated by the fact that the share of the respondents who completely or mostly believe in the prevalence of cynicism decreased by 12 percentage points (from 67% to 55%). The share of those who hesitate about their position has increased by the same amount (from 17% to 29%).

• The positive dynamics is explained by the decreasing shares of the respondents who:

• believe in the ability of most people to commit dishonest acts for the sake of profit;

• believe that most people don’t like to burden themselves in order to help others.

• In almost all socio-demographic groups, from 49% to 61% of the respondents say that cynical attitudes are completely or mostly characteristic of Ukrainian society. At the same time, the most significant differences are observed in the context of the financial situation. The poor group of the respondents believe in the cynicism of the society most of all: 77%, while among the well-off, this share falls to 47%. The group of women aged between 18 and 35 years old should also be singled out: these respondents most often (22%) say that cynicism is not inherent in Ukrainian society.

Background: The cynicism scale is an additional scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). The cynicism index reflects the degree of disdain for generally accepted values.

• The Fifteenth national survey during the war, conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on July 23-24, 2022, showed that 73% of the respondents believe that things in Ukraine are going in the right direction. 12% of the respondents have an opposite opinion, while another 15% could not make an estimate. A gradual decrease in the share of those who assess the direction of the country's development as the right one is observed. This share is shifting in favor of those who are undecided in their assessments. The assessment of the direction of the country’s development as the right one continues to dominate in all the regions of Ukraine and among all the age groups. The views differ in terms of income groups: for the poorest respondents, they are somewhat worse (63% of them consider the direction of Ukraine’s development to be right).

• An increase in pessimism can be observed in the assessments of the changes in the economic situation of the respondents’ families and the country over the past six months. Despite this, when talking about the economy of Ukraine in the future, respondents voice more positive expectations than they did before the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, today, 86% of the respondents say that the economic situation of Ukraine has worsened over the past six months (70% said so in January of this year). As for the personal economic situation, 74% say it has worsened (52% in January). At the same time, 25% hope that in the next 12 months their personal economic situation will improve, a quarter believe that it will not change, and a third are pessimistic about it. At the same time, the latter share has increased compared to the one in our survey of April of this year (from 27%). On the other hand, there is an increase in the share of optimistic assessments of the future of the country: the share of those who believe that the economy will improve in the next year today is 34% (it was 32% in April). Accordingly, the share of those who expect deterioration has decreased: from 42% to 37%.

• The residents of the West of Ukraine, younger respondents, those who are employed, as well as those who are better off assess their economic situation relatively better. On the other hand, no particular differences between the demographic groups are noticeable in the assessments of the dynamics of the changes in the economy of Ukraine over the past six months: negative assessments dominate everywhere. Regarding the expectations about the future, the residents of the East of Ukraine, younger people and those who are not currently working have more positive expectations about their economic situation. And regarding the expectations about Ukraine’s future, the residents of the West, South and East, those from the youngest and the oldest age groups and those who are not employed express relatively more optimistic expectations.

• A certain reassessment of their financial stability in the times of crisis is observed among the more affluent respondents. The share of those who believe that they have enough savings – for six months or more – increased compared to March of this year. The highest share of such respondents is among the wealthiest ones and among the entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the share of those who believe that their savings will last only for a month has not changed (it is approximately 40%). The highest shares of such respondents are among the unemployed, the retired respondents, and among those who are employees in the private or public sector.

• According to the estimates of this survey, the share of those who changed their place of residence in Ukraine stays at approximately 20%. The highest share of such respondents is among the residents the East of Ukraine (58%). Only 10% of the respondents do not intend to return to their homes (3% did not intend in April and 8% in June). 16% said that they will return soon, while 18% will return, but they are going to wait a little longer. 50% said that they intend to return, but only if the war ends – and this number is gradually growing.

• The dynamics of resuming employment, which has been observed over the past three months, has slowed down. Today, 59% of those who had a job before the war are currently working: 34%, full-time, 19%, remotely or part-time, and 6% found a new job. On the other hand, the share of those who nevertheless lost their jobs increased (from 35% in June to 39% in July). The highest shares of the latter are among the residents of the East of Ukraine, women, the poorest respondents, those who work in the private sector or have their own business, as well as among the internally displaced persons (IDPs).

• The dynamics by the regions shows a further increase in the share of the unemployed among the residents of the East (from 53% in June to 57% in July). A certain increase of the share of those who lost their jobs can also be noticed among the residents of the central and western regions (37% in the Center, 32% in the West).

• Half of the employed respondents experienced a salary reduction of 10% or more. For 43% of the respondents, the salary did not change, and for 9%, it increased. The biggest shares of those who have experienced a decrease in income are among those who are currently working remotely or part-time and among the entrepreneurs. At the same time, the relative majority of civil servants retained their previous salaries.

• The relative majority of the respondents (57%) are ready to continue working even if their salary is reduced, while 40% have a more active position (are going to look for a new job). The biggest shares of the latter are more among the young people and among those who work in the private sector or are self-employed.

• The employed respondents are predominantly confident that they will keep their job over the next six months (83% are convinced of this). 11% are not sure. The highest share of the latter is among those whose salary has decreased by more than 50%.

• Almost 40% of the employed respondents are confident that they would be able to find a job quickly if they lost it. 57% do not have such confidence; most often, these are older respondents, women, and public sector employees.

• Among those who lost their jobs during the war, only a third are actively looking for one now. Another 23% are thinking about it, and 41% are taking a wait-and-see position. Older respondents, civil servants, and those with savings are less motivated than others to look for a new job.

• Most of those who are currently looking for a new job are ready to change both the workplace and their professional field. Instead, they prefer not to move to another region or country for work. In general, the IDPs, those who work in the private sector, as well as those who have experienced a reduction in salaries are more open to changes.

• Salary is the dominant criterion in choosing a desired job today (70%). Salary means financial security and allows to satisfy the basic needs of the individual – this level of needs is naturally the most important one during wartime. The schedule of work and the safety of the workplace are also relatively important for the respondents (23-24%), which also covers the basic level of needs. Social guarantees are important for 17%, relationships in the team, for 16%, and the opportunity to work remotely, for 10%. Such criteria as career growth, prestige and social status are on the lowest positions among the criteria for choosing a new job (3-7%), since during the war, such levels of needs are not relevant for most due to the high number of threats and risks to life. Security (the physical and material one) is far more important than career growth and status.

• Respondents rated the opportunity to achieve success relatively better than other opportunities in Ukraine (47%). Only 26% of respondents said there is a lack of such opportunity. About a third of the respondents highly rated the opportunity to find a job and to have a stable income (the same share said there are no such opportunities). The ability to find a job was mostly rated at a medium level. About 30% believe that there are opportunities to make a career or become an entrepreneur (35-37% rated these opportunities low). The rating of the opportunities to become an entrepreneur and to achieve success has increased over the past three and a half years. 

• Residents of the West and the East, men, young people, people with higher income, as well as those who work full-time or are entrepreneurs, rate all the opportunities higher than other respondents. Also, the more active is the position of the respondents regarding the strategy of increasing their income, the better they rate their opportunities.

• The share of those who wish to start their own business has almost doubled: today, 45% would like to become an entrepreneur, 9% already have their own businesses, and 46% have no such desire. Residents of the West of Ukraine, young people, those who are better off, men, those who are employed in the private sector and those motivated to succeed show a greater desire to start their own business.

• The study of the models of economic behavior showed that in the event of an abrupt reduction of income, 62% will seek additional sources of income, and 35% will reduce their expenses. 53% want to live no worse than others, while 42% want to live better than others. Half of the respondents believe that they can influence the increase of their own income, and the same share of the respondents have the opposite opinion. Therefore, the majority of Ukrainians continue to demonstrate an active life position regarding their financial situation and the opportunities for professional fulfillment in business.

• Over the course of a year, the share of those who said that they could influence their income decreased from 60% to 50%. The war and the current socio-economic situation are objective circumstances that probably reduce the feeling of subjectivity regarding one’s own impact on income. In general, the youth, the better-off and men have a more active strategy regarding their financial opportunities, probably due to the availability of appropriate resources and the traditional value of these categories on the labor market and in business.

• Regarding external migration, 28% would personally like to work or get a job abroad (70% would not like to). 9% would like to go abroad for permanent residence (90% would not like to). The share of those who would like to go abroad for permanent residence has critically decreased from 27% to 9% over the last two years. This is also due to the fact that a large number of Ukrainians went abroad in forced immigration. The desire to work or live abroad is more prevalent among the residents of the East, young people and men.

• Construction (60%) and military industry (42%) are the industries that will be developing most after the war, according to the respondents. Construction is aimed at restoring the infrastructure destroyed by the war and at creating new architectural projects, while military industry means the support and strengthening of Ukraine’s defense capabilities, which will have high support and will be relevant for a long period after the war. The assessment of the potential of other sectors is the following: 34% expect the development of agriculture, 26%, healthcare, 18%, heavy industry and metallurgy, 16%, IT sphere, 13%, education and science, and 7%, transport and transportation. Regarding trade, culture, tourism, light industry, 5 to 6% of the respondents expect the development of each sector. 

• The majority of Ukrainians are still quite optimistic about the reconstruction of the country after the war: 43% believe that five years will be enough. 28% believe that it will takes up to ten years. The share of those who see the prospect of reconstruction as a long period of more than ten years has increased (from 10% to 21%), and the share of those who believe that reconstruction will take less than a year has decreased (from 13% to 5%).

• The share of those who are ready to personally participate in the reconstruction of the country decreased by one and a half times: from 61% to 45%. 46% indicated that they would like to, but are not able. Residents of the East of Ukraine, respondents aged 18 to 50, men, better-off people and those who have changed their place of residence are more willing to participate in the reconstruction.

• Almost 90% of respondents believe that Russia should compensate Ukraine's economic and infrastructural losses incurred because of the war. In addition, 21% of Ukrainians believe that European countries should contribute to the compensation of losses, 18% think international organizations should do it, and 11%, the USA. The share of those who believe that Ukraine should also contribute to this has increased: from 10% to 15%.

As a part of the fourteenth wave of the “Ukraine during the war” project, Sociological Group “Rating” conducted another study of psychological markers: the levels of resilience and psychological exhaustion as well as the acceptability of entertainment during the war. 

SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE CITIZENS OF UKRAINE

• The share of the respondents who have been forced to leave their place of permanent residence since February 24, 2022, remains practically unchanged. In contrast to previous measurements, the share of the internally displaced persons from the eastern and southern regions is increasing, and the share of those from the central regions is decreasing. 

• 87% of the surveyed IDPs express their intention to return home: 15%, soon, 24% want to return, but are going to wait, and 48% will return, but after the end of the war. 8% said that they will not return home. Compared to April of this year, the share of those who plan to return immediately is decreasing, while the share of those who either will return after the war, or not at all, is increasing.

• The gradual return of the citizens of Ukraine to their workplaces continues. Today, 38% of those who worked before the war have returned to their regular jobs, while 18% are working remotely, and 7% have found a new job. Despite this, a third of such respondents are still not employed. Most of the latter are among the youngest and the oldest respondents, as well among women and among the residents of the East and the South of the country. In terms of dynamics, the best situation with returning to work is among the residents of the Center and West of Ukraine and the worst one is among the residents of the East. 

LEVEL OF RESILIENCE

• During the fourth month of the war, Ukrainians continue to demonstrate a good level of resilience (3.8 points out of 5). The components of this indicator – psychological resilience (3.9) and maintaining physical health (3.7) – did not change significantly, although they slightly decreased compared to April. 

• Curiosity about what is happening around (4.4), normal nutrition (4.2), having plans for the future (4.2), confidence in one's decisions (4.0) and the absence of regrets about the past (4.0) primarily contribute to the relatively high index of psychological resilience. 

• Today, Ukrainians suffer most from fatigue (only 36% do not feel it) and lack of adequate sleep (only 44% have adequate sleep). Such reactions of the body are natural for stress. Despite this, other emotional and moral indicators of citizens are better. 

• Women have a lower level of resilience than men. With age, resilience decreases, too. Having a job has a positive effect on resilience: those who are working full-time or part-time feel better than those who are not working. 

• The more a person believes that it is necessary to live a full life, the higher their level of resilience is. Those who have relatives who are fighting in the war today have a higher level of resilience. This is perhaps explained by a heightened sense of responsibility and concern for the loved ones who are in potential danger. 

• In the regional terms, the residents of the East of the country, where today the main front line runs, as well as the most destruction and deaths take place, have the worst level of resilience.

• For all groups of the respondents, psychological resilience (3.9) is higher than the indicators of physical condition (3.7). The war physically exhausted Ukrainians to a bigger extent, while psychological endurance is still better. 

• The dynamics of the resilience index has somewhat worsened over the past 2 months. The resilience index has slightly decreased since April (from 3.9 to 3.8). However, Ukrainians still have enough physical and moral strength to live during the war, to work, to help, and to fight. The summer period is favorable in this case: the length of the day and the solar activity usually have a positive effect on mood and well-being. The most negative changes occurred with interest in the life around and with nutrition, as well as with the plans for the future and with the regrets about the past. 

LEVEL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXHAUSTION 

• The dynamics of our studies of the emotional states of Ukrainian citizens for the period from March 2020 to June 2022 shows that the changes in their day-to-day assessment of their emotional stress are insignificant. The peak of stress was observed at the beginning of April 2022 (3.5). But as of June 2022, a gradual return to the indicators of the “peaceful” time is observed (2.9). It is probably an emotional adaptation to the war, which could be linked both to the reserves of the human psyche and to the external circumstances, which for the majority of citizens have relatively stabilized or at least have become clear and defined.  

• 24% of Ukrainians feel calm and very calm. 39% feel tense and very tense. Stress increases with age. Also, stress is more common among women (probably due to their higher sensitivity and the need to take care not only of themselves, but also of their children) and among those who believe that people should restrict themselves during the war – this demand considerably increases stress.

• The index of psychological exhaustion is still quite moderate (2.0). It has not changed in the dynamics from April to June 2022, except for the indicator of trust in people (it decreased). The shares of the respondents who believe that people cannot be trusted and of those who think that something bad may happen to them have increased. The latter tendency is related to the news about the destruction and the casualties and to the realization that there are few left who have not been at least indirectly affected by this.

• The index of psychological exhaustion is mainly “warranted” by the sad mood (2.7) and mistrust of people (2.6). However, Ukrainians still can rely on themselves (1.6) and do not feel “dead” inside (1.4).

• Women, the residents of the East of the country, those who are not working or are retired, those who have changed their place of residence, as well as those who are prone to self-restrictions feel the most exhausted.

TYPES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ADAPTATION TO THE WAR 

• The results of our analysis allowed us to distinguish two population groups distinguished by their level of adaptation to war conditions. The “Adapted” ones: have high resilience, do not restrict themselves in pleasures, have low emotional stress and psychological exhaustion, and use more adaptive strategies to overcome stressful situations. The “Not adapted” ones: experience significant emotional stress, tend to restrict themselves in entertainment and pleasures, are exhausted psychologically, and have low resilience. Their strategies for overcoming stress are not effective and often lead to depressed psychological state and to exhaustion.

LIFE DURING THE WAR 

• The war evokes a large number of feelings and thoughts, which are often opposite and contradictory; many things no longer have nuances, but become black and white, unambiguous and dogmatic. A person faces a high level of stress, experiences the “survivor's guilt”, the “witness trauma” and other conditions that are associated with war. A change in habitual behavior and priorities is among the consequences of such conditions. Self-blame and restricting oneself in pleasures and in the opportunities to enjoy life or even to live a normal “peaceful life” are increasing.

• Today, 59% of the respondents consider it necessary to significantly limit themselves in entertainment and shopping, while 36%, on the other hand, believe that it is necessary to try to live a full life.

• Young people under the age of 35 are less inclined to self-restrictions (only 46% support it). Also, people who work full-time (55%) or part-time (58%) restrict themselves less, probably believing that their frontline is the economic one (paying taxes, helping the army).

• In general, we did not find significant gender differences in self-restrictions. However, young women under the age of 35 are more likely to try to live a full life (54%), unlike their male peers (44%). One of the important reasons for this difference is the social acceptability of such behavior for women. According to the majority, men have different roles during the war.

• Going to the gym (84%), visiting beauty salons (67%), celebrating own birthday (62%) are the most acceptable practices. The less acceptable ones are outdoors leisure (having a barbecue): 42%, going to restaurants and cafes (37%) and buying expensive food and clothes (36%). Therefore, sports, as a sign of a healthy lifestyle, keeping oneself in good physical shape and taking care of oneself, is a positive behavior allowed during wartime. Other positions are probably considered redundant, those that people can do without. This particularly applies to expensive food and clothes, which are not essential, especially considering the fact that occupied regions or damaged cities suffer from the lack of basic products, clean water, medicine, etc. Therefore, it causes more guilt and is considered an excess.

• The respondents of the older age group (51+) are most prone to restrictions, especially regarding the purchase of expensive food and clothing and eating out. Age differences apply the least to sports and beauty salons. Therefore, the patterns of behavior that cause judgment and self-restrictions are most likely to do so among the older age group. Young people under the age of 35 who try to live a peaceful life and restrict themselves less are least likely to show judgment and self-restrictions. 

• In contrast to men, women are also less supportive of the “peaceful life behaviors” with the exception of the visits to beauty salons, where there are no gender differences. Probably, women's favoring beauty salons is not considered a surplus, but a necessity, while men support going to beauty salons because it is a more feminine practice and therefore allowed for women, towards whom there are different requirement during wartime than to men.

• Regarding macro-regional differences: the residents of the West of Ukraine more often consider it unacceptable to celebrate their own birthday and to buy expensive food and clothes. 

• Those who believe that it is necessary to restrict oneself during the war consider various activities, excluding going to the gym, to be unacceptable much more often than those who believe that it is necessary to live a full life.

• Also, those whose relatives are fighting in the war are somewhat less inclined to restrict themselves. Perhaps this is due to the fact that they feel less guilty, since someone close to them is already “paying” for their peaceful life.

• The Thirteenth national poll during the war, conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on June 18-19, 2022, shows that 75% of the respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction. 13% have the opposite opinion, and another 12% could not make an assessment. The assessment of the country’s direction as the right one continues to dominate in all the regions of Ukraine and across all the age groups. 

• 93% of respondents believe that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack. The high level of such confidence is observed among the residents of all the macro-regions and among the representatives of different age groups.

• Despite the high level of confidence in Ukraine’s victory in the war, the respondents are more “sober” in their estimates of the timing of the victory. Today, the majority of them (57%) believe that it will take Ukraine at least six months or more to win. A quarter of the respondents believe in the victory in a few months, and about 6%, in a few weeks. There are slightly more those who wish the victory to happen in a shorter time among the senior respondents. Nevertheless, even in this age group, half of the respondents anticipate the victory in six months to a year period.

• Polish President Duda and British Prime Minister Johnson are the foreign leaders who enjoy the highest positive attitudes among Ukrainians – over 90% (74-76% of the attitudes are completely positive, while 15-16% are rather positive). 89% of the respondents have a positive attitude to US President Biden, 73%, to Lithuanian President Nausėda, 71%, to the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, 59%, to Turkish President Erdoğan, 58%, to French President Macron, and 50%, to Romanian President Iohannis (30% don’t know him). 45% of the respondents have positive attitude to the Prime Minister of Italy Draghi (25% do not know him), and 41%, to German Chancellor Scholz. Negative attitudes prevail towards Hungary's Prime Minister Orbán: 53%. 20% have a positive attitude to him, and 20% do not know him.

• The absolute majority of the respondents have a negative attitude towards the leaders of Belarus (95%) and Russia (98%).

• The attitudes towards Chancellor Scholz and the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen have improved over the last two months, while the attitudes to the President of Turkey Erdoğan and to the President of France Macron have worsened. 

• 87% of the respondents would support Ukraine's accession to the European Union in the event of a referendum (4% would be against it and 8% would not vote). The support for EU accession is unanimous among the representatives of all the macro-regions and all the age groups.

• 69% of respondents believe that Ukraine will join the EU in 5 years (40% believe it will happen in 1-2 years, and 29%, up to five years). Another 14% believe that Ukraine will become a member of the EU in the next 5 to 10 years, and 3%, in 10 to 20 years. Only 7% do not believe that Ukraine will integrate into the European Union.

• The support of Ukraine’s NATO membership has increased: 76% would support such an initiative in a referendum, 10% would not support it, and 12% would not vote. In March 2022, 68% supported joining the Alliance. In contrast to joining the EU, joining NATO is more cautiously perceived by the respondents in the East of Ukraine (55% of them support the membership, 20% are against, and 22% would not go to the polls).

 • The opinion of Ukrainians on whether the direction in which things in the country are going is right almost has not changed: the absolute majority (79%) gives a positive answer. There are slight differences in this regard in different regions and age groups. However, the share of positive assessments does not fall below three quarters (74% in the South of Ukraine and among the respondents aged from 30 to 39 years).

• The assessments of the efficiency of Ukrainians government significantly improved during the war. While at the end of 2021, only 5% thought that the central government authorities had successfully performed almost all their duties, in May 2022, this share increased to 54%. The group of those who believe that the authorities hardly perform their duties has decreased symmetrically: from 44% to 4%. The number of the respondents with an intermediate assessment (the government partially performs its duties) has hardly changed. In the regional context, the assessments of residents of the East of Ukraine are somewhat more restrained. In terms of age groups, relatively better assessments are typical for young people.

• The estimates of the ratio between Ukraine's achievements and failures since its independence have moderately improved. While at the end of 2021, more than half of the respondents (53%) believed that failures have prevailed since 1991 and up to date, in May 2022, this share decreased to 30%. At the same time, the share of those who emphasized on the predominance of Ukraine’s achievements increased from 4% to 18%, and the share of those who believe that the failures and achievements compensated each other increased from 34% to 44%. It is quite interesting that the largest share of the negative assessments is observed among the residents of the Central region of Ukraine, and the smallest one, among the residents of the East. In terms of age, the assessments tend to deteriorate somewhat as the age of the respondents increases.

• Despite the war in the country, the assessments of living conditions have also improved for the majority of Ukraine's population. The vast majority of the respondents (59%) now believe that these conditions are generally satisfactory (compared to 34% at the end of 2021). The share of those who assess these conditions as generally bad ones has also decreased significantly: from 53% to 28%. As expected, the shares of the respondents who say their living conditions are poor are slightly larger among the residents of the South and East of Ukraine. In terms of age, young people (18-29 years old) stand out with better assessments.

• Significant positive changes have taken place regarding the opinions about the future of Ukraine. The share of those who believe that the situation will not change has significantly decreased (from 38% to 13%), as did the share of those who believe that the situation will deteriorate (from 35% to 7%). At the same time, the share of the optimists increased significantly: from 13% to 76%. From the point of view of the regional and age groups, the answers are quite homogeneous: all the regions believe in a better future for Ukraine.

• Together, the five indicators presented in the graphs (government efficiency, achievements and failures, living conditions, and social expectations, satisfaction with events) allow constructing a generalized image of the Ukrainian state (GSR-5 methodology), to which the respondents are leaning. In November 2021, 35% of respondents were leaning to a strongly negative image, while 32%, to a moderately negative one. About a quarter of the respondents (25%) had an intermediate image (not good, but not bad), and only 8%, a moderately or clearly positive one. As of May 2022, the situation has changed significantly. Slightly more than the half of the respondents report a clearly (5%) or moderately (46%) positive image of the state. The share of the respondents leaning to the intermediate image has hardly changed (30%). Consequently, the share of those who adhere to the moderately (15%) or clearly (3%) negative image has significantly decreased.

• In the regional context, the image of the state is somewhat more restrained among the residents of the East of Ukraine. Also, a slight deterioration in this parameter takes place as the age of the residents increases. Men and women differ insignificantly. Substantial differences are present between the electorates of different political parties. The most positive image is typical for the voters of the political parties “Servant of the People” and “Vitaliy Klychko’s UDAR”, while the most negative, for those of the political parties “Batkivshchyna” and “Razumkov’s Party”. Yet, the worst image of the Ukrainian state is typical for those who do not intend to go to the polls at all. This is the only group in which more than half of the respondents lean to a moderately or clearly negative image of the state: 38% and 15% respectively. 

• The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” in May 2022 and commissioned by the public initiative “Ukrainian Arsenal of Freedom” showed a significant difference in the assessments of the situation in Ukraine and the one at the local level. Speaking about Ukraine, 73% of the respondents said that the situation in the country is tense, 22% said it was critical, and only 4% said it was calm. On the other hand, when assessing the situation at the local level, 61% consider it calm, 34%, tense, and only 4%, critical. The residents of the East and South of Ukraine see the situation as more tense than the respondents from the Center and especially those from the West.

• The importance of the safety of life (52%) and the protection against terrorist and military threats (52%) has increased significantly for the respondents over the past four months – these two factors top the ranking of important components in the field of personal security. Social protection is important in this context for 20% of respondents, while protection against corruption and smuggling, for 18%, protection of health, for 17%, human rights protection, for 13%, and the environment, only for 5%.

• The right to protect their life is the most important right for the respondents today (58%) among the key rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine. Freedom of speech is the most important right for 32%, the right to personal integrity, for 30%, the right to work, for 27%, the right to social protection, for 25%, and the right to property, for 21%. The freedom of movement is the most important right for 14%, judicial protection, for 13%, education, for 11%, safe environment, for 8%, freedom of religion, for 7%, and the right to entrepreneurship, for 6%.

• Over 90% of the respondents agree that freedom is one of the main values for Ukrainians.

• Half of the respondents believe they are able to defend themselves in the event of a sudden threat to life, health or property before the arrival of the police. The other half don’t think so. Men, young respondents and those who are can use firearms perfectly consider themselves more able to defend themselves.

• The respondents are more concerned about the safety of their relatives and friends (91%) than about their own safety (63%). Women, the residents of the South and the East, as well as the respondents from the places where hostilities or occupation took place are more concerned about their personal safety.

• A personal ownership of a firearm or the ownership of a firearm by a family member provides a greater sense of security (48%) than the fact that there are other people around who own legal firearms (33%)

• During the war, the share of those who support granting Ukrainian citizens the right to own firearms and ammunition has more than doubled. Today, 58% support such an initiative, while 39% do not. Thus, for the first time in the history of the studies of this issue in Ukraine, the share of the supporters of this idea exceeded the number of its opponents (in 2018-2021, about a quarter supported this idea, while more than 70% did not support it). There are more supporters of the “armament” of the citizens among the residents of the Center of the country, the respondents in young and middle age groups, and among men. 

• The respondents who have relatives who are currently defending Ukraine in the war are more supportive of the idea of granting citizens the right to bear arms than other respondents.

• 61% believe that mass armament of Ukrainian citizens with firearms will help strengthen the country's defense capabilities. 36% are of the opposite opinion. Young people, men and those who want to have weapons agree with this statement more. 

• 45% believe that establishing a legal framework for the free purchase of firearms will increase the personal freedoms of citizens, while 40%, on the contrary, believe that freedoms will be infringed under such conditions. There are more latter respondents among the residents of the East of Ukraine, among women and among the opponents of creating conditions for the free purchase of firearms.

• At the same time, 58% fear that the free purchase of firearms will increase crime. The opposite opinion was expressed by 35% of the respondents. There are more latter respondents among the residents of the Center of Ukraine, among men and among those who want to become owners of firearms.

• About 80% of respondents did not feel the need to own a firearm before the Russian invasion. Instead, today 44% would like to own firearms and ammunition. Therefore, today, a third of those who did not want to have weapons before the war changed their minds, and almost half of them want family members to have weapons.

• Now, 60% of men and 28% of women would like to own firearms and ammunition. At the same time, while women are generally against owning firearms personally, most middle-aged and younger women want their family members to own weapons.

• Among those who want to have a firearm, the majority (70%) would like to have one firearm. 21%, would like to own two pieces, while 9%, three or more. Among the firearms, they prefer guns (57%) and slightly less, automatic rifles (48%). 18% would like to have a shotgun (rifle).

• Almost 60% of men and 30% of women would use the right to purchase firearms and ammunition if they had the financial and legal capacity to do so.

• At the same time, 64% believe that there is a significant threat of illicit arms trafficking after the war is over. 31% believe that although such a threat exists, it is insignificant. 3% do not see this threat at all.

• 17% of the respondents (including 31% of men and 4% of women) said that they can use firearms perfectly. 38% have general skills. 45% said they did not have such skills. Among those who know how to use firearms only in general, two-thirds would like to improve their skills. Among those who cannot use firearms at all, 37%. Interestingly, more than half of young and middle-aged women would like to learn to use a firearm.

• The majority of respondents (72%) support the idea of introducing mandatory firearms training for civilians in Ukraine. 26% do not support it.

• As a part of the Tenth national survey during the war, the Sociological Group “Rating” has conducted comprehensive research of the ideological markers of the Ukrainian society. Before May 9, the respondents were asked about the Soviet past, the role and participation of the Ukrainian people in World War II, the national liberation movement, the assessment of historical figures, and about their attitude to the ban on symbols and to the dismantling of monuments. In addition, the issues of nationality, language, and the attitude to various ethnic groups were studied.

• The full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine has significantly affected the perceptions of ideological issues, especially those related to the “shared” Soviet history. The results of many years of observations in Ukraine and Russia confirmed the shift of public opinion in opposite directions regarding the historical past. An example of this is the rate of nostalgia for the collapse of the USSR: in Russia, it has mostly been increasing over the past ten years (since 2010, this indicator increased from 55% to 63%), while in Ukraine, it decreased (from 46% in 2010 to 11% in 2022). As a result, Ukrainian national heroes and symbols have begun replacing once significant and imposed by Soviet propaganda historical figures. Thus, as of the end of April 2022, the lowest level of nostalgia for the collapse of the USSR over the history of observations was recorded in Ukraine (11%). The vast majority of the respondents – 87% – do not miss the USSR.

• At the end of February 2022, as a result of Russian aggression, a dramatic change took place in the ideological views of the Ukrainian society on any markers related to Russia. A “decommunization” and “de-Russification” of public opinion happened. Everything “Soviet” is now often perceived as the Russian one, and, consequently, the hostile one. The main reason for this is the use of Soviet symbols and speculations regarding the “common” historical past by Russian propaganda in the war against Ukraine.

• The reassessment of the attitudes towards the May 9 Victory Day is one of the key changes in the historical memory. While before 2022, this holiday was perceived by the absolute majority of the adult population of Ukraine (80%) as the one that has a significant personal symbolism, in 2022, for a considerable share of the respondents it became a relic of the past (36%), or just a regular day (23%).

• In addition, the “victorious” symbolism of this day changed to the “memorial” one. Since 2012, the gradual dynamics of rethinking this date has been recorded. But the war with Russia has dramatically changed the views of Ukrainians, and today, it is a Remembrance Day for 80% of the respondents, and only for 15%, it is a Victory Day (this share was 58% in 2018).

• Despite the change in attitude to the symbolism of the Victory Day, Ukrainians highly appreciate (78%) the contribution of the Ukrainian people to the victory over fascism, and 67% believe that Ukraine was the largest contributor to the victory over Germany in World War II. 23% think it was Russia, 24%, Belarus, and 21%, think it were other countries of the USSR. Regarding the allies, 30% of Ukrainians say the largest contribution was by the United States and 27%, by the United Kingdom. 

• The emphasis of the struggle of the Ukrainian people during the war shifted from the pro-Soviet to pro-Ukrainian. While in 2008, 74% of the respondents believed that Ukrainian soldiers and officers in the Soviet army fought for their Soviet homeland, 13% believed they fought for the liberation of Ukraine, and only 3%, for the liberation of Europe, in 2022 the share of those who believe that Ukrainians fought for their land increased to 44%. 39% believe they fought for the Soviet homeland, and 7%, for the liberation of Europe. As in 2008, only 3% believe the Ukrainians fought for Stalin.

• Interestingly, assessing the current Ukrainian-Russian war, three quarters of the respondents believe that Ukrainian soldiers and officers protect both the people of Ukraine and the peoples of Europe today, and only 22% believe that Ukrainian soldiers and officers protect only the people of Ukraine.

• Ukrainians have a positive attitude towards the warriors who defended their homeland from enemies at different times and in different armies. The vast majority (96%) have a positive attitude to the soldiers of the modern Ukrainian army. Also, a positive attitude towards the Soviet soldiers who fought against fascism (85%) and towards the UPA soldiers (71%) dominates in Ukrainian society. And while there still are regional differences in the assessments of the Soviet soldiers and the UPA soldiers, there is a complete consensus across regions and age group on the contemporary soldiers of the Ukrainian army.

• The support for the recognition of the OUN-UPA as the participants of the struggle for the national independence of Ukraine has significantly increased: 81% support it, and only 10% are against. This support has increased 4 times since 2010, and doubled since 2015.

• Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Mykhailo Hrushevsky are Ukrainian historical figures who are unequivocally positively perceived by Ukrainian society (by more than 90% of the respondents). Over the recent years, there has been a positive trend in the attitude towards Ukrainian historical figures, around which heated debates were going on in Ukrainian society decades ago. In particular, the attitudes that gradually improved are the ones towards Ivan Mazepa (44% in 2012 and 76% in 2022), Simon Petliura (26% in 2012 and 49% in 2022) and Stepan Bandera (22% in 2012 and 74% in 2022). It is important that the positive attitude towards the ideologue of Ukrainian nationalism prevails today in the south-eastern regions of Ukraine, and among those who speak only Russian in everyday life.

• In contrast, the attitudes towards Soviet leaders have been mostly negative during the last decade, and have deteriorated particularly sharply in 2022. Over the last 5-8 years, the negative attitudes towards Lenin have doubled, and negative attitudes toward Stalin have tripled. Today, only 13% have a positive attitude to Lenin and 7%, to Stalin.

• The absolute majority (89%) of the respondents support the recognition of the actions of Russian troops in Ukraine as the genocide of Ukrainian people. 76% support the ban on the use of symbols Z and V that are marked on Russian military equipment and 74% support for the ban on the “St. George's” ribbon in Ukraine. It is noteworthy that over the past 5 years, the support for the latter initiative increased from 45% to 74%.

• More than 65% support renaming the streets in Ukraine that have Russian or Soviet names. 71% support dismantling the monuments associated with Russia. 62% think that airing music from Russia on radio and television should be banned. At the same time, the initiative to exclude the works of Russian literature from the school curriculum is controversial (35% support it, 30% do not support it, and 31% are neutral). As for the dismantling of monuments related to the history of the World War II, a relative majority opposes it (40%). 19% support this initiative, while 36% are neutral.

• Dictatorship (41%) and fascism (37%) are the main characteristics used by Ukrainians to describe the current political regime in Russia. Another 10% describe the Russian regime as Nazism.

• Today, 92% of the respondents consider themselves Ukrainians by nationality. 5% consider themselves Russians, and 3% identify as other ethnicities. Interestingly, from 2008 to 2014, there was a stable distribution of ethnic identification: about 83% considered themselves Ukrainians, while about 15%, Russians. After the occupation of Crimea and a part of Donbass in 2014, the number of respondents who identified as Russians decreased to 11%, and the number of those who identified as Ukrainians increased to 87%-88%. At the same time, the share of those who considered themselves Russians has been gradually declining over the past eight years.

• Our studies of the attitudes towards various ethnic and linguistic groups living in Ukraine showed that the respondents’ attitudes towards them are mostly positive or neutral that lean positive. Ukrainians have the best attitude towards Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (95% expressed positive attitude) and Russian-speaking ones (57% have positive attitude, 30%, neutral one, and 13%, negative one). Positive attitudes also prevail towards Jews (60%) and Hungarians (49%) living in our country.

• When the war has already started, the attitudes towards Russians who live in Ukraine as well as the one towards the residents of the occupied Crimea and the residents of so-called “DNR/LNR” territories have deteriorated. 

• 41% have a positive attitude towards the residents of the occupied Crimea, 14% have a negative attitude, and 40% have a neutral one. 30% have a positive attitude towards the Russians who live in Ukraine, while 27% have a negative one, and 39%, a neutral one. 27% expressed positive attitude to the residents of so-called “DNR/LNR” territories, while 31% expressed a negative one, and 37%, a neutral one. 

• Ukrainians have much better attitude towards the residents of Belarus than towards the residents of Russia, although both categories have lost much of their credibility during the war.

• Only 22% of the respondents have positive attitude towards the residents of Belarus (this share has shrunk three times over the year). 33% have negative attitude, and 42%, a neutral one. On the other hand, a negative attitude prevails regarding the residents of Russia: 69%. 8% have positive attitude towards them (this share has shrunk more than three times over the year), and 20% have a neutral attitude.

• Thus, over the last year the attitude towards the residents of Belarus, the residents of the so-called “LNR/DNR” territories and the occupied Crimea shifted from a rather positive one to a more neutral one. Instead, the attitudes toward the residents of Russia have significantly deteriorated, while the attitudes towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians have improved.

• Linguistic self-identification and the language used in everyday life are two different matters. We can observe a steady decrease in the Russian-speaking segment of Ukrainians: in 2012 there were about 40% of such respondents, at the end of 2021, 26%, at the beginning of the war, 18%, and as of the end of April, 15%. Instead, the “flow” of Russian-speakers takes place into the segment of “bilinguals” (from 15% to 33%). The share of those who constantly use only Ukrainian language at home has slightly increased from 44% to 51%.

• 80% of the respondents consider Ukrainian their native language, 16%, Russian, and 3%, another language.

 • The ninth national poll conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on April 26, 2022, showed that 80% of respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction. Only 10% disagreed with this assessment, while another 10% could not make an assessment. The assessment of the direction of things in the country as a correct one continues to dominate in all the regions of Ukraine and across all the age groups. 

• The assessment of international assistance from Ukraine’s Western partners have improved over the past 1.5 months. In particular, the respondents pointed to the positive dynamics in the provision of diplomatic, humanitarian, and financial assistance. About 60% consider diplomatic and humanitarian aid sufficient (this share was about 50% in early March). 46% consider financial support sufficient (39% in March).

• The assessment of the provision of weapons to Ukraine almost has not changed: 29% consider it sufficient and 65%, insufficient. The assessment of economic sanctions against Russia has deteriorated: only 20% consider them sufficient (this share was 33% in March).

• Over the past two months, Ukrainians' attitudes toward the leaders of Poland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Turkey, Lithuania, and France have improved significantly. 92% of the respondents have a positive attitude to Polish President Duda, 87%, to British Prime Minister Johnson, 86%, to US President Biden, 76%, to Turkish President Erdoğan, 75%, to Lithuanian President Nausėda, and 75%, to French President Macron. 66% have a positive attitude towards the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen.

• At the same time, the attitude towards German Chancellor Scholz has deteriorated: 30% have a positive attitude towards him, while 54% have a negative attitude (in January 2022, the share of the latter ones was 23%). 26% report a positive attitude towards German President Steinmeier, while 44% have negative attitude towards him. 

• The absolute majority of the respondents have a negative attitude towards the leaders of Belarus (96%) and Russia (98%).

• The Ninth national poll, conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on April 26, 2022, showed that 20% of adults in Ukraine had to change their place of residence (this figure has been constant since mid-March). Most of those who were forced to leave are from the eastern regions (58%) and among the young people (33%).

• Since the beginning of April, the share of those who plan to return home has slightly decreased (from 29% to 22%). Instead, the share of the respondents who would like to return, but a little later, has increased (from 24% to 31%). The share of those who intend to return home, but after the war is over, has not changed (43%).

• A gradual increase of the number of Ukrainians returning to work can be seen. Currently, 59% of those who had a job before the war continue to work (this share was 46% in March). In particular, the number of those who are working in the usual mode has increased (from 23% to 32%). 24% are working part-time or remotely, and 3% started at a new job. Most of those who are working now are the residents of the western and central regions (about 60%). The share of the residents of the South of Ukraine who are working is 52%, and the one of the residents of the East of Ukraine is about 40%. The gradual recovery of employment is observed in the Center, South and East of Ukraine. In the West of Ukraine, on the other hand, the situation with employment has stabilized since the beginning of April.

• At the same time, 39% of those who were employed before the war still do not have a job (this share was 53% in March and 41% in early April).

• Half of the respondents (54%) who lost their jobs during the war believe that they will be able to return to their previous jobs. 40% do not think so. The shares of the latter ones are the highest among the rural residents, the senior respondents and women. 

• An important finding is that two thirds of the respondents who lost their jobs as a result of the war are willing to change jobs. 58% of the respondents who lost their jobs do not mind retraining for another occupation, and 49% are ready to work in another region of Ukraine. Most of those who are ready to change their occupations and jobs are among the residents of the eastern regions of Ukraine.

• 70% of the respondents support the possible mobilization of conscripts of certain occupations to rebuilding the country instead of serving in the army. 6% do not support this. Older respondents are more often in favor of such an initiative, while young people are relatively less supportive.

• 55% heard about the “Gardens of Victory” initiative (28% heard a lot, 27% heard something). 45% don’t know anything about it. 82% assess this idea positively.

• 56% of the respondents said they have a plot of land and plan to plant a garden this year, while 9% do not have their own land, but also plan to plant with relatives or friends. Only 8% said they have a garden, but will not plant anything. Another quarter of the respondents don’t have land plots. Most of those who are going to plant gardens are the residents of the West and the Center of the country. The share of the respondents who are going to plant gardens is 83% among the rural residents, 65% among the residents of small towns, and 50% among the residents of regional centers.

• 33% said they attended church on Easter, while 67% did not. This is a higher share than during the first quarantine (in April 2020), but lower than before 2020. The highest shares of those who went to church on Easter are among the residents of the western regions of Ukraine and among the rural population.

В рамках восьмої хвилі проекту «Україна в умовах війни» Cоціологічною групою «Рейтинг» було проведене дослідження психологічних маркерів війни: стратегій адаптації до стресових станів, рівнів життєстійкості та психологічного виснаження.   

АДАПТАЦІЯ ДО СТРЕСОВИХ СТАНІВ

• За більше, ніж місяць війни Індекс емоційного напруження піднявся з 2.7 до 3.5. Сьогодні кількість тих, хто оцінює свій емоційний стан як дуже напружений або напружений складає майже 50%.У спокійному емоційному стані сьогодні лише 8% опитаних, тоді як до війні цей показник коливався в межах 22-26%. 

• Найбільше емоційно напруженим свій стан визначають старші люди. Також така ситуація спостерігається серед жінок, які зазвичай емоційніше реагують на складні ситуації. З них майже 60% сукупно мають високі та надвисокі рівні емоційної напруги, тоді як серед чоловіків таких  лише 35%. Абсолютна більшість (74%) тих, хто перебуває у складних обставинах, оцінюють свій стан як напружений.

• Загалом, лише 5% респондентів зазначили, що перебувають у складній ситуації. Ще 44% мають труднощі, але вони терпимі. У відносно нормальних обставинах знаходиться 51% опитаних. 

• Найбільше складнощів відчувають ті, хто вимушено змінили місце проживання, особливо мешканці східних областей. Легше тим, хто має роботу, або хоча б часткову занятість. Відповідно найважче тим, хто не працює – лише 40% з них перебувають у відносно нормальних обставинах. Отже, можливість якнайшвидше відновити роботу, запустити підприємства залишається вкрай важливим для відносної нормалізації життя українців під час війни.

• У складних життєвих обставинах людина може обирати різні стратегії поведінки: наразі, 50% опитаних намагаються активно вирішувати свої проблеми – для умов війни це показник хорошої адаптації до ситуації та прийняття відповідальності за своє життя на себе. 35% намагаються перечекати, не поспішають з рішеннями, отже займають пасивну позицію. 13% шукають підтримки в інших людей (здатні спиратися на інших та залучати їх до рішень). В цілому, конструктивні стратегії поведінки в складних життєвих обставинах притаманні сьогодні 63% опитаних.

• Найменш активну стратегію поведінки використовують мешканці сходу (41%), і вони ж більше за інших звертаються за допомогою (17%). Молодь більше схильна перечекати і не поспішати з рішеннями (40%). Жінки більше, ніж чоловіки шукають підтримку в інших людей (16% проти 10%) і набагато менш схильні до активного вирішення своїх проблем (44% проти 56%). Це відповідає традиційним гендерним типам поведінки, які актуалізувалися під час війни. 

• Активно вирішують свої проблеми ті, хто працює повноцінно або частково (60%). Ті, хто не працює більше готові перечекати і не поспішати з рішеннями (41%). Активна життєва позиція сприяє збереженню або поверненню на робоче місце і навпаки – наявність роботи сприяє можливості активно вирішувати свої проблеми, бо людина зберігає свій соціальний статус і має матеріальне забезпечення.

• Зрозумілою є набагато нижча активна позиція у тих, хто перебуває у складних життєвих обставинах (36%), вони більш схильні перечекати (39%) та шукати підтримки в інших людей (18%), на відміну від тих, хто знаходиться у відносно нормальних обставинах та відчувають незначні труднощі. 

• Країна згуртувалася у боротьбі з ворогом і у підтримці один одного та взаємодопомозі. Стосунки та взаємодія з рідними є миролюбними (94%). Лише 5% уникають цих стосунків. Також хороші взаємини зберігаються із сусідами (89%). З незнайомими мають миролюбні взаємини 67%. Водночас, майже третина уникають контактів з незнайомцями. Агресивні стосунки з іншими практично відсутні. Отже, навіть з незнайомцями більшість нормально взаємодіє – це хороший показник атмосфери взаємин та довіри і низький рівень підозрілості до співгромадян.

• Найбільше уникають незнайомих людей мешканці центру та півдня, люди середнього віку, жінки та ті, хто не змінили місце проживання у зв’язку з війною.  

РІВЕНЬ ЖИТТЄСТІЙКОСТІ

• Українці на другому місяці війни демонструють хороший рівень життєстійкості  (3.9 з 5). Індекс життєстійкості складається із психологічної стійкості (4.0) та підтримки фізичного здоров’я (3.8).

• Низький рівень життєстійкості мають лише 2% опитаних. У більшості він на середньому рівні (59%). Високу стійкість все ще мають 39%. Хоча війна вже триває більше місяця, але насправді це критично, оскільки  резерви психіки розраховані на більш тривалий складний період життя. 

• Психологічна життєстійкість пов’язана з інтересом до життя, відчуттям себе корисним, здатністю приймати рішення, наявністю планів на майбутнє та відсутністю жалю за минулим. Українці в цьому є достатньо сильними:  цікавляться тим, що відбувається навколо (92%), та мають плани на майбутнє (82%). Однак втоми не відчувають лише третина, мають повноцінний сон лише 40%, слідкують за своїм здоров’ям половина.  Водночас, нормально харчуються більшість (83%).

• Найменшу стійкість мають мешканці сходу, пенсіонери та ті, хто втратили роботу. У жінок підтримка фізичного здоров’я у гіршому стані, ніж психологічна стійкість. Найгірший стан у тих, хто перебуває у складних життєвих обставинах. Підтримка фізичного здоров’я в них на незадовільному рівні. В усіх категоріях опитаних психологічна життєстійкість є вищою за фізичний стан. Тож наразі війна фізично виснажила більше, а психологічно ми є більш витривалими. 

• Дещо вищий рівень психологічної витривалості, готовності до тривалої боротьби виявляють люди до 50 років, в основному чоловіки, ті, хто повноцінно працюють, перебувають у відносно нормальних обставинах, здатні активно вирішувати проблеми та не змінили місце проживання у зв’язку з війною. Тому зрозумілим є прагнення багатьох швидше повернутися до дому, який є важливим ресурсом в житті людини. Це не лише матеріальна, але і важлива емоційна складова підтримки, нормалізації життя.

• Також найбільша життєстійкість у тих, хто відчуває такі емоції щодо країни як радість (53%), гнів (43%) та гордість (40%), а найменше у тих, кому страшно (28%) та сумно (33%). Гнів не є позитивною, але є активною емоцією, яка дозволяє підтримувати життя та рухатися вперед, не завмирати та не розсипатися. Особливо коли гнів справедливий.

РІВЕНЬ ПСИХОЛОГІЧНОГО ВИСНАЖЕННЯ

• На сьогодні високий рівень виснаження мають лише 2% опитаних, у 71% він на середньому рівні, а у 27% на низькому. Резерви психіки людини набагато більші, ніж на такий короткий проміжок часу. Ми здатні швидко адаптуватися і достатньо повноцінно жити, бути активними та дієвими. В умовах війни часто відкривається «друге дихання» і безумовно з’являється жага до життя, коли навколо багато смерті та руйнувань. Не відчувають себе «мертвими» всередині 79%, можуть покластися на себе 69%, не відчувають себе слабкими – 55%. Тоді як часто відчувають на собі загрозу від світу лише 6%.

• Виснаження у більшості проявляється у сумному настрої, зниженні довіри до інших людей, думках про власну безпорадність і що зі ними може статися щось погане. 

• Найбільшими є гендерні відмінності: жінки почуваються вдвічі більш психологічно виснаженими, ніж чоловіки. Війна емоційно і фізично є більш травмуючим досвідом для жінок, це підтверджується в усіх попередніх наших дослідженнях.

• Також відносно вищий рівень психологічного виснаження у тих, хто зараз не працює, хто вимушено змінив місце проживання, та у молоді. Найважча ситуація у тих, хто перебуває у складних обставинах. Поведінкова стратегія на активне вирішення проблем як стратегія поведінки сприяє низькому рівню психологічного виснаження. 

• Результати також доводять, що радість та гордість за країну країни найбільше сприяють хорошому психологічному стану. Повернення додому (як з’явиться така можливість) теж зміцнює людину і допомагає відновитися швидше.

Аудиторія: населення України віком від 18 років і старші в усіх областях, крім тимчасово окупованих територій Криму та Донбасу. Вибірка репрезентативна за віком, статтю і типом поселення. Вибіркова сукупність: 1200 респондентів. Метод опитування: CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews - телефонні інтерв'ю з використанням комп'ютера). Помилка репрезентативності дослідження з довірчою імовірністю 0,95: не більше 2,8%. Терміни проведення: 6  квітня 2022 р.

• The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on April 6, 2022, showed a significant increase in pride regarding Ukraine among the respondents. While in August 2021, 34% of the respondents said they felt proud of their country (at that time, the emotion that prevailed was sadness regarding Ukraine), today this feeling is dominant (80%). 32% feel sadness regarding Ukraine, 20% feel joy, 16%, fear, 11%, anger, and 6%, interest. Today, such emotions as indifference and shame regarding Ukraine are practically absent among the respondents.

• The emotion of pride regarding Ukraine is dominant among all the respondents, regardless of their age or region of residence. Residents of the Center of the country feel a little more joy (the time of this survey coincided with the liberation of three central regions from the occupiers). In addition, joy is a more common emotion regarding Ukraine among the youth. At the same time, fear for Ukraine is most often registered among the residents of the East of Ukraine today.

• Since August 2021, the share of the respondents who identify as the citizens of Ukraine has increased significantly (from 75% to 98%), as did the share of those who identify as “Europeans”: from 27% to 57%. Instead, fewer respondents tend to describe themselves as “the Soviet people”: their share has decreased from 21% to 7%. Also, an absolutely high level of local patriotism has been recorded. 

• The identification as the citizens of Ukraine dominates among all the age and regional groups today. Regarding the European identification, there are practically no differences among the age groups. At the same time, there are some differences from the point of view of macro regions: the European identification is somewhat more prevalent in the West and in the Center. The Soviet identity is relatively more common among the most elderly respondents.

• The vast majority (91%) of the respondents do not support the statement that “Russians and Ukrainians are one people”. Today, only 8% have such an opinion (the share of such respondents was 41% in August 2021 and 21% in March 2022). This idea is still supported by 23% of the residents of the East of Ukraine and by 13% of the older respondents. In contrast, in other macro regions and age groups, the support for this statement is almost non-existent.

• Over the last month, the share of the respondents who believe that restoring friendly relations between Ukrainians and Russians is impossible has increased 1.5 times (from 42% to 64%). 22% of the respondent believe that this might happen no sooner than in 20 to 30 years. About 10% predict such reconciliation in up to 15 years. Even in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine, more than half of the respondents do not believe in restoring the friendship between the two nations.

• About 80% of respondents are involved in defending their country in one way or another. 45% of the respondents help protect the country by financial contributions (in March 2022, this share was 39%). 35% volunteer: they help other people or the military. 18% participate in information resistance, 13% work in critical infrastructure, 3% serve in territorial defense, and 3% serve in the military. A quarter of the respondents are unable to help defend Ukraine.

• More and more people are resuming their jobs. Currently, 58% of those who had jobs before the war continue to work (this share was 46% in March). In general, 29% work normally, 26% work part-time or remotely, and 3% started at a new job. 41% lost their jobs during the war (53% did in March). Most of those currently employed are in the western oblasts, while only a third of the residents of the East of Ukraine have a job: other two-thirds have lost their jobs.

• 20% of the adult population of Ukraine had to change their place of residence. Most of those who were forced to leave their place of residence were in the eastern regions (46%). Also, young people moved out more (31%), while older people found it harder to leave their homes (13%). A third of those who have left their homes plan to return soon, while a quarter will wait a little longer. About 40% are ready to return, but only after the war is over.

• Almost 80% of the respondents are satisfied with the work of their mayor, the providers of utility services, and the police. Three quarters are satisfied with the work of medical institutions, while two thirds are satisfied with public transport and educational institutions.

• The vast majority of the respondents (90%) support the initiative to deprive the pro-Russian Members of Parliament of their mandates. 86% support a total ban on the activities of these MPs in Ukraine.

• 81% support the idea of raising taxes for Ukrainian businesses that continue to operate in Russia.

• 76% support the initiative to rename the streets and other objects, the names of which are linked to Russia.

• The support for the idea that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate should sever its ties with the Russian Orthodox Church is growing. 74% support this initiative (63% did in early March). Only 7% do not support it. 

• Half of the respondents (51%) believe that the Ukrainian government should ban the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine (the ban is supported by two thirds of respondents in the West and only by 29% in the East). At the same time, 21% support cancellation of the benefits of this church and the abolition of the leases of this church’s premises. Nevertheless, 20% think the government should not interfere in the affairs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate: most of all in the East (35%) and the South (25%).

• The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on March 30-31, 2022 shows that 78% of the respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction. Only 11% disagreed, while another 11% could not make an assessment. The assessment of this direction as the right one continues to prevail in all the regions of Ukraine and among all the age groups. 

• 95% of the respondents believe that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack, but the confidence in the quick victory “over a few weeks” has slightly decreased: from 47% to 35%. Instead, the shares of the answers “several months” and “six months to a year” increased. 14% of the respondents could not answer this question.

• The support for NATO accession continues to decline. In the first days of the war, the support for Ukraine's accession to the Alliance increased from 62% to 76%. After the first week of the war, this support decreased to 72%, and at the end of March, it equals 68%, i.e., it is approaching the pre-war levels.

• At the same time, the support for EU accession is growing. In the first days of the war, it increased from 68% to 86%, then its growth continued, and as of the end of March, 91% support Ukraine’s membership in the EU – an absolute record over all the years of our surveys.

• At the same time, the majority of the respondents (56%) are convinced that Ukraine will become a member of the European Union in one or two years, while 23% believe it will happen in five years. Over the last month, the share of those who believe that Ukraine will join the EU in the very short term decreased slightly (from 61% to 56%), and the share of those who believe Ukraine will join the EU in five years increased (from 13% to 23%).

   
• Over the last decade, there has been a steady growth in the number of those who consider Ukrainian their mother tongue: from 57% in 2012 to 76% in 2022. The share of the Russian language has decreased from 42% to 20% over the 10 years. Several trends should be pointed out in this dynamic. The first one is that significant changes in language self-identification took place between 2012 and 2016. One of the key reasons was a) the reaction of Ukrainian society to the experiments of the then government in the language policy; b) the events of the Revolution of Dignity; and c) Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and the temporary occupation of Crimea and some territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The second trend is that the positive dynamics in the self-identification took place due to the change in the attitudes towards the Ukrainian language in the Center, as well as in the South and East of Ukraine.
   
• At the same time, the practical aspect of this issue is somewhat different: the language self-identification and the everyday language are two different areas. We can confirm the steady decrease of the Russian-speaking segment of Ukrainians: in 2012, there were about 40% of such respondents, at the end of 2021, 26%, and at the beginning of the war, 18%. The Russian speakers instead “shift” into the segment of “bilingual speakers” (from 15% to 32%). The number of those who constantly use only Ukrainian at home has increased slightly from 44% to 48%.
   
• The transition to another language of communication is not a one-time event and requires some adaptation. What is important today is that two thirds of those who use both Ukrainian and Russian languages in their everyday life are ready to switch exclusively to Ukrainian soon. Among the Russian speaking respondents, these respondents comprise one third.
   
• Unprecedented unity of Ukrainian society during the war had a dramatic impact on the attitudes to the status of the languages: today, the absolute majority (83%) support Ukrainian being the only state language in Ukraine. This opinion dominates in all macro regions and in all age and language groups. On the other hand, almost a quarter of Ukrainians supported granting Russian the status of the state language before the war, and today, it is only 7%. In peacetime, residents of the South and East of Ukraine had traditionally advocated for granting Russian the status of the state language. But even in these regions, the share of such respondents was only one third, and today this share has almost halved.
   
• Today, the data suggest that language is more of a regional feature than a way of thinking. For example, in December 2021, 65% of bilingual speakers and half of those who speak Russian considered Russia an aggressor. At the same time, in the Ukrainian-speaking segment, one in ten had pro-Russian views. The sympathy to Russia was determined not so much by the language of communication as by political views and the influence of propaganda and was associated with the support for pro-Russian parties (“The Opposition Platform — For Life”, “Nashi” and Shariy’s party).
   
• Today, the majority (67%) believe that there are no issues between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. 19% believe that the language issue exists, but it is not that important. Only 12% believe that this issue is a threat to domestic security. It is important that the statements about the existence of the language problems are more prevalent not among the Russian-speaking population, but in the western regions, where Ukrainian dominates in all areas. Importantly, according to our previous survey, only 2% of Ukrainians believe that Russia came to protect Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. This myth was not accepted by Ukrainians.

Summing up, we can make the following conclusions:

   
1. The language self-identification of Ukrainians is growing steadily. The war, being a challenge for the whole society, will only accelerate this process. Today, the Ukrainian language is only strengthening as one of the cornerstones of Ukrainian statehood, and the lines of opposition on this issue are disappearing.
   
2. The transition to Ukrainian in everyday life is happening in an evolutionary manner. The destruction of the myth of the “brotherly people” and the isolation of Russia from the world’s cultural and informational context will only contribute to its acceleration in the Ukrainian society.
   
3. The “language issue” and the attempts to initiate arguments around this topic are not supported by the majority of the population. This problem is purely political and partly local. Nevertheless, most citizens, regardless of their language of communication, realize that we have one common enemy: Russia, which is trying to destroy our statehood. The Russian-speaking cities of the East are the most affected by the aggressor's actions. Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking people are fighting in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and they are united by the common goal: the victory over the enemy. After the victory, we can expect continued changes in the language self-identification of the citizens and the expansion of the use of the Ukrainian language in all areas.

 • The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on March 19, 2022 shows that two thirds of the citizens of Ukraine hope that it will be possible to rebuild Ukraine’s infrastructure and economy in less than five years after the war. 13% think it is possible to do over a year, while 51% think it will take up to five years. 18% believe that rebuilding the infrastructure and the economy will take up to ten years. There are not many skeptics who believe that the recovery will take more than ten years: only 10%. The younger respondents and the residents of the western regions of Ukraine are more optimistic about the rapid reconstruction. Those who had to leave their cities also demonstrate optimism regarding the recovery process.

• 61% of the respondents are ready to personally contribute to the reconstruction of Ukraine's infrastructure: financially or by participating in construction works. A third of the respondents would like to contribute to the rebuilding of the infrastructure, but cannot. Only 5% believe that this is solely the responsibility of the government, not the people. More than 70% of men are ready to join the reconstruction compared to the half of women. Those who have left their city at the moment are more willing to join the reconstruction.

• 90% are convinced that it is Russia that must compensate all the expenses for the reconstruction of Ukraine after the war. 20% believe that international organizations or European countries should invest in it, 12%, that the United States should do this, and 10%, that Ukraine itself should do this.

• Among those who previously had a job, 45% continue to work during the war, including 22% who are working as usual, 21% who are working part time or remotely, and 2% who even got a new job. 53% of the respondents who were employed before the war are currently unemployed. In the western regions, there is a bigger share of those who did not lose their jobs (47%). In the South, they comprise about 40%, and in the East, less than 25%. About half of the respondents who remained in their cities are employed. Among those who left their cities, about a third keep working, with 5% of them having already found a new job. There are also slightly more employees who work as usual among the senior workers; many of them may be working in the critical infrastructure.

• The economic situation of the families of 18% of the respondents did not change during the war. For 28%, it rather got worse, and for 52%, got definitely worse. The economic situation of the residents of the eastern regions, as well as of those who lost their jobs since the war started, has deteriorated the most. On the other hand, more than a quarter of retirees say their economic situation has not changed, probably because they continue to receive benefits from the government.

• In case they lose their source of income, 53% of the respondents have savings for several months or more: for 25%, their savings will be enough for up to 2 months, for 13%, up to three months, and for 15%, up to six months or more.

• 40% of the respondents have savings for less than a month, but this share is smaller compared to the quarantine crisis of 2020. Back then, the share of those who had limited savings was 55%. The younger respondents have bigger savings than the older ones. The situation is also better in the western and central oblasts, as the residents of the eastern and southern regions may have already lost their jobs and started spending their savings more intensively.

• One out of two respondents say they have a proactive position toward their own lives at the moment. One out of five say that their life position is neither active nor passive. A third of the respondents said that they have virtually no effect on their lives now. The younger respondents, men, and those who continue working have proactive attitude in their lives more often.

• 43% of the population feel aggressive at the moment, while 38% do not. The rest of the emotions are experienced by the minority of the respondents: 27% feel pessimistic, while 47% do not, and 31% feel despaired, while 53% do not. Only 17% say they feel apathetic, while 66% do not.

• Apathy, despair and pessimism are more pronounced among the residents of the East of Ukraine, while aggression, on the contrary, is more present in the Center and in the West. Women are more likely than men to experience negative emotions except aggression, which is more pronounced among men. In addition, senior respondents are experiencing negative emotions more at the moment.

• Those who lost their jobs during the war feel apathy, despair and pessimism more than those who continue working now.

• Also, those who believe they have no impact on anything at the moment experience more pronounced negative emotions than people with a proactive attitude.

• Interestingly, those whose homes have been damaged do not experience more negative emotions than others. But those who do not know what happened to their homes experience more pronounced of despair, apathy, and pessimism because of the uncertainty.

• Those who had to part with their family or partner due to the war, as well as those who communicate with their relatives and friends less frequently experience more negative emotions. 

• 44% of the respondents said they had to temporarily separate from their family or partner because of the war. The highest shares of such people are in the eastern and central regions and among young people.

• 19% of the respondents (adults) said they had to leave their city or village because of the war. The highest share of such respondents is in the East of Ukraine (35%). In the Center and South of Ukraine, one in five or six was forced to leave their place of residence, and in the West, almost one in ten. About a third of young respondents left their city or village.

• One out of four people who have left their homes do not know what is the condition of their house now. The houses of one in five such respondents are either destroyed or damaged. Nevertheless, 58% of those who left their homes said their homes are intact. 93% of those who left their homes want to return there. Only 5% said they did not intend to go back.

• 60% believe in God and do not doubt His existence. 14% believe in God, but have some doubts, while 17% do not believe in God, but believe in other higher powers. Only 6% identify themselves as total atheists. Compared to the pre-war period, the share of those who believe in God and do not doubt His existence has not changed. The highest level of religiosity is traditionally observed in the West of the country, among the elderly and among women.

• About half of the respondents intend either to travel around the country or to obtain additional education or new knowledge after the war. A third want to learn a new profession, a quarter want to start a business or to get a pet, and one in five are ready to change their job. At the same time, only 8% want to change their place of residence within Ukraine, and only 3% want to leave Ukraine.

• The respondents most often communicate with their family members and close ones (72%, constantly, and 18%, often). 48% constantly communicate with their friends, while 23% communicate with them often. 38% constantly talk to neighbors, and 17%, often. 28% communicate constantly with colleagues at work, and 16%, often. Interestingly, compared to the first lockdown in 2020, despite the difficult times, the respondents are much more active in communication with family and friends.

• The frequency of communication with relatives remains virtually the same regardless of the region and age. The residents of the East and the West as well as the youngest and the oldest ones speak with their friends slightly more often. The youngest respondents and those who have left their cities speak with their neighbors least often. 

• Compared to the pre-war times, the role of the TV, the groups and channels in messengers, the radio, as well as the one of relatives and friends as the sources of information about the events in Ukraine has increased. The TV is a source of information about the events in Ukraine for 62% of the respondents, internet sites, for 47%, groups and channels in messengers, for 42%, social networks, for 37%, relatives and acquaintances, for 28%, and regional television and radio, for 15% to 16%.

• The respondents in the West and in the Center of Ukraine use the TV and the radio more frequently. In the East, on the other hand, the frequency of hearing news from relatives and acquaintances has increased.

 • The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on March 18, 2022 shows that 77% of the respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction. Only 14% disagreed with this, and 10% could not make an assessment. The assessment of the direction as a positive one dominates in all the regions and among all the age groups.

• Belief in victory remains at its highest level: 93% of the respondents believe that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack. Confidence in victory prevails in all the regions of the country.

• Half (47%) of respondents hope that Ukraine will be able to win the war with Russia over the next few weeks. A quarter (23%) believe that the war will last several months. Only 12% think that the war will end in six months or more. There are almost no people who do not believe in victory at all. 17% were not able to answer this question.

• Inflation and rising prices (45%) as well as fuel shortages (38%) are the threats that Ukrainians believe are likely to arise over the next few months. Depreciation of the hryvnia and disruption of the sowing campaign are believed to be likely by no more than a quarter of respondents, and hunger, by 13%. The residents of the eastern regions are slightly more afraid of these threats than the residents of other macro regions.

• The vast majority of the respondents (82%) consider the threat of the country being split unlikely. This confidence has increased significantly due to the public cohesion during the war.

• According to Ukrainians, Poland, Lithuania, the United Kingdom and the United States are the friendliest countries to Ukraine today. The Czech Republic, Romania, Moldova, Slovakia, Turkey, France and Slovenia are also considered friendly. About half of the respondents consider Hungary, Georgia and Germany to be friendly countries, while a third of the respondents consider these countries neutral.

• China is now mostly considered by Ukrainians to be a neutral country. However, Russia (98%) and Belarus (84%) are seen by Ukrainians as hostile countries. Attitudes toward these countries have deteriorated significantly since they started the war against Ukraine. The attitude of Ukrainians towards China has also slightly deteriorated. Almost nothing has changed in regards to Germany, Hungary, and Georgia. The attitude to Turkey, France, Poland, Lithuania, the UK, the USA and Romania has improved.

• This change of attitudes has been accompanied by their regional consolidation. While previously, the attitudes of the residents of the East and South of Ukraine were more neutral towards the United States and other Western countries, now these countries are seen as friendly equally by the residents of all macro regions. The same applies to hostile countries: Russia and Belarus are considered hostile countries by the vast majority of Ukrainians, regardless of place of residence.

• 74% of the respondents support Zelenskyy's direct talks with Putin on ending the war, while a quarter of the respondents do not. There are slightly more supporters of the direct talks in the South and in the East of Ukraine, but in other regions they comprise the majority as well.

• At the same time, signing a temporary truce with Russia without withdrawing its troops from Ukraine is viewed as unacceptable by Ukrainians (89%).

• The support for the creation of a military and political union of Ukraine, Poland and the United Kingdom increased from 61% in January to 85%. Today, the support for such an alliance is higher than the support for Ukraine's membership in NATO (72%).

• 44% of the respondents believe that Ukraine should join NATO, while 42% believe that Ukraine should continue to cooperate with NATO, but should not become its member. More people support NATO cooperation outside of the Alliance than before the war, a figure that has increased at the expense of those who previously said there was no need to cooperate with NATO at all (currently it’s only 7%). Most proponents of Ukraine’s accession to NATO are in the West and Center of Ukraine. Those in the South and the East of Ukraine are more supportive of the cooperation with NATO outside of the membership.

• The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on March 12-13, 2022, shows that 76% of the respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction. This is the highest share in the history of our measurements. Only 15% disagreed with this and 10% could not to give their estimate. The assessment of the direction as the right one dominates in all the regions and among all the age groups.

• The self-esteem of Ukrainians significantly increased during the war. Now, most respondents see Ukraine either among the “leaders” (34%) or among the “average ones” (42%) compared to European countries, while as recently as two months ago, most placed Ukraine among the “outsiders”. At the same time, 63% see Ukraine as a “leader” among the countries of the former Soviet Union, while as recently as two months ago they saw the country mainly among the “average ones”.

• The vast majority of the respondents support the initiative to give cities the status of a hero city (93%) and rename the streets in honor of the Heroes who are currently defending Ukraine (92%). Maximum support for such an initiative is observed in all the regions of Ukraine. It presents a unique chance to create a new history through the new heroes who unite the nation.

• 56% of the respondents believe that the main goal of Russia's invasion is the complete destruction of the Ukrainian people, and this view dominates in all the regions of Ukraine. Another half believe that the target of the attack is the occupation of Ukraine and its annexation by Russia. Only 15% to 17% think that Russia is pursuing the goal of changing Ukraine's political course or preventing the deployment of NATO bases. 10% believe that Russia’s motive is the destruction of military infrastructure, while 5%, that it’s provoking NATO to a war. Those who believe that the Russian invasion was aimed at protecting Russian speakers comprise only 2%.

• The majority (64%) of the respondents consider looking for compromises at the negotiations that involve other countries as a real way to end the war. Almost a third of the respondents believe that Ukraine should withdraw from the negotiations and fight until the liberation of all its territories, while only 1% believe that Ukraine should agree to most of Russia’s demands. 

• Ukrainians are not ready to give up either the Crimea or Donbas: most believe that Ukraine should use all the opportunities to return the occupied territories of Donbas (86%) and the Crimea (80%). Residents of all the regions believe so, and this share is now higher than in the pre-war times.

• A half of the surveyed Ukrainians estimate the probability that Russia will carry out a military attack on one of the European countries as a high (25%) or medium (26%) one. Only 22% deny such a possibility at all: it is primarily elderly people.

• The support for Ukraine's accession to NATO has decreased slightly from a record 76% to 72% over the last two weeks. The main reason is the lack of the decision to close the sky over Ukraine, which almost 90% of Ukrainians demanded.